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Abstract 
 
Even in the absence of specific evidence it is surely unthinkable to imagine Napolean 
Bonaparte himself, when considering the potential benefits of invading England, failing to 
weigh against them the costs of building a tunnel under La Manche. In the light of the 
considerable literature of cost benefit analysis (CBA) and by gathering together several 
analyses that have been performed on the Channel Tunnel in more recent times, this thesis 
demonstrates that a comprehensive ‘big picture’ CBA framework is missing, and then 
provides one: a new methodology, represented in Data Flow Diagram (DFD) form, for the 
generalised cost benefit analysis of large infrastructure projects. 
 
Now, almost two hundred years after Napoleon’s death, the world spends nearly $40 
trillion (almost £24 trillion) on constructing and upgrading roads, railways, power plants 
and other infrastructures so as to keep up with demand. Such huge investments require 
realistic plans, clear deadlines and tight budgets for the best allocation of resources but cost 
overruns and delays are all too frequent. What exactly causes the cost overruns or delay is 
difficult to identify, but better planning and focus on the accuracy of the appraisal is one 
way to reduce the problems.  
 
The new model presented herein should prove useful in assisting decision-makers for all 
large infrastructure projects, and as a foundation for developing an appropriate decision 
making tool for different categories of projects too, based upon the experience of the 
VII 
 
Channel Tunnel. This, after all, was a project that the Government had financed through 
the private sector with high investment risks and significant degrees of uncertainty and had 
then put out for construction and operation in two different tenders. In spite of never being 
viable for the private sector, the Eurotunnel Company looks in a better shape now and the 
tunnel is working properly, but the construction cost and deadlines were clearly exceeded.  
 
 
  
VIII 
 
Table of Contents 
1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... - 2 - 
1.1 Background ............................................................................................................. - 2 - 
1.2 Aims and Objectives ............................................................................................... - 7 - 
1.3 Research Methodology ........................................................................................... - 7 - 
1.4 Layout of the Thesis ............................................................................................. - 10 - 
2 LITERATURE SURVEY............................................................................................ - 14 - 
2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... - 14 - 
2.2 Cost Benefit Analysis ........................................................................................... - 14 - 
2.3 Types of CBA ....................................................................................................... - 16 - 
2.4 Why Decisions Go Wrong .................................................................................... - 19 - 
2.5 Approach to Cost Benefit Analysis ...................................................................... - 22 - 
2.6 Surplus .................................................................................................................. - 24 - 
2.7 Discounting ........................................................................................................... - 25 - 
 NPV .......................................................................................................... - 25 - 2.7.1
 IRR ........................................................................................................... - 26 - 2.7.2
 BCR .......................................................................................................... - 27 - 2.7.3
2.8 CBA Tools ............................................................................................................ - 28 - 
2.9 Period of Analysis ................................................................................................. - 29 - 
2.10 Short Comings of CBA ......................................................................................... - 29 - 
2.11 CBA Framework ................................................................................................... - 30 - 
2.12 Selected Approaches to CBA ............................................................................... - 31 - 
2.13 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ - 33 - 
3 THE CHANNEL TUNNEL ........................................................................................ - 35 - 
3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... - 35 - 
3.2 History of the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL) ............................................... - 36 - 
3.3 Past Appraisals of the Channel Tunnel ................................................................. - 45 - 
 Proposals for a Fixed Channel Link (Ministry of Transport, 1963) ......... - 45 - 3.3.1
 The Channel Tunnel: A United Kingdom Transport Cost Benefit Study 3.3.2
(Coopers & Lybrand Associates Ltd., 1973) .......................................................... - 46 - 
IX 
 
 The Channel Tunnel and Alternative Cross-Channel Services (Channel 3.3.3
Tunnel Advisory Group, 1975) .............................................................................. - 47 - 
 Fixed Channel Link Report (UK/French Study Group, 1982) ................. - 47 - 3.3.4
 The Channel Tunnel; an Ex-Post Economic Evaluation (Anguera, 2006) - 49 - 3.3.5
3.4 Comparison ........................................................................................................... - 50 - 
3.5 Eurotunnel ............................................................................................................. - 52 - 
3.6 Construction .......................................................................................................... - 53 - 
3.7 Lifetime (Life Span) ............................................................................................. - 53 - 
3.8 Financing .............................................................................................................. - 54 - 
3.9 Capital Costs ......................................................................................................... - 57 - 
3.10 Why the forecast went wrong ............................................................................... - 58 - 
3.11 Operation .............................................................................................................. - 61 - 
 Eurostar ..................................................................................................... - 62 - 3.11.1
 Le Shuttle .................................................................................................. - 63 - 3.11.2
 Through Rail Freight Service ................................................................... - 64 - 3.11.3
 Europorte .................................................................................................. - 64 - 3.11.4
 Who uses the Tunnel?............................................................................... - 65 - 3.11.5
3.12 Operating Costs ..................................................................................................... - 65 - 
3.13 Total Cost .............................................................................................................. - 66 - 
3.14 Traffic and Demand .............................................................................................. - 67 - 
 Eurotunnel Passenger Service .................................................................. - 68 - 3.14.1
 Eurotunnel Freight Service ....................................................................... - 68 - 3.14.2
 Sea Traffic ................................................................................................ - 70 - 3.14.3
 Air Traffic ................................................................................................. - 70 - 3.14.4
 Forecasted Traffic ..................................................................................... - 71 - 3.14.5
3.15 Revenue ................................................................................................................ - 75 - 
3.16 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ - 77 - 
4 CHANNEL TUNNEL COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS ................................................ - 79 - 
4.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... - 79 - 
4.2 Inflation Adjustments ........................................................................................... - 79 - 
4.3 Period of the Project ............................................................................................. - 80 - 
4.4 Cost Benefit Model ............................................................................................... - 80 - 
4.5 Generated Traffic Calculation............................................................................... - 81 - 
 Generated Eurostar Passengers ................................................................. - 81 - 4.5.1
X 
 
 Generated Le Shuttle Passengers .............................................................. - 83 - 4.5.2
 Generated Le Shuttle Cars ........................................................................ - 84 - 4.5.3
 Generated Le Shuttle Coaches .................................................................. - 85 - 4.5.4
 Generated Le Shuttle Freight .................................................................... - 86 - 4.5.5
4.6 User Benefits ......................................................................................................... - 88 - 
 Time Savings ............................................................................................ - 88 - 4.6.1
 Fare Reductions’ Savings ......................................................................... - 98 - 4.6.2
 Producers’ Losses ................................................................................... - 105 - 4.6.3
 CO2 Emission Savings ............................................................................ - 105 - 4.6.4
 Total Users’ Benefits .............................................................................. - 111 - 4.6.5
4.7 Cost Benefit Analysis ......................................................................................... - 112 - 
 Cost Benefit until Now ........................................................................... - 113 - 4.7.1
 Payback Period ....................................................................................... - 114 - 4.7.2
 Net Present Value ................................................................................... - 116 - 4.7.3
 Internal Rate of Return ........................................................................... - 120 - 4.7.4
4.8 Ex post Financial Appraisal ................................................................................ - 123 - 
4.9 Subsidy Option ................................................................................................... - 124 - 
4.10 Comparison ......................................................................................................... - 126 - 
4.11 Sensitivity Analysis ............................................................................................ - 130 - 
 NPV-Discount Rate ................................................................................ - 130 - 4.11.1
 Capacity .................................................................................................. - 132 - 4.11.2
4.12 Summaries .......................................................................................................... - 135 - 
4.13 Conclusions ......................................................................................................... - 136 - 
5 TOWARDS BETTER COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS .............................................. - 139 - 
5.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... - 139 - 
5.2 Generalised CBA Process Model ....................................................................... - 140 - 
5.3 Stage 0 – Project Identification ........................................................................... - 142 - 
5.4 Stage 1 - Setting the Framework ......................................................................... - 142 - 
 Decide Perspective (1.1) - Whose Cost Benefit Analysis? .................... - 143 - 5.4.1
 Scoping Study (1.2) ................................................................................ - 144 - 5.4.2
 Choose Level of Detail (1.3) .................................................................. - 144 - 5.4.3
 Choose Tool(s) (1.4) ............................................................................... - 145 - 5.4.4
5.5 Stage 2 - Technical Analysis .............................................................................. - 145 - 
 Catalogue Impacts (2.1) .......................................................................... - 146 - 5.5.1
 Forecasting (2.2) ..................................................................................... - 147 - 5.5.2
XI 
 
 Analysis of the Benefits (2.3) ................................................................. - 148 - 5.5.3
5.6 Stage 3 - Economic Evaluation ........................................................................... - 148 - 
 Monetisation (3.1) - or Quantifying ....................................................... - 149 - 5.6.1
 Discounting (3.2) .................................................................................... - 150 - 5.6.2
 Cost Benefit Analysis (3.3) .................................................................... - 150 - 5.6.3
5.7 Stage 4 - Evaluation of Results ........................................................................... - 154 - 
 Sensitivity Analysis (4.1) ....................................................................... - 155 - 5.7.1
 Assessment of Alternatives (4.2) ............................................................ - 156 - 5.7.2
5.8 Stage 5 - Decision Making .................................................................................. - 156 - 
5.9 Conclusions ......................................................................................................... - 157 - 
6 CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................................... - 159 - 
6.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... - 159 - 
6.2 Research Conclusions ......................................................................................... - 159 - 
6.3 Recommendation for High Speed 2 .................................................................... - 164 - 
6.4 Contribution to Knowledge ................................................................................ - 165 - 
6.5 Future Work ........................................................................................................ - 167 - 
REFERENCES .................................................................................................................. - 169 - 
APPENDIX A: Journey Time ........................................................................................... - 180 - 
APPENDIX B: Passenger Travel Time Saving Calculation ............................................. - 181 - 
APPENDIX C: Freight Travel Time Saving Calculation .................................................. - 183 - 
APPENDIX D: Passenger User Benefit from Fare Reduction Calculation ...................... - 184 - 
APPENDIX E: Freight User Benefit from Fare Reduction Calculation ........................... - 185 - 
APPENDIX F: Passenger Producers’ Loss Calculation .................................................... - 186 - 
APPENDIX G: Freight Producers’ Loss Calculation ....................................................... - 187 - 
APPENDIX H: CO2 Emissions Saving Result .................................................................. - 188 - 
APPENDIX I: Cost Benefit Analysis (Short Term, 3.5% Discount Rate, £Million) ........ - 189 - 
APPENDIX J: Cost Benefit Analysis (Long Term, 3.5% Discount Rate, £Million) ........ - 191 - 
 
XII 
 
Table of Figures 
 
Figure 1:  Infrastructure projects in low and middle income countries by primary sector (PIPD) - 3 - 
Figure 2: Examples of models with degree of quantification versus level of richness ................ - 23 - 
Figure 3 : Standard Supply/Demand curve to calculate surplus................................................... - 25 - 
Figure 4 : Cartoon of 1802 tunnel designed by Albert Mathieu Favier (Unmuseum website) .... - 36 - 
Figure 5 : A political cartoon showing a French invasion using balloons, boats and a tunnel. Fear of 
this caused the British to cancel the project. This cartoon was drawn in 1804, after the resumption 
of war between England and France in 1803 (Science Photo). .................................................... - 37 - 
Figure 6 : CTG/FM option with two bored rail tunnel and a service tunnel ................................ - 41 - 
Figure 7 : Europont included a rail tunnel and 12-lane motorway within a vast tube suspended from 
half kilometre spans by Kevlar cables. ......................................................................................... - 42 - 
Figure 8 : Artificial Island connected by an underwater Tunnel .................................................. - 42 - 
Figure 9 : Bridge towards one of the Artificial Islands ................................................................ - 42 - 
Figure 10 : French President François Mitterrand (L) and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
(R) sign, 12 February 1986, in Canterbury Cathedral, the Canterbury treaty between France and 
Britain on the construction of a double rail tunnel under the English Channel ........................... - 43 - 
Figure 11 : Official opening by Queen Elizabeth II and French President François Mitterrand on 
6th may 1994 ................................................................................................................................ - 44 - 
Figure 12 : Eurotunnel share price from the start of construction until 1995 (Flyvbjerg) ........... - 56 - 
Figure 13 : Forecasted and actual capital cost of the tunnel ........................................................ - 59 - 
Figure 14 : Channel Tunnel Map of Destination (Eurotunnel) .................................................... - 62 - 
Figure 15 : Who uses the tunnel? (Picture Reference : 2012 Annual Review, 2013, p 8) ........... - 65 - 
Figure 16 : Operating Costs ......................................................................................................... - 66 - 
Figure 17 : Total Costs ................................................................................................................. - 67 - 
Figure 18 : Eurotunnel Passenger Service traffic ......................................................................... - 68 - 
Figure 19 : Eurotunnel Freight Service traffic ............................................................................. - 69 - 
Figure 20 : Sea Traffic ................................................................................................................. - 70 - 
Figure 21 : Air Traffic .................................................................................................................. - 71 - 
Figure 22 : Total cross channel passenger market ....................................................................... - 72 - 
Figure 23 : Tunnel passenger market ........................................................................................... - 72 - 
XIII 
 
Figure 24 : Tunnel tonnage freight market ................................................................................... - 74 - 
Figure 25 : Eurotunnel Revenue ................................................................................................... - 75 - 
Figure 26 : Forecasted and actual Revenue .................................................................................. - 76 - 
Figure 27 : Different Stages Considered in Conducting the CBA ............................................... - 80 - 
Figure 28 : Generated Eurostar Passengers .................................................................................. - 82 - 
Figure 29 : Generated Le Shuttle Passengers ............................................................................... - 83 - 
Figure 30 : Generated Le Shuttle Cars ......................................................................................... - 84 - 
Figure 31 : Generated Le Shuttle Coaches ................................................................................... - 85 - 
Figure 32 : Generated Le Shuttle Freight ..................................................................................... - 86 - 
Figure 33 : Eurotunnel Generated Passengers .............................................................................. - 93 - 
Figure 34 : Passenger Time Saving .............................................................................................. - 95 - 
Figure 35 : Eurotunnel Generated Freight .................................................................................... - 96 - 
Figure 36 : Freight Time Saving .................................................................................................. - 97 - 
Figure 37 : Total Time Saving ..................................................................................................... - 98 - 
Figure 38 : Surplus Calculation .................................................................................................... - 99 - 
Figure 39 : Average Tunnel/Ferry Fare per vehicle ................................................................... - 101 - 
Figure 40 : Total Passenger User Benefit ................................................................................... - 102 - 
Figure 41 : Total Freight User Benefit ....................................................................................... - 104 - 
Figure 42 : Total Producers’ Losses ........................................................................................... - 105 - 
Figure 43 : Air/Eurostar CO2 Emissions Calculation ................................................................. - 107 - 
Figure 44 : Ferry/Shuttle Passenger CO2 Emissions Calculation ............................................... - 108 - 
Figure 45 : Ferry/Shuttle Freight CO2 Emissions Calculation .................................................. - 109 - 
Figure 46 : Emissions Saving Comparison ................................................................................ - 110 - 
Figure 47 : Comparison of CO2 Emissions by Competitors ...................................................... - 110 - 
Figure 48 : CO2 Emissions Savings by Tunnel ......................................................................... - 111 - 
Figure 49 : Total Users’ Benefits ............................................................................................... - 112 - 
Figure 50 : Cost Benefit until Now ............................................................................................ - 113 - 
Figure 51 : Tunnel Benefits in 3 Perspectives ............................................................................ - 115 - 
Figure 52 : Payback Period Calculation ..................................................................................... - 115 - 
Figure 53 : Payback Period Calculation with Forecasts ............................................................. - 116 - 
Figure 54 : NPV until 2012 ........................................................................................................ - 118 - 
XIV 
 
Figure 55 : NPV until the end of the contract ............................................................................ - 119 - 
Figure 56 : IRR until the end of the contract .............................................................................. - 121 - 
Figure 57 : Ex Post Financial Appraisal NPV ............................................................................ - 123 - 
Figure 58 : Ex post Financial Appraisal IRR ............................................................................. - 124 - 
Figure 59 : Subsidy Option NPV ............................................................................................... - 125 - 
Figure 60 : Subsidy Option IRR ................................................................................................. - 126 - 
Figure 61 : Sensitivity Analysis on Discount rate ...................................................................... - 131 - 
Figure 62 : Capacity Calculations .............................................................................................. - 134 - 
Figure 63 : Generalised CBA Process Flowchart ....................................................................... - 141 - 
Figure 64 : Stage 1 - Setting the Framework.............................................................................. - 143 - 
Figure 65 : Stage 2 - Technical Analysis ................................................................................... - 146 - 
Figure 66 : Stage 3 - Economic Evaluation ................................................................................ - 149 - 
Figure 67 : Stage 4 - Evaluation of Results ................................................................................ - 154 - 
 
  
XV 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table 1: Some famous examples of cost overruns in large transport projects (Flyvbjerg, 2003) .. - 4 - 
Table 2: Types of CBA (Boardman et al., 2001 and Anguera, 2006 and Li et al, 2010) ............. - 18 - 
Table 3 : Examples of simple measures and complex decision making tools (Fülöp, 2005 ) ...... - 28 - 
Table 4 : Selected Approaches to CBA ........................................................................................ - 32 - 
Table 5 : Percentage of growth rate and traffic in C&L study ..................................................... - 46 - 
Table 6 : Detailed comparison of the older studies ...................................................................... - 51 - 
Table 7 : Channel Tunnel Equity ................................................................................................. - 55 - 
Table 8 : Forecasted and actual capital cost of the tunnel (£M) ................................................... - 57 - 
Table 9 : Investments of British Rail related to the Channel Tunnel (Gourvish, 2006, p324) ..... - 58 - 
Table 10 : Value of time per person ............................................................................................. - 89 - 
Table 11 : Freight value of time ................................................................................................... - 90 - 
Table 12 : Calculated Value of Time ........................................................................................... - 91 - 
Table 13 : Journey Time Calculation ........................................................................................... - 92 - 
Table 14 : Passenger Time Saving Formulas ............................................................................... - 94 - 
Table 15 : Freight Time Saving Formulas.................................................................................... - 97 - 
Table 16 : NPV until 2012 ......................................................................................................... - 117 - 
Table 17 : NPV until the end of the contract .............................................................................. - 120 - 
Table 18 : IRR Results ............................................................................................................... - 122 - 
Table 19 : Comparison with other studies .................................................................................. - 128 - 
Table 20 : NPV/IRR Comparison with other studies ................................................................. - 129 - 
Table 21 : Discount Rate Sensitivity Analysis Result ................................................................ - 132 - 
 
 
 
 - 1 - 
 
 
 
Chapter 1  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 - 2 - 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
The American Heritage Dictionary states that “The term infrastructure has been used since 
1927 to refer collectively to the roads, bridges, rail lines, and similar public works that are 
required for an industrial economy, or a portion of it, to function. The term also has had 
specific application to the permanent military installations necessary for the defence of a 
country. Perhaps because of the word's technical sound, people now use infrastructure to 
refer to any substructure or underlying system.” (The American Heritage® Dictionary of 
the English Language, 2009) 
 
Richard Threlfall, the UK Head of Infrastructure in 2010 said that “the need for 
infrastructure development is one of the great global challenges of our time.” Failure to 
invest is equal to failure to grow and failure to improve socially and economically. Some 
Specialist’s assessment is that nearly $40 trillion (almost £24 trillion) is required 
worldwide to construct or upgrade roads, railways, power plants and other infrastructures 
so as to keep up with demand. As stated by the Treasury, the UK infrastructure’s spending 
could require £40bn to £50bn each year up to 2030 (Threlfall, 2010). Investment in 
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infrastructure is crucial for the modern economy. Infrastructure investment will simply 
boost economic development if it is distributed to high value plans and they are built in a 
cost effective way. Most of the infrastructures in the USA are provided by the private 
companies. As stated by national income accounts data in 2012 gross fixed private 
investment was $2 trillion. Total federal, state and local government infrastructure 
investment in 2012 was $472 billion (Edward, 2013). The following graph from the Private 
Infrastructure Projects Database (PIPD) of World Bank shows trends of investment in 
infrastructure projects in low and middle income countries by primary sector (PPID, 2013). 
The graph shows the increase of investment in infrastructure projects from 1990 to 2012. 
As the investment and number of projects grow the importance of the plan and risk of the 
project will increase.  
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Figure 1:  Infrastructure projects in low and middle income countries by primary sector (PIPD)  
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In terms of size, a large infrastructure project means a cost per project from hundreds of 
million to several billion dollars (Flyvbjerg and Cowi, 2004). Such huge investments 
should have a plan, deadline and tight budget to use the best allocation of resources; but 
with years of practise, trial and error methods and learning, there is still a long way to 
perfection. Unfortunately cost overruns and delays are habits in mega projects’ setup. In 
the past there have been a vast number of projects with cost overruns and delays, all for 
different reasons. What exactly causes the cost overruns or delay is difficult to forecast, but 
better planning and focus on the decency of the appraisal is the way to reduce the problems 
(Flyvbjerg et al, 2005). Some famous examples of cost overruns in large transport projects 
have been gathered by Flyvbjerg (2003) and can be seen in Table 1 below. 
 
Project Cost Overrun (%) 
Boston’s artery/tunnel project  196 
Humber Bridge, UK  175 
Boston-Washington-New York rail, USA  130 
Great Belt rail tunnel, Denmark 110 
A6 Motorway Chapel-en-le-Frith/Whaley bypass, UK  100 
Shinkansen Joetsu rail line, Japan  100 
Washington metro, USA  85 
Channel Tunnel, UK, France 80 
Karlsruhe-Bretten light rail, Germany  80 
Öresund access links, Denmark  70 
Mexico City metro line  60 
Paris-Auber-Nanterre rail line  60 
Tyne and Wear metro, UK  55 
Great Belt link, Denmark  54 
Öresund coast-to-coast link, Denmark/Sweden  26 
 
 
Table 1: Some famous examples of cost overruns in large transport projects (Flyvbjerg, 2003)    
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Transport, as an example of large infrastructure projects, is costly and frequently faces 
large cost overruns. Work can be more expensive than in the original primary calculation; 
therefore extra budget is needed. This will cause other problems such as delay and the 
project might stop for long time to get the extra budget approval (Flyvbjerg et al 2005). 
Accordingly the budget cannot afford the other projects because the overall budget for 
infrastructure is fixed and tight in general. Consequently it will not only damage the 
project under consideration, but also other planned project as well (Cantarelli et al., 2012). 
This problematic situation is even more alarming seeing that the “cost escalation has not 
decreased over the past 70 years.” (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003) This can affect the whole 
country or region if the cost escalation goes out of hand. Examples of the Suez Canal 
(1900%) and Sydney Opera House (1400%) show how much cost overruns can damage an 
economy (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). Large infrastructure projects have special characteristics 
that the planner should take into account (Flyvbjerg and Cowi, 2004): 
 
• These projects are naturally risky because of long term planning and complex 
boundaries, 
• Decision making and planning of such projects are related to different sections with 
conflicting interests, 
• The scope or motivation level might change a lot over time, 
• Statistical calculations demonstrate that unexpected events are mostly not 
considered in budget planning, 
• Therefore misinformation of costs, benefit and risk is happening all the time. 
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The outcome is cost overruns and/or benefit shortages with most of the projects. These vast 
amounts of investments and the problematic history of this category proves that there is a 
need to have a direct path that everyone can learn from, use, understand and be able to 
compare their results together. A method called cost benefit analysis (CBA) has been used 
for decades. It has advantages and shortcomings that will be explained in this thesis. 
Although it has been used for many years there is still no comprehensive framework that 
all can use for planning and decision making. There are various examples of using CBA in 
financial regulation (Cochrane, 2004), crime prevention (Dossetor, 2011), healthcare 
benefits (Eichler, 2004), cloud computing (Konodo et al., 2009). 
 
In a way that no study to date has done, this thesis introduces a generalised CBA process 
model for large infrastructure projects, taking into account that any such model must be 
based on actual experience from real projects. The purpose is to guarantee a realistic 
consideration of the problems and difficulties as well as suggestions that are practically 
required and possible to implement in a real situation.  
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1.2 Aims and Objectives 
 
The aim of this thesis is to produce a generalized cost benefit analysis model for large 
infrastructure projects based on the channel tunnel case study and the objectives are: 
 
1. Review the use of established concept for cost benefit analysis. 
2. Determine whether the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL) was justified; was it really 
on time and on budget; did it deliver the fare reductions and travel time savings? 
3. Present an improved methodology/framework for cost benefit analysis including 
hitherto neglected items.  
 
1.3 Research Methodology  
 
Whatever the answers to the second objective above, it was realised that there would then 
be further questions about the extent to which they could be generalised, whether to other 
tunnelling projects, other infrastructure projects or even any other projects in any sphere of 
human activity. In some senses the Channel Tunnel was atypical, it being the largest such 
project of its time, funded by private investors and involving international collaboration; 
furthermore there was considerable uncertainty about the costs, what demand might be 
realised and how its competitors might react. In others though, the Tunnel was ideal: most 
importantly there been a handful of reasonably independent studies conducted at different 
times, by different people and using different methods. It was envisaged that the thesis 
would be predominantly quantitative and, unlike in so many other cases where the data and 
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calculations are veiled in commercial confidentiality, availability of detailed information 
from the public domain would be guaranteed. This was essential in that the research was 
intended to expose the single “truth” of the matter i.e. a set of measurable dimensions of 
the Channel Tunnel project’s costs and benefits that could be quantitatively and 
independently calculated using exact quantitative approaches and frameworks (Creswell, 
2003).  
 
Central to the research would thus be to establish the quantitative nature of the 
relationships between the costs and the benefits of large infrastructure projects using Cost 
Benefit Analysis. Proof has been found from the literature on related studies about the use 
of such an approach (see Ministry of Transport, 1963; Coopers & Lybrand Associates Ltd., 
1973; Channel Tunnel Advisory Group, 1975; UK/French Study Group, 1982 and 
Anguera, 2006).The basics of a qualitative method were also combined to deliver further 
insight into the costs and Benefit of the Channel Tunnel and benefits of the project.  
 
The study started with a literature review, which illustrates an opportunity to improve a 
suitable theoretical approach for the study and a generalised CBA process model for all 
large infrastructure projects.  
 
Then the introduction of the CBA case study for the Channel Tunnel project has been 
studied. The information such as the history of the project in terms of reasons that led to 
the construction of the project, Past appraisals of the project, comparison of them together 
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and information about the construction, finance and capital cost of the project, the current 
operation data and the procedure for collecting data is discussed.  
 
Afterward a complete research strategy adopted for the case study is given. Further 
assessment to categorize differences in the costs and benefits of the Channel Tunnel 
throughout different categories, the calculation of generated traffic, user benefit, 
comparisons with old studies, payback period, net present value, internal rate of return, 
sensitivity analysis and capacity of the tunnel is studied.  
 
In order to examine costs and benefits, it is required to have a theoretical and generalised 
model that brings together, in a logical routine, all the crucial features to be considered; 
and offers proper parameters and ideas of reference for the analysis. Therefore the next 
section addresses the development of a generalised CBA framework of any large 
infrastructure project. This supports the identification of proper theories, data collection 
and a former CBA case study of the Channel Tunnel. The suggested DFD framework is a 
base for all inclusive Cost Benefit Analysis of any project based on the experiment on the 
Channel Tunnel case study. The consideration for the flow chart looks at the big picture 
and making CBA, a step by step procedure. The new perspective for applying the IRR is 
recommended later on. 
 
 
 
 - 10 - 
 
1.4 Layout of the Thesis 
 
This thesis contains six chapters including the introduction and conclusion. Chapter 1 is the 
introduction and outlines the background within which this research has been carried out 
and the validation for the study; and then points out the aims and objectives. The key 
research questions have been discussed and the research methodology to address these 
questions has been explained. The reason for choosing the Channel Tunnel project asa case 
study is also covered. 
 
Chapter 2 illustrates a review of the literature focusing on the current methods and process 
of cost benefit analysis and comparison of different models and methods. The chapter hints 
about the practice of CBA and how it has developed within its theoretical foundations. 
Additionally it will be discussed why most of the projects have cost overruns and delays. It 
will be shown why there is a need for a new comprehensive framework for cost benefit 
appraisals. It then shows how this method is modifiable for application in large 
infrastructure projects. 
 
Chapter 3 is the introduction of the CBA case study for the Channel Tunnel project. This 
chapter will demonstrate the history of the project in terms of reasons that led to the 
construction of the project. Past appraisals of the project, comparison of them and 
information about the construction, finance and capital cost of the project will be discussed 
afterwards. In addition, the current operation of the Eurotunnel Company and all the 
required background data to conduct the CBA for the project is demonstrated. Opinions are 
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shown modifying this choice of method and the explicit study approaches applied for 
collection of data. The procedure for collecting the data is explained in this chapter. 
 
Chapter 4 presents the data analysis section. A complete research strategy adopted for the 
case study is given. The chapter also presents a study of the data on costs and benefits of 
the Channel Tunnel case. Further assessment to categorize differences in the costs and 
benefits of the Channel Tunnel throughout different categories is also offered. This chapter 
will go through the calculation of generated traffic, user benefit, comparisons to old 
studies, payback period, net present value, internal rate of return, sensitivity analysis and 
capacity of the tunnel. It also completes with thoughts on the findings and the 
recommended suggestions. 
 
In order to examine costs and benefits, it is required to have a theoretical and generalised 
model that brings together, in a logical routine, all the crucial features to be considered; 
and offers proper parameters and ideas of reference for the analysis. In Chapter 5 the 
discussion addresses the development of a generalised CBA framework of any large 
infrastructure project. This supports the identification of proper theories, data collection 
and a former CBA case study of the Channel Tunnel. This chapter is dedicated entirely to 
the development of the practical model concerning the costs of the infrastructure and the 
benefits accruing from such costs. Although there are lots of cost benefit research and 
publications in the literature review; a comprehensive big picture framework is missing. 
The suggested DFD framework is a base for all inclusive Cost Benefit Analysis of any 
project based on the experiment on the Channel Tunnel case study. The consideration for 
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the flow chart looks at the big picture and making CBA, a step by step procedure. The new 
perspective for applying the IRR is recommended in this chapter as well. 
 
Chapter 6 goes through the conclusions and recommendations drawn from the whole 
study. The objectives and research questions are reviewed and highlighted. The main 
conclusions from the research for the Channel Tunnel case study, generalised cost benefit 
analysis model and future areas of research are also presented. Recommendation of 
analysis for the new UK high speed 2 rails is provided as well.  
 
Finally, the references show the details of the literature used in this thesis and the 
appendices are an enhancement of some sections providing more detail.  
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Chapter 2 
 
LITERATURE SURVEY 
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2 LITERATURE SURVEY 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will explain about the current methods and process of cost benefit analysis 
and provides a comparison of different models and methods. Additionally the reason why 
most projects have cost overruns and delays will be discussed. It will be explained why 
there is need for a new comprehensive framework for cost benefit appraisals. 
 
2.2 Cost Benefit Analysis 
 
In life everybody should decide between choices. Business analysts’, investors’ and 
governments’ decisions are more important because of the scale and impact of their 
choices. They regularly study diverse means to develop performance and outcomes. 
“Sometimes, the “means” are alternative project approaches; sometimes, the means are 
acquisition of competing products or services” (RMS, n.d.). The most difficult aspect each 
time is the response to the questions: “What is the best option?”, “Should you undertake 
this project?” or “When a project should start?”. The cost benefit analysis will help to find 
the answer. 
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Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) definition is “Process of quantifying costs and benefits of 
a decision, programme, or project (over a certain period), and those of its alternatives 
(within the same period), in order to have a single scale of comparison for 
unbiased evaluation” (Business Dictionary). Harberger and Jenkins’ (2002) definition of 
CBA is a set of tools for guiding judgments on whether or not to take a specific course of 
action. Another definition says that CBA is a methodology of valuing costs and benefits 
that allows comprehensive comparisons to be made and recommends benefits and costs for 
consideration, measurements and approaches for combining them together (Pearce, 1988 
and Snell, 1997 and Preez, 2004). Carcoba (2004) defined CBA as a method designed to 
calculate the viability of a plan by quantifying the costs and benefits which are to be used 
to assess the social costs and benefits of an investment. Watkins’ (2006) definition is the 
course of weighing the entire anticipated costs against the entire anticipated benefits of one 
or more activities, so as to select the best or most profitable. CBA is mostly used for the 
comparison of projects i.e. if a project pays a net economic profit to the public welfare. It is 
intended to carry enough information to decision makers, to see if the plan can make 
society better off than the status quo. It has been used either for a yes or no conclusion on 
whether a course of action is going to be undertaken. Also it has been used to pick among 
two or more opposite courses of actions (Harberger and Jenkins, 2002). CBA is a method 
of “assessing the economic worth of an investment, which is judged over its life-time using 
the discounted values of all current and future flows of costs and benefits associated with 
the project” (DFID, 2004). It means that all impacts of the process will be calculated by an 
economic view. CBA will usually pay attention to economic benefits that can be translated 
as a monetary value. Therefore, the non-quantifiable benefits and costs are regularly 
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denoted as social and/or environmental benefits and costs. The separation among 
economic, social and environmental impacts is often not obvious. In a practical sense, the 
benefits and costs of a plan are usually narrowed down to a chain of unconnected 
categories that can be calculated in monetary values. Additionally non-quantifiable impacts 
can be weighed in qualified terms. In this situation the CBA can be improved to use more 
complex “ranking methods”. Various environmental impacts can be assessed and in 
numerous circumstances, for roads or railways, they must be considered to meet strict 
environmental standards. On the other hand, the understanding of the ‘social’ impacts are 
less clear cut, and therefore slight or no consideration has been given to this type (A Guide 
to Pro-poor Transport Appraisal, 2004). In addition, CBA should be comprehensive but 
simple. Manteiga & Sunyer (2000), with their experiences in the improvement of 
environmental assessment methodologies, concluded that “to achieve the main evaluation 
objectives a much more simple methodology was needed”. While the simplicity is 
important, the new CBA method should still be comprehensive (Brooks and Tobias, 1996). 
 
2.3 Types of CBA  
 
There are three types (or class) of CBA in the literature: ex-ante, in medias res and ex-post. 
ex-ante is the most common method which takes place before the project and at the time of 
the project’s consideration. Forecasts have a big impact for this type of CBA. In medias res 
happens during the project and helps to modify the ex-ante analysis to help the further 
decisions. Ex-post will be conducted at the end of each project. The ex-post works as a 
learning device for the decision makers as it can measure the effectiveness of the CBA 
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calculations (Boardman et al, 2001). “Ex-post evaluation aims to compare the plan and the 
actual results, to analyse the reason for any differences, and to draw out lessons learned, 
which contribute to holding smooth evaluations in future” (Li et al, 2010, pp 3). 
 
In addition, some literature (Boardman et al, 2001) mentions a comparison of all CBA’s 
after the project is finished and includes it as the fourth option. This thesis assumes the 
comparison as a part of ex-post, to calculate the effectiveness of the first two types’ effects 
with the ex-post result. Table 2 compares all types of CBA in different aspects for transport 
projects. As can be seen in the table, everything is changeable “ex-ante” but it is hard to 
change most of the things “in medias res” and impossible “ex-post”. On the other hand the 
learning factor is the main point of “ex post”, a minor one for “in medias res” and 
impossible “ex ante”. 
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 Ex-Ante In Medias Res Ex Post 
Resource Allocation Helps to select best project If low sunk costs, can still shift resources Too late, project is over 
Traffic Forecast based on other 
competitors’ work or estimate of 
market 
Forecast based on actual values from the start of 
project 
Actual values after the project 
finished 
Price, Revenue, Costs, 
Benefits 
Forecasts based on forecasted 
traffic and forecast willingness to 
pay by consumer 
Forecast based on actual data gathered from the 
start of the project and reaction of market. 
Therefore the result is more reliable and accurate 
and errors are less. 
Actual values after the project 
finished 
Ability to Make a 
Change 
Yes - Every change is possible 
because the project is not started 
yet 
Yes but limited - Change is limited because the 
project is in operation but PM will be able to 
have actual calculation about the situation and 
decide to proceed to the original plan or change. 
No - The project life time is finished 
Learning about Actual 
Value of the Project 
Poor estimate - high uncertainty 
about future of cost and benefits 
Better estimate - learn from errors in the ex-ante 
CBA to prevent them happening again during 
the life time of the project 
Excellent - Provides information 
about errors and the accuracy of 
both ex ante and in medias res CBA 
Table 2: Types of CBA (Boardman et al., 2001 and Anguera, 2006 and Li et al, 2010) 
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2.4 Why Decisions Go Wrong 
 
Funnily enough Murphy's Law (Anything that can go wrong will go wrong) does apply to 
large projects. There is even some research that proves “whatever can go wrong will” 
unless there is a way to prevent it (Warnera & McCarthy, 2013).  
 
Cost overruns and delays are one of the major risks of big projects According to Flyvbjerg 
et al. (2002) study of 258 cases. In the study the average cost of overruns for railway 
projects was 45%; for bridges and tunnel projects it was 34% and for roads was 20%. The 
overruns happened in 5 continents and 20 countries. Although each type should be treated 
separately, because of the difference in their overrun percentages, they still create major 
problems for planning such projects (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002). The problems which occur 
because of these cost overruns are: 
 
 Inefficient allocation of resources (waste) 
 Delays and further cost overruns because of the above 
 Destabilizing the policy, planning, implementation and operation of projects. 
 
A project gets bigger and therefore the problems get bigger (Flyvbjerg et al, 2003). 
Flyvbjerg (2005) explains two reasons for failures in financial appraisals. The first is the 
wrong forecast of cost, benefits and risks by promoters and planners; and the second is the 
optimistic forecasts for a project to get approval. He recommends finding a better 
methodology for appraising the project to avoid the forecasting mistake of the first 
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problem. In addition, he indicates that the second problem is hardest to solve and the 
solution is to “improve incentive structures, with the latter being the more important.” This 
will lead to underestimating the costs and overestimating the benefits in order to get 
permission to start the project. 
 
𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙 
 
 
 
Using this formula means showing the project at its best on paper and not in reality. This 
will cause the selection of the “unfittest” project that will produce the most problems and 
inaccuracy (Flyvbjerg, 2005). 
 
This thesis is focused on solving the first issue, as the second issue is usually happening in 
the policy makers divisions. Flyvbjerg and Cowi (2004) showed different examples of how 
planners “intentionally” choose the optimistic view to get the approval and explained 
briefly on how to solve this problem. 
 
Priemus et al. (2008) categorized the problems that prevent the implementation of 
megaprojects from being successful into two types of “pitfalls” i.e. ones that are: 
 
  “Unmanageable in terms of time or money”: there are many reasons for this such 
as technical complexities like uncertainties and social complexities like 
disagreement between the parties involved on design, cost, etc. 
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  “Impoverished as to its substance”: the project not being “sufficiently future 
oriented and to prevent unmanageability it has too little ambition.”  
 
They recommend the following three possible explanations for these: 
 
1. Inaccuracies in the decision-making process leading to pitfalls such as wrong cost 
estimations 
2. The nature of the project such as differences between the completeness of 
technology for different project that lead to more or less uncertainty. 
3. The implementation of the project such as projects facing little opposition being 
quicker to implement than ones facing more. (Priemus et al., 2008) 
 
Short and Kopp’s (2005) study of mega-projects identified 6 main improvements for better 
investment decision making: 
 
1. Better data collection for policy and research 
2. More in depth analysis of investment allocations between different modes 
3. Increasing transparency of national investment planning 
4. Better analysis and clearer understanding of where international planning may 
apply 
5. Improving the strategic appraisal from a neutral perspective including ex-ante and 
ex-post 
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6. Research into planning and decision-making processes in order to improve the 
value of investment to society 
 
This thesis will focus on the 5
th
 of these items. 
 
2.5 Approach to Cost Benefit Analysis 
 
The important aspect of CBA is the identification and calculation of all relevant costs and 
benefits related to the suggested project (Briscoe, 1993). Brent’s (2003) definition of cost 
is everything that imparts a loss and a benefit is any gain to an individual. Lindqvist and 
Lindholmn (2001) defined costs as the values of the actual used resources. These resources 
should be used in the best possible way to avoid waste. In order to achieve the Pareto 
optimality or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency in decision making, the ideal decision models should 
have the best degree of quantification as well as level of richness (Barr, 2012 and 
Scitovsky, 1941). The level of richness is the extent to which factors are included. 
Therefore effective choices have to be made - and usually they are made implicitly - about 
the appropriate level of detail to employ. For example, in discrete simulation, it is more or 
less at one extreme of the full range of modelling approaches actually available within 
management science. It is characterised by high levels of quantification being applied to a 
small set of supposedly pertinent features and (without much formal justification) to the 
neglect of everything else. Discrete models typically have high levels of detail but low 
richness (Figure 2). Of course predictions can be horribly wrong if anything important is 
omitted (Tobias, 2014). 
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Examples of models with a high degree of quantification are models that use only simple 
quantified investment appraisal tools such as payback period, NPV and IRR. Examples of 
models with a good level of richness but not enough quantification use the management 
insight and expert’s managerial instinct. Complex tools try to get the best out of both the 
richness and quantification to achieve the Pareto efficiency. Achieving the Pareto 
efficiency means the best allocation of resources in decision making and avoids waste 
(Flyvbjerg et al, 2005). 
 
 
 
In order to discuss CBA some basic definitions should be explained. Willingness and 
capability of a user to buy a product or service under certain conditions is called demand. 
Demand figures have been used to evaluate behaviours in competitive markets. Sometimes 
a Supply figure has been added as well to evaluate the equilibrium price. The equilibrium 
Figure 2: Examples of models with degree of quantification versus level of richness 
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price is the price that suppliers are willing to sell at for a product or service which matches 
the price the consumers are willing to pay (Brent, 2006). In cost and benefit calculations, 
the analyst should “consider all costs and benefits to society as a whole”. The net benefit of 
society (NSB) equals the total society benefit (B) minus total social costs (C) (Boardman, 
2006). 
 
𝑁𝑆𝐵 = 𝐵 − 𝐶 
 
2.6 Surplus 
 
The highest price that the consumer is happy to pay for a service or product is the willing 
to pay price. Therefore, the difference of actual price, up to the willing to pay price, is the 
consumers’ benefit. As this price is different for different consumers, the equilibrium price 
will be calculated as mentioned previously to maximise the suppliers’ benefit. The 
monetary gain for the consumers who pay less than their willing to pay price is the 
consumer surplus. The monetary gain by selling at the actual price (or market price), 
which is more than the minimum price at which they would be willing to sell is the 
producer surplus (Brent, 2006 and Boardman et al, 2001). The Figure 3 shows the 
consumer and producer surpluses in a supply demand figure example. 
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2.7 Discounting 
 
There is one problem of adding all benefits and costs together. The value of money is 
different for different years. CBA must take into account the sum of benefits and costs of a 
project for different years over a period of time. All the forthcoming benefits and costs 
must be discounted relative to the present value. Different methods use different tools in 
order to have the same scale for comparison. Two major tools of CBA are NPV and IRR. 
Preez (2004) included the Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR) as well as the first two and discussed 
that one or more of the three can be used for decision making.  
 
 NPV 2.7.1
 
The main type of tool that has been used for many years is the Net Present Value. The 
present value (PV) is: 
Figure 3 : Standard Supply/Demand curve to calculate surplus 
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𝑃𝑉(𝐶𝐵) = ∑
𝐶𝐵𝑡
(1 + 𝑑)𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=0
 
• 𝑡 is the year of cost and benefits occurrence 
• 𝑑 is the discount rate 
• 𝐶𝐵𝑡 is the benefit or cost in year t 
• 𝑛 is the life time period of the project. 
 
The NPV is the difference of the present value of Benefit (𝑃𝑉(𝐵)) and the present value of 
Cost (𝑃𝑉(𝐶)). 
𝑁𝑃𝑉 = 𝑃𝑉(𝐵) − 𝑃𝑉(𝐶) 
 
In this method a project is viable if the NPV is positive and the option with the bigger 
value of NPV is better. There are some downsides to this method, which will be explained 
later sections (Brent, 2006 and Boardman et al, 2001 and Layard and Glaister, 1994). 
 
 IRR 2.7.2
 
There is another method that is irrelevant to the discount rate and to a certain degree 
calculates the speed of returning the investments. It is called the Internal Rate of Return 
(IRR). The Internal Rate of Return or Economic Rate of Return is the discount rate when 
the NPV becomes zero. 
 
𝑁𝑃𝑉(𝐶𝐵) = ∑
𝐶𝐵𝑡
(1 + 𝑟)𝑡
= 0
𝑛
𝑡=0
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• 𝑡 is the year of cost and benefits occurrence 
• 𝑟 is the rate of return 
• 𝐶𝐵𝑡 is the benefit or cost in year t 
• 𝑛 is the life time period of the project. 
 
The advantages of IRR are that it is independent of the discount rate, inflation and interest 
rates and also can be used to compare projects with different start times and different 
lengths. 
 
 BCR 2.7.3
 
The Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR) is the ratio of the present value of the benefits relative to the 
present value of the costs (Preez, 2004):  
 
𝐵𝐶𝑅 =
𝑃𝑉(𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡)
𝑃𝑉(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡)
=
∑
𝐵𝑡
(1 + 𝑟)𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=0
∑
𝐶𝑡
(1 + 𝑟)𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=0
 
 
In this formula for the acceptance of a project, the discounted BCR should be more than 
one and for comparison between the projects the higher BCR is better.  
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2.8 CBA Tools 
 
Different tools have been discovered for solving a decision problem. It is not an easy job to 
choose a suitable tool. It depends on the actual decision problem and also the objectives of 
the decision makers. “Sometimes the simpler the method the better, but complex decision 
problems may require complex methods, as well” (Fülöp, 2005). In capital budgeting or 
investment appraisals as well as NPV and IRR, which have been explained previously, 
there are many tools to use; such as accounting rate of return; payback period; profitability 
index; modified internal rate of return. In this thesis these methods are called simple 
measures because they use only one formula to generate the result. There are more 
complex methods as well as CBA in the literature. Fülöp gathered most of these complex 
methods in his paper and briefly explained them (2005). Table 3 shows well-known simple 
measures and complex methods used for decision making. 
 
 
Simple Measures 
•Payback Period (PP) 
•Return on Investment (ROI) 
•Accounting Rate of Return (ARR) 
•Profitability Index (PI) 
•Net Present Value (NPV) 
•Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 
•Modified Internal Rate of Return (MIRR) 
Complex Methods 
•Cost Benefit Analysis 
•Multi-Criteria Analysis 
• Utility theory 
• Goal programming 
• Outranking methods 
• Analytic hierarchy process  
•Cost Effectiveness 
•Cost–Utility Analysis 
•Economic Impact Analysis 
•Social Return on Investment (SROI) 
•Game Theory 
Table 3 : Examples of simple measures and complex decision making tools (Fülöp, 2005 ) 
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2.9 Period of Analysis 
 
The period of analysis should regularly cover the useful life of the project, such as the life 
time of a bridge.  On the other hand, it is impossible to find a finite life cycle for some 
calculations such as many health and social policies. In those cases a similar medium to 
long term period can be chosen to have a single scale for alternatives (New Zealand 
Treasury, 2005). In addition, an operational contract can be the base for the period of 
analysis as the project might have a life cycle of more than the contract. The perspective of 
the analyst would be the operational time that the company will benefit from the project, 
such as BOT contracts (Build-Operate-Transfer) for railway projects (Delmon, 2010). 
 
2.10 Short Comings of CBA 
 
Underestimated costs and overestimated benefits: As discussed in Section 2.4, one of 
the main weaknesses of financial appraisal is getting the project approved by any means. 
There have been numerous examples in the literature that have caused an over running or 
over timing of big projects (Flyvbjerg, 2006). This will lead to underestimating the costs 
and overestimating the benefits in order to get permission to begin the project. This means 
showing the projects at its best on paper and not in reality. This will cause the selection of 
the “least fit” project that will produce the most problems and inaccuracy (Flyvbjerg, 
2005). 
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Identifying incorrect cost and benefit: All costs and benefits should be identified and 
quantified appropriately. Unfortunately the uncertainty of future projects and human error 
to assign an appropriate monetary value to intangible impacts, results in an incorrect cost 
benefit analysis (Plowman, 2011). 
 
Monetising errors: As some impacts are not naturally monetary, they frequently need to 
be assigned a monetary value. This approximation is frequently based on past experiences 
that can be biased; which can cause an incorrect cost and benefit result (Plowman, 2011). 
 
Inaccuracy, unsuitability or insufficiency of tools used for calculation: Each tool has 
its short comings that might affect the whole CBA. For example, the calculation of the 
present value balances all present and future costs and benefits, but the estimation of the 
discount rate is not going to be realistic. Also the NPV tool is not suitable for the 
comparison of projects with different capital investment. Moreover, using the same tools in 
isolation is insufficient for informing decisions (as covered in Section 5.6.3.1) and cannot 
reflect all of the aspects of the project (Plowman, 2011 and Boardman, 2001).  
 
2.11 CBA Framework 
 
More or less all the frameworks use the following steps to implement CBA: 
 
I. Specify the set of change alternatives (if there is more than one)  
II. Find data regarding the operation of the project 
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III. Decide whose cost and benefit should be recognized 
IV. Set the framework for CBA 
V. Identify and categorize cost and benefits (Impact) 
VI. Forecast cost and benefit over life time of the project 
VII. Monetize and quantify all impacts 
VIII. Discount cost and benefit to achieve the present value 
IX. Perform sensitivity analysis 
X. Decide on continuation, closure or making changes on the operation of the 
project or choose between change alternatives. 
The keywords for each step are highlighted and will be used throughout this thesis. 
 
2.12  Selected Approaches to CBA 
 
Table 4 shows a comparison of the more complex frameworks and models found in the 
literature. Their differences have been shown in terms of their style, name and most 
importantly, what each stage includes. 
 
As can be seen in the table, although all the frameworks have different titles and names for 
different CBA steps, all can be categorized in 4 different stages. These stages are: Setting 
the Framework, Technical Analysis, Economic Evaluation and Evaluation of Result. This 
thesis will use this new categorize to introduce the new approach for the proposed CBA. 
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Cellini & Kee Boardman Minnesota 
South East High Speed 
Rail 
Scotland 
Style 
 
List of 10 steps List of 9 steps 
4 stage single 
level flowchart  
Hierarchy of Benefits 
2 level flowchart with 
feed back  
Name  CEA or CBA CBA BCR /BCR CBA Framework BCA 
Stages 
Setting The 
Framework 
1. Set the framework 1. Specify alternatives 
Planning the 
Analysis 
_  
  
Define the Problem 
2. Decide whose CBA? 2. Decide whose CBA? 
Eliminate 
Unreasonable Option 
Technical 
Analysis 
3. Identify & Categorize cost 
benefits  
  
3. Catalogue the Impacts 
  
Engineering 
Analysis 
User benefits   
 
  
Determine the Benefit 
and Cost 
  
  
  
Non user benefits 
Operating impacts 
 4. Project cost benefit 
  
  
4. Predict The Impacts  
  
  
Capital cost 
Engineering cost 
Operating and 
Maintenance cost 
Economic 
Evaluation 
5. Monetize Costs 5. Monetize all impacts 
Economic 
Valuation 
Annual benefits 
Compare Option 
Benefits and Costs 
6. Quantify Benefits in term 
of effectiveness or Monetize 
benefits 
6. Discount benefits and 
costs 
Annual costs 
Choose the best Option 
  
  
7. Discount Cost and 
Benefits 7. Compute NPV 
  
Discount stream of 
benefits and costs 
8. Compute Cost-
effectiveness ratio or NPV 
  
Evaluation 
of Result 
9. Sensitivity Analysis 8. Sensitivity Analysis 
Evaluating 
Results 
Evaluation criteria 
Test the robustness  of 
the choice 
10. Make a recommendation 
9. Make a 
recommendation 
Preferred alternatives Select preferred Option 
Table 4 : Selected Approaches to CBA 
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2.13 Conclusion 
 
This chapter explained how the use of CBA has developed and its theoretical foundations, 
current methods and process; together with a comparison of different models and methods. 
Additionally, it has been discussed as to why most of the projects have cost overruns and 
delays. It has been shown why there is a need for a new comprehensive framework for cost 
benefit appraisals. As can be seen in the literature, there are none or limited models related 
to cost benefit analysis. Most of the literature materials use the steps of CBA and some that 
have introduced a framework, methodology or chart are not comprehensive or have errors. 
The introduction of a generalised CBA model can help contribute to better decision 
making and help to achieve a greater rate of productivity. If used effectively it is capable of 
improving decisions in the infrastructure industry. 
 
In order to have a better understanding of the application of CBA, the next chapter 
introduces the case study of the Channel Tunnel. Following on, a new simple and 
comprehensive CBA model will be proposed. 
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Chapter 3 
 
THE CHANNEL TUNNEL 
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3 THE CHANNEL TUNNEL 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The Channel Tunnel has been chosen for the case study because it was one of the largest, if 
not the largest, infrastructure mega projects in Europe of its time (Gourvish, 2006). The 
project has been a big challenge for decades with lots of uncertainties. There are still 
different opinions about whether it should have been built (Anguera, 2006 and Gourvish 
2006). There were various proposals and appraisals that led to the construction of the 
project and comparison of these with the actual operation of the project is the main purpose 
of the case study with the hope of helping decision makers makes better judgments on 
future projects. 
 
This chapter is the introduction of the CBA case study for the Channel Tunnel project. The 
history of the Channel Tunnel will be included as well as past appraisals of the project for 
comparison. Information about the construction, finance and operation of the project will 
be discussed afterwards. These are all the data required to conduct the CBA for the project 
in Chapter 4. 
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3.2 History of the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL) 
 
Gourvish’s work (2006) has been used as the main literature for the history of the tunnel 
with the addition of some other references. 
 
The idea for building the tunnel was recommended to Napoleon Bonaparte during a short-
term peace between France and England in 1802. Albert Mathieu Favier, who was a 
French mining engineer, drafted the first plan to Napoleon. He designed a two level tunnel 
to be used paved and lit by oil lamps; the top one to be used by horse-drawn carriages and 
the underside for groundwater flows. However war soon started again and the plan was 
abandoned. In addition, the lack of technology for building the tunnel was a big problem. 
They did not have the necessary geological science for building the structure. 
 
 
 
Figure 4 : Cartoon of 1802 tunnel designed by Albert Mathieu 
Favier (Unmuseum website) 
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Steam trains were invented in the 1820s and by 1850 the railways started to run from Paris 
to Calais and from London to Dover. Passengers used small ferries to cross the water with 
fear of death. By this time, engineers had more experience on tunnelling jobs and the 
French and English engineers now approached the task of planning to build a 25-mile 
undersea tunnel. They faced several problems and needed to find a good path for 
tunnelling; this required geology science. The rock had to be suitable for tunnelling and in 
addition they had a problem with ventilation of the tunnel, because of the steam from the 
locomotives. Moreover, both countries were afraid of building a route that could be used 
for war.  
 
 
 
A French mining engineer called Thomé de Gamond was working on the project for 
decades, with the help of a few English engineers such as William Low and John Brunlees, 
to produce the first serious plan between Calais and Dover. His scheme in 1857 was 
Figure 5 : A political cartoon showing a French invasion using balloons, boats and a tunnel. Fear of 
this caused the British to cancel the project. This cartoon was drawn in 1804, after the resumption of 
war between England and France in 1803 (Science Photo). 
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accepted by both sides. He proposed a rail tunnel bored through the chalk, which he 
thought ran underneath the sea-bed. His plan had an international gate on an artificial 
island in the middle of the tunnel and ventilation was provided in his plan. His marketing 
proposal mentioned that 350,000 passengers per year were using ferries for crossing the 
water and he estimated that the appeal of 25 minutes under the water, crossing with no 
sickness would double the usage.  
 
Around the time of the Franco-Prussian war (1870-1871), the English and French grew 
closer and the first serious attempt to build the tunnel was in 1870. Boh countries agreed to 
build a joint tunnel scheme and tunnel companies started to find the best geological area 
for the tunnel. In 1881 companies started to dig the tunnel with the newly invented tunnel 
boring machines; but once again, because of the fear of war, the construction decision was 
postponed (Gourvish, 2006, pp 6-7). 
  
In the wake of the Second World War, objections to military usage of the tunnel weakened. 
The Channel Tunnel Company that was established a few decades earlier in 1929, restarted 
its work and formed a Channel Tunnel study group on the recommendation of Shawcross 
the Labour MP at a dinner party he attended with three members of parliament and others 
related to the project (Gourvish, 2006, p 19). The initial cost of the tunnel reported by the 
study group in 1947 was estimated at £45-65 million depending on the choice of lining 
material (Gourvish, 2006, p 19). In addition, another group somewhat confusingly called 
“Channel Tunnel Study Group” was formed and they published a small report in 1960. 
They assumed a bored tunnel, immersed tube, bridge and bridge-tunnel combination and 
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also engineering and financial support for each type. Return on capital was not mentioned, 
but an investment of £130 million would be needed. Another report was conducted by the 
French government in the same year and these two groups then worked together on another 
proposal, publishing it in 1963. They conducted a full evaluation of two competing 
proposals for the fixed link: a bridge, or a tunnel. Both would need 6 years for construction 
and would reduce London-Paris journey times from the original 7 hours to 4.5. In 1962 the 
bridge would cost £298.5M, the tunnel £143M (Gourvish, 2006, p 35). Either way there 
were to be “clear long term savings over established transport modes, ‘realistic’ economic 
benefits, ‘acceptable’ financial returns and compatibility with Britain’s European policy” 
(Gourvish, 2006, p 42).  
 
Both governments agreed to have three phases and had worked on two agreements by 1972 
(Gourvish, 2006, pp 100-101). Coopers & Lybrand conducted a cost benefit study of the 
Channel Tunnel for the UK under the direction of British and French project managers and 
governments in 1973. It was a much updated and clearer report and had a better evaluation 
of the project (Gourvish, 2006, p 111 and Coopers & Lybrand Associates Ltd., 1973). In 
the same year the UK finally joined France in the common market and the governments 
agreed to build the tunnel. The private funding of the project was discussed and more 
experimental work was done but Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson cancelled 
construction in 1975 on financial grounds because of the oil crisis (Gourvish, 2006, p44, p 
165 and Eurotunnel Group website). 
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The Channel Tunnel and Alternative Cross Channel Services report was published in the 
same year by the Channel Tunnel Advisory Group (CTAG, 1975), discussing whether the 
various earlier studies were sufficient for deciding to invest in the tunnel rather than in air 
and sea transport; and comparing four different projects with more updated fuel prices. The 
study shows that the capital and operating cost would be less if the tunnel were constructed 
instead of expanding the existing air and ferry services (Gourvish, 2006, pp 179-184). 
 
However when the Conservatives came back into power in 1979, the UK Government 
decided it would have nothing to do with the funding of the plan; Margaret Thatcher the 
British Prime Minster saying that “she had no reservations (about) the project being 
independently subsidised” (Channel Tunnel website and Wilson, 1991, pp 14 -21 and 
Gourvish, 2006). 
 
In September 1981 a United Kingdom/French summit meeting took place and both agreed 
to build “a joint study by experts of the type and scope of possible fixed links, taking 
account of interests of maritime transport, with a view to advising both governments on 
whether a scheme for fixed cross-Channel link can be developed which would be 
acceptable to and in interests of both countries” (Department of Transport, 1982). 
Therefore the study was carried out and they published a report in June 1982 explaining 
their methods of analysis, results and the conclusions of the study group (Department of 
Transport, 1982). 
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In 1984 both sides agreed to fund the project privately and promoters were sought. The 
banking report was published and there were arguments between the banks, promoters and 
governments about funding the project and government guarantees (Gourvish, 2006, pp 
238-258). 
 
After an invitation from the governments in 1985, four submissions were proposed: 
1. Channel Tunnel Group/ France-Manche: a rail proposal based on the 1975 plan by 
(CTG/F-M) with twin 7.3 metre bored rail tunnels and a third service tunnel. 
 
 
 
2. Euro Bridge studies group (Euro Pont): a multispan suspension bridge with a 12-
lane roadway and optional rail link in an enclosed tube based on untried techniques.  
 
Figure 6 : CTG/FM option with two bored rail tunnel and a service tunnel 
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3. Euro route: a 21 km tunnel between artificial islands approached by bridges. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 : Europont included a rail tunnel and 12-lane motorway within a vast tube suspended from 
half kilometre spans by Kevlar cables. 
Figure 8 : Artificial Island connected by an underwater Tunnel 
Figure 9 : Bridge towards one of the Artificial Islands 
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4. Channel Expressway: 11.3 metre bored road and rail tunnels with mid-channel 
ventilation towers (Wilson, 1991 and Gourvish, 2006, p 263 and Commolli et al, 
1986, pp 261-269).  
 
On 20 January 1986 Thatcher and Mitterrand said that the Eurotunnel bid had been 
nominated and on 12 February 1986 the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the two countries 
signed the Franco-British Treaty in Canterbury (Eurotunnel Group Website). 
 
 
 
On 14 March 1986 it was the Channel Tunnel Company that won the votes. The 
Concession Agreement was awarded for a period of 55 years between the two 
concessionaires, the Channel Tunnel Group Ltd and France-Manche SA. They were 
delighted to win the concession and confident to finish the project by the spring of 
1993 (Eurotunnel Group website, Gourvish, 2006, p 277).  
 
Figure 10 : French President François Mitterrand (L) and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
(R) sign, 12 February 1986, in Canterbury Cathedral, the Canterbury treaty between France and 
Britain on the construction of a double rail tunnel under the English Channel 
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On 15 December 1987 boring of the service tunnel started on the UK side and on 28 
February 1988 on the French side. On 1 December 1990 they completed the first 
breakthrough, in the service tunnel, 22.3 km from the UK and 15.6 km from France. 
Englishman Graham Fagg and Frenchman Phillippe Cozette broke through the service 
tunnel. Eurotunnel completed the tunnel boring on time (Flyvbjerg pp 96-97). The other 
breakthrough was on 22 May 1991 in the North rail tunnel and on 28 June 1991 in the 
South rail tunnel. The handover from TML to Eurotunnel was on 10 December 1993 and 
equipment installation and testing was completed by 1994 (Eurotunnel Group website). 
 
The tunnel was officially started its operation with one year delay compared to original 
plan by Queen Elizabeth II and French President Francois on 6 May 1994. A full public 
operation did not start for some months. The first international freight train in commercial 
service went through the Channel Tunnel on 1 June 1994.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 11 : Official opening by Queen Elizabeth II and French President François Mitterrand on 6th 
may 1994 
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3.3 Past Appraisals of the Channel Tunnel 
 
The Channel Tunnel is a 50.5 kilometre under water rail tunnel linking the United 
Kingdom to northern France. Predictions before the construction of the Channel Tunnel 
mainly and methodically overestimated the scales of the  construction costs and the 
enlargement of the number of cross channel passengers and freight markets. 
 
Anguera, in his paper, stated that “the construction cost of the tunnel has been doubled” 
and “cost benefit appraisal of the Channel Tunnel reveals that overall the British economy 
would have been better off if the Tunnel had never been constructed, as the total resource 
cost has been greater that the benefits generated” (Anguera, 2006). 
 
As mentioned in the history of the tunnel, the idea of building a tunnel between the UK and 
France started over 200 years ago; therefore, there have been different types of analysis 
previously. A large amount of research had been carried out in the last 25 years prior to the 
construction of the tunnel. This thesis will investigate four major ex-ante analyses and one 
economic evaluation after the tunnel has been built and operated for a few years; also there 
will be a comparison of the studies.   
 
 Proposals for a Fixed Channel Link (Ministry of Transport, 1963) 3.3.1
 
On 17
th
 November 1961 both governments decided to work on a report about a fixed 
tunnel or bridge link between the two countries. They needed to understand if the project 
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was “technically adequate and practicable”. They worked on “Traffic, technical problems 
and matters of international law, costs, economic implications and financing” (MoT, 1963 
report p 1). The base year for this study is 1969 and the discount rate is of 7% for 50 years 
until 2019. 
 
 The Channel Tunnel: A United Kingdom Transport Cost Benefit Study 3.3.2
(Coopers & Lybrand Associates Ltd., 1973) 
 
This report shows the cost benefit analysis for a double track rail facility from Cheriton 
near Folkestone to Sangatte near Calais (C&L, 1973, p 14). Their assumptions for the 
growth rate of traffic and revenue are: 
 
 Central Case 
% p.a. 
Low Case 
% p.a. 
1991 -  2000 5 3.5 
2001 - 2010 3 1.5 
2011 - 2030 1 0.5 
 
In this report five sets of costs and benefits have been calculated:  
1. The UK share of the tunnel capital costs. 
2. Other infrastructure costs added because of the tunnel. 
3. The British owned transport companies’ loss as an outcome of the tunnel 
construction. 
Table 5 : Percentage of growth rate and traffic in C&L study 
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4. The net benefits to passengers’ resident of the United Kingdom from the improved 
service that the tunnel will produce (fares, journey time reduction and extra service 
frequencies). 
5. The reduction in freight costs that the tunnel will create in the interests of the UK 
(C&L, 1973, p 1). 
 
The base year for this study is 1973 and the discount rate is of 10% for 50 years until 2030. 
 
 The Channel Tunnel and Alternative Cross-Channel Services (Channel 3.3.3
Tunnel Advisory Group, 1975) 
 
This report is produced by the Channel Tunnel Advisory Group presented to the Secretary 
of State for the Environment in 1975. They have calculated just the UK’s share of the 
project and chose a 50% share for most of the investments and revenue. The report shows 
the cost benefits of the tunnel itself against dependence on ferries and also a tunnel with a 
development of the current air and ferry services (CTAG, 1975 pp 28-29). 
 
The base year for this study is 1973 and the discount rate is of 10%. The appraisal period is 
50 years until year 2030 (CTAG, 1975). 
 
 Fixed Channel Link Report (UK/French Study Group, 1982) 3.3.4
 
The Department for Transport joined with the French government to build a UK/French 
study group and calculated a broad range of possibilities for an extra service for the 
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Channel market. This is the main study that resulted in the construction of the tunnel with 
three scenarios: A, which favoured the tunnel; B, the base case and C, which favoured the 
improvement of the existing services (DOT, 1982, p 18). 
 
They calculated all the benefits and costs for:  
 
 Single 6 metre rail tunnel 
 Single 7 metre rail tunnel  
 Single 7 metre tunnel with vehicle shuttle facilities 
 Double 7 metre rail tunnel with vehicle shuttle facilities 
 Road bridge  
 Road bridge and 6 metre rail tunnel 
 Composite scheme.  
 
They made four assumptions for each of the projects to which the various scenarios 
related: 
 
 Traffic forecasts 
 Capital costs and finish dates 
 Size and utilisation rate of ferries for the future 
 Costs of aviation. 
(DoT, 1982, pp 80-81) 
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The base year for this study is 1981 and the discount rate chosen is 7%. However for each 
option there are different construction times and appraisal periods. In Table 5 the closest 
options to the actual project have been selected. 
 
 The Channel Tunnel; an Ex-Post Economic Evaluation (Anguera, 2006) 3.3.5
 
There is one study carried out after construction of the tunnel, in which Ricard Anguera 
outlines his calculations of the economic evaluation of the project. He concludes that the 
project was not viable and the tunnel should not have been constructed. His approach and 
data will be discussed in this thesis. 
He studied a short term appraisal until the year 2003 and also forecasted the benefits of the 
tunnel until the year 2052. He mentioned two scenarios: 
 
1. If the current debt and size of the tunnel remains the same, therefore the market 
should grow by 10% to achieve a positive NPV; but the capacity of the tunnel is not 
enough for that. 
2. If the whole tunnel debt is written off, the tunnel can compete with ferry companies 
and will be able to achieve a £2billion NPV (Anguera, 2006 p 313). 
 
The base year for the study is 2004 with the discount rate of 3.5% as in the HM Green 
Book and the final appraisal period of 2003 for a short version and 2052 for a longer 
version. 
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3.4 Comparison 
 
The comparison of different CBA’s is difficult because there are different approaches and 
methods that researchers have used for their different studies. However, Table 5 shows the 
summary of former tunnel CBA approaches and differences. In addition there have been 
differences on appraisal period, forecasted traffic, difference in price base etc. Some of 
these differences are because of the time period when the studies were carried out; for 
instance, the discount rate varies at different times. Some differences are because of 
different assumptions and some are because of different approaches that have been used in 
each study.  
 
Table 5 shows the detailed comparison of the older studies. As can be seen in the table 
there are significant differences between the methods of CBA calculation in different 
studies. Some of the differences are obvious such as base year and construction period but 
some are strangely different such as taking different impacts into account. Some of the 
studies calculate the producer’s loss and some include the “avoided investment” or 
“avoided benefits”.  
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Study Name MoT (1963) C&L (1973) CTAG (1975) DoT (1982) Anguera Thesis Anguera Paper 
Different 
Scenarios 
Very high, 
upper, lower,  
very low 
Low-forecast, central-
forecast 
Tunnel with different 
investment in existing 
services 
Scenario A, 
central B, 
scenario C 
Short term, long term Short term 
Comments 
 
Just UK share Just UK share 
   
Base Year 1969 1973 1973 1981 2004 2004 
Start Year 1963 1973 1975 1991 1987 1987 
Discount Rate 7.0% 10.0% 10.0% 7.0% 3.5% 3.5% 
Construction 
Period 
5 7 5 11 7 7 
Operation 
Period 
50 50 50 39 9 9 
End of Contract 2018 2030 2030 2041 2003 2003 
End of Contract 
if Starts at 1987 
2042 2044 2042 2037 2003 2003 
Channel Tunnel 
Costs 
Capital costs, 
operating costs 
Capital costs 
Capital costs, 
operating costs  
Capital costs, 
operating costs 
Capital costs, 
operating costs 
Capital Cost 
Avoided  
Shipping, ports, roads Other services 
   
BR Investment 
Costs     
Infrastructure, 
passengers and  
freight rolling stock 
Infrastructure, 
passengers and  
freight rolling stock 
Channel Tunnel 
Benefits 
Revenue, 
consumer 
surplus 
Total user benefit from 
fares, journey time 
reduction, extra service 
frequencies 
Revenue, travel time 
savings, consumer 
surplus 
Travel time 
savings 
Revenue, travel time 
savings, consumer 
surplus 
Revenue, travel time 
savings, consumer 
surplus 
Avoided 
Benefit/Cost  
Reduction in transport 
operators' costs 
Benefit/costs from the 
avoided investment in 
other services 
Avoided 
cost/benefit of 
existing service 
  
Producers’ 
Losses  
Decrease in transport 
operators' revenues    
Decrease in ferries’ 
revenue 
Table 6 : Detailed comparison of the older studies 
  
3.5 Eurotunnel 
 
Groupe Eurotunnel S.A. is the company that manages and operates the Channel Tunnel. 
The company is based in Paris. It includes the shuttle services and produces revenue on 
other trains from DB Schenker freight and Eurostar passengers through the tunnel. The 
company is on both the Euronext Paris and the London Stock Exchange.  
 
The first year of operation did not go as planned; the company lost £925m because of a 
disappointing amount of revenue and huge interest charges from the debt (Eurotunnel 
annual report, 1995). After all the first years’ problems and disagreements of the board and 
shareholders, a dissident shareholder group took control of the board in 2004 with a so-
called “boardroom coup” because of the disagreements. They appointed Raymond as chief 
executive but he resigned the next year and Jacques Gounon took control of the company 
as chairman and chief executive in 2005 (Norris, 2005). In 2006 the shareholders voted on 
a deal that would have exchanged half the reduced debt of £6.2bn for 87% of the equity 
(BBC, 2007 and Harrison, 2006). However, the plan did not work out and the company 
were given protection from bankruptcy by a French court for six months (BBC, 2006). 
After a month of work a new plan for restructuring was accepted by the shareholders, 
which included share swapping and waiving travel benefits. Deutsche Bank, Goldman 
Sachs and Citigroup were approved to provide £2.8bn long term loan (BBC, 2007). 
Eurotunnel announced a net profit of €1 million for the first time in its history after the 
restructuring in 2007 (BBC, 2008). In 2008 the company paid its first dividend of €0.04 
per euro value because of a €40 million net profit (Le Figaro, 2009). 
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3.6 Construction 
 
Although the construction of such a huge and cutting edge project is an important 
challenge, as this thesis is focused on the decision making and appraisal of the project, 
technical details and history of the construction of the tunnel are not covered. This detailed 
information can be seen in Gourvish (2006 pp 320, 266, 373, 383, 384), Flyvbjerg (2003, 
pp 6 and 14), Eurotunnel website, Eurotunnel right issue (1994) and DOE Report (2001).  
 
3.7 Lifetime (Life Span) 
 
The construction of the main section of the tunnel which explains its potential lengthy 
lifetime is made from very high strength and dense concrete to add extra protection to the 
steel reinforcements. To guarantee no feature of the plan was overlooked, 18 design 
development studies were carried out. The lining was also produced with a lifespan of 120 
years; it had to be tough enough as not to deteriorate within that timeframe (John Neerhout, 
1995). Although the lifetime of the project has been designed to be at least 120 years, for 
the sake of this thesis, the 99 years of the Eurotunnel contract has been assumed in 
calculating the CBA based until the end of contract and  to give a private company 
perspective. After this length of time, probably another invitation to tender will take place 
to choose the next operator. The extra maintenance needed after this time span will 
probably be more than normal and the new company should take this into account. This 
thesis assumed normal maintenance costs increase every year until the end of the contract. 
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3.8 Financing 
 
The concession was for a period of 55 years originally but then it extended to 65 years and 
extended again later on to 99 years until 2086 because of the changes that the Government 
made to the original plan (Flyvbjerg, 2003). The Channel Tunnel project had two 
challenges: financing and construction. Therefore the two groups of promoters and 
construction companies worked together closely in order to achieve the best result. A 
consortium of ten contractors operated together with the name of the Trans Manche Link 
(TML), with five banks that invested the initial equity of £47 million (Equity 1) (Grant, 
1997). In 1986 the ten construction companies negotiated with five banks on two of the 
key contracts: the construction contract and the detailed term sheet for the credit facilities. 
A private placement of shares with organizations (Equity 2) was launched later on (Grant, 
1997). Co-financier of the project, The European Investment Bank's (EIB) contribution 
was an important indication of European backing for the project. An arrangement was 
signed that helped the loan syndication that should have been finalized before the Equity 3 
issue launch. 50 banks together, who guaranteed the agreement, syndicated it productively 
to over 200 banks (Grant, 1997); £770 million was gathered by selling 220 million units of 
£3.50 shares as a public offer (Gourvish, 2006, p 297). The rights issue (Equity 4) was 
postponed until the first breakthrough of the tunnel. It was accomplished two days before 
the last closing day of the equity issue. The syndication of the scheduled extra £2 billion 
credit was only achieved with substantial support from the four agent banks (Natwest, 
Midland, Banque Nationale de Paris and Credit Lyonnais) (Grant, 1997). In 1992 there 
were more financial complications. The TML Company asked for extra construction costs 
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of about £1.5 billion. It was obvious that Eurotunnel had appropriate capitals to open the 
tunnel, but there would be a requirement for extra after opening to pay the banks’ interest 
fees until the breakeven point. A condition for the presentation of the rights issue in 1994 
(Equity 5) was gaining the initial functioning licence from the IGC (Intergovernmental 
Commission). Investors wanted to know that the structure was working. The two 
governments approved an extension of the concession by another 10 years and it was the 
signal for the banks to approve the equity launch (Grant, 1997). 
 
Financing   £ Million Date 
Equity 1 (Founder shareholders) 47 Sep-86 
Equity 2 (Private institutional placement) 206 Oct-86 
Equity 3 (Public Issue) 770 Nov-87 
Equity 4 (Rights Issue) 566 Nov-90 
Equity 5 (Rights Issue) 793 May-94 
 
Eurotunnel lost about £925 million in the first year (Eurotunnel annual report, 1995) 
because of a delay in operation, huge debt interest owed to the banks and not enough 
traffic and revenue (Gourvish, 2006, pp 370-373). The risk of construction did not pay off 
and Eurotunnel shares dropped. The original price was £3.50 per share in 1987. The share 
price increased up to £11.00 in the middle of 1989 because of the over-optimistic 
projections about the project before, due to cost overruns and delays, the shares dropped 
dramatically to £1.42 in 1995. This resulted in the suspension of interest payments to 
prevent bankruptcy (Flyvpjerg, 2003, p 32 and Vilanova, 2006, p 26).  
 
Table 7 : Channel Tunnel Equity 
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After the first restructuring in 1997, due to the small revenue and big debt interest the trust 
did not produce for the investors and the shares traded for the price of 65 pence, almost 95 
percent of the pick value (Flyvbjerg, 2003, p 33). Figure 12 shows the peaks and throughs 
of Eurotunnel’s share price from the start of construction to the first year of operation.  
 
 
  
Figure 12 : Eurotunnel share price from the start of construction until 1995 (Flyvbjerg)   
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3.9 Capital Costs 
 
The total cost of construction of the Channel Tunnel and equipment in 2012 prices was 
£11,932 million. Table 8 shows the different forecasts, the concession award (CTG-FM) 
and the actual cost of the tunnel in the base year and also at 2012 prices.  
 
Study Name TG 
1960 
MoT 
1963 
C&L 
1973 
CTAG 
1975 
DoT 
1982 
CTG-FM 
1985 
Actual 
1994 
Base Price 1962 1962 1973 1973 1981 1985 1985 
Tunnel 80 103 246 
 
1296 1329 2110 
Terminals 14 15 80 
  
448 553 
Fixed Equipment 
     
688 1200 
Railway 
Installation 
10 11 
     
Project 
Development 
Including Start-up 
Cost 
  
32 
    
Highway 
construction 
(France) 
2 2 
     
Rolling Stock 6 7 31 
 
257 245 705 
Engineering and 
Management   
37 
    
Contingencies 
  
42 
  
132 
 
Portal 
Infrastructure     
581 
  
Inland 
Infrastructure     
187 
  
Subsequent 
Investment     
671 
  
Bonuses 
      
46 
Direct work 
      
36 
Total £ 112 £ 138 £ 468 £ 458 £ 2992 £ 2842 £ 4650 
Total In 2012 Price £ 2024 £ 2488 £ 4793 £ 4691 £ 9712 £ 7292 £ 11932 
 
Table 8 : Forecasted and actual capital cost of the tunnel (£M) 
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As well as the tunnel construction cost, which was financed privately, the British 
Government invested in new services and upgrading of the current railway network from 
1987 to 1994. Gourvish (2002) gathered and published a list of related investments to the 
Channel Tunnel in his book. Table 9 shows the detailed investments of British Rail related 
to the Channel Tunnel. 
 
 
Item Investment (2012 Prices) 
Infrastructure: Phase I 1273.5 
(Waterloo International Terminal, Waterloo associated work, North 
Pole International Depot, west London line electrification, 
Tonbridge-Redhill electrification, Dollands Moor Freight Operation 
Centre, other freight terminals, Chiselhurst -Folkestone resignalling, 
route upgrading, structural/clearance work and other. 
 
Infrastructure: Phase II 174.2 
Ashford International station, north London line electrification and 
other. 
 
Total Infrastructure 1447.5 
  Rolling stock: Phase I 1119.3 
Class 373 trains (Eurostar), night service stock, class 92 locomotives, 
intermodal wagons and other. 
 
Rolling stock: Phase II 217.5 
North of London train sets, class 92s - included in Phase I  
Total rolling stock 1336.8 
  Total  2784.3 
 
3.10 Why the forecast went wrong 
 
In the 1987 financing package, a 25% cushion was considered which most parties believed 
was more than enough (Grant, 1997). What were the important causes/effects in the cost 
overruns of the Tunnel and also do they suggest failure in this context? Every mega-project 
has some uncertainties that may occur in its construction and the Channel Tunnel was no 
different. The Channel Tunnel construction cost almost doubled, but the project was nearly 
Table 9 : Investments of British Rail related to the Channel Tunnel (Gourvish, 2006, p324) 
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on time compared to other mega projects. The comparison shows that it is in the middle 
range of the mega projects’ over budget list (Flyvbjerg book, p 14). Nonetheless, there are 
some mega projects that were hugely over time and budget; for instance, both the Suez and 
Panama canals were more than 50 times over budget; the Concorde project was more than 
7 times over budget and had unsatisfactory returns; and the Seikan tunnel in Japan had a 14 
year delay (Gourvish, 2006, p 366).  
 
Grant (1997) mentions three problems: first, tunnelling progress was not as fast as planned. 
The contractor misjudged the challenge of getting the logistical backing for the boring 
machinery and the cost control was not satisfactory. Second, several changes occurred in 
the terminal and fixed equipment plan. Third, there was the underestimation of rolling 
stock costs. TML asked for a large claim of extra expenses.  
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Figure 13 : Forecasted and actual capital cost of the tunnel 
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Flyvbjerg et al (2003) explains that the reasons for the cost over runs of the tunnel were 
firstly, the enhancement in safety, security and environmental requirements and the 
changing of regulations by the governments and secondly, the lack of a clear owner for the 
scheme.  
 
Gourvish and Anson (2006) published a table that summarises the additional investment 
costs to safety related investments, safety related operating, security-related investments 
and environment-related investments. They also calculate the cost of these extra capital 
investments in net revenue over the life time of the concession (Gourvish, 2006, p 361). 
 
Carmen Li et al. (2000) mention that the difficulties involved in building and 
commissioning of the equipment are in different stages; such as tunnelling, rolling stock 
and design changes. In reality, on the British side, the ground conditions showed to be far 
worse than predicted with salt water in the rock reducing the capability of the boring 
machines and this initiated delays and forced costly adjustments to the equipment. This 
was one of the reasons that the tunnelling stage started more slowly than in the forecasted 
timetable. As well as tunnelling problems, the unforeseen rises in the cost of the rolling 
stock followed and added to the cost of the construction. Furthermore, the Inter-
Governmental Commission group, which was liable for permitting Eurotunnel an operating 
authorization, made some design changes. For instance, they required fire doors linking the 
shuttle wagons to be enlarged by 10cm, which seems very small, but as Carmen Li et al. 
discussed, required significant and expensive re-engineering. The original proposal did not 
consider any cooling system; therefore another design change had to be conducted to 
 - 61 - 
 
reduce the temperature caused by the friction of the trains and electrical equipment. This 
problem could increase the tunnel temperature up to 50C and finally, a cooling system 
was added, moving cold water through many hundreds of kilometres of piping (Li, 2000, 
pp 5-6). 
 
With the extra capital cost as resulting from the changes, Eurotunnel tried to obtain money 
from governments or expand the period of the concession. Morton the co-chairman of the 
tunnel at the time revealed that a ten year extension of the contract might be worth £200 
million in NPV (Gourvish, 2006, p 360). In December 1993 the governments had decided 
to extend the original end period of the concession from 2042 to 2052. In addition in 1997 
Eurotunnel was able to achieve an arrangement from the French and UK governments for a 
considerable extension to the end period of the concession from 2052 to 2086 (Li, 2000)  
 
3.11 Operation 
 
The tunnel is used 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. Eurotunnel offers the fastest cross-
channel service; the passenger shuttle takes almost 35 minutes to cross the strait without 
even having to get out of the car. This value amounts to almost 90 minutes for truck 
shuttles from motorway to motorway. The Eurotunnel 2008 Reference document (2009) 
shows that the Eurotunnel Group earned 98% of its income from two main sources: 
 
1. Le Shuttle freight that carries trucks and Le Shuttle passengers that carries cars, 
motor homes, caravans, coaches, motorcycles and trailers; and also 
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2. Tolls from the railway services for use of the tunnel by Eurostar and the through 
rail freight services. (ET 2008 Reference Document, 2009, p 21). 
 
 
 
 Eurostar 3.11.1
 
Eurostar is a high-speed railway passenger service owned by the Eurotunnel Company 
connecting London to Paris and Brussels via the Channel Tunnel. Eurostar fares were 
considerably more in the past than nowadays. The cheapest price in 1994 was £99 and to 
win back the customers they reduced the price; the cheapest price in 2003 was £59 (Trend, 
2004).  
The first UK part of the Eurostar route called High Speed 1, runs from London to the 
Tunnel. There are other plans to expand the network to Birmingham, Manchester, 
Sheffield and Leeds called High Speed 2. The first phase that connects London to 
Figure 14 : Channel Tunnel Map of Destination (Eurotunnel) 
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Birmingham is planned to finish by 2026 and the whole project is going to finish by 2032 
(HS2, 2014). Eurostar competes directly with the air passenger market from all London 
airports to Paris and Brussels.  
 
Eurostar reached its record breaking 9.9 million passengers transported in 2012. The 
Eurostar market share in 2012 was more than 80%, in competition with the airlines 
according to the Eurotunnel annual report of that year (ET 2012 annual review, 2013,  p 
15). 
 
 Le Shuttle 3.11.2
 
The Eurotunnel shuttle (Le Shuttle) service transports vehicles between two heads of the 
Channel Tunnel (Folkestone and Calais) by a different type of train to the Eurostar. It has a 
motorway to motorway access, 4 departures every hour, the trip is just 35 minutes and the 
price starts from £23 per car and £302 per coach each way (Eurotunnel website).   
 
Le Shuttle freight uses semi-open wagons to carry lorries and trucks for crossing through 
the tunnel. The trip is just 35 minutes, it has up to 6 departures every hour and its price 
starts from £126 per vehicle each way (Eurotunnel freight website).  
 
Le Shuttle competes with ferries that cross the channel in both the passenger and freight 
markets. The passenger Le Shuttle’s market share by 2012 was 51%, in competition with 
the ferries which had 49%. Le Shuttle Freight’s share was still less than half the market 
with 43%, in contrast with 57% for the ferries (ET 2012 Annual Review, 2013, p 14). 
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 Through Rail Freight Service 3.11.3
 
There are some services using the tunnel between the UK and central Europe operated by 
companies such as SNCF and DB Schenker. The Eurotunnel Group does not operate them 
and cannot impact on the operations of through rail freight services; but an important share 
of the Eurotunnel Group’s income consequently is dependent on the progressive operation 
of these services, over which it has no operational control (ET 2008 Reference Document, 
2009, p 9 and 21). 
 
 Europorte 3.11.4
 
Europorte is a European rail freight company founded in 2003 and is part of the Eurotunnel 
Group, operating between France and the United Kingdom using the Channel Tunnel 
(Europorte website). The company started to receive revenue in 2009 and achieved 170 
million pounds of revenue by 2012 (ET 2012 Annual Review, 2013). Europorte services 
are:  
 
 Traction for rail freight trains at a national  
 Local rail services 
 Management of private branch lines and rail hubs 
 Contracted infrastructure management on rail networks in ports and on industrial 
sites 
 1st level maintenance service on wagons 
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 Who uses the Tunnel? 3.11.5
 
As can be seen in the graph below, Eurotunnel utilities up to 55% of the tunnel capacity; 
Eurostar uses 13%, the Truck Shuttle 21%, through rail freight 1%, Le Shuttle 10% and 
maintenance 10% of the capacity.  
 
 
 
Eurotunnel should use 50% of the capacity because of its contract and the only reason that 
they are using the extra 5% can be the maintenace percentage that should be attributed to 
all users of the tunnel. 
 
3.12 Operating Costs 
 
The figure below shows the operating costs during the operation of the tunnel. It is obvious 
that the operating costs start with a high value but they settled during the operation of the 
Figure 15 : Who uses the tunnel? (Picture Reference : 2012 Annual Review, 2013, p 8) 
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tunnel because the management tried to optimize everything. But it is hard to discuss 
whether this drop was normal or not. Another point arising from the graph is that the 
employee benefit expenses almost doubled from 1994 to 2012. 
 
 
 
3.13 Total Cost  
 
Figure 17 shows all costs together. The purple figure is the added value of all costs as a 
total. The investment of the British Government, capital cost of the tunnel and operation 
costs are all included. 
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It can be seen that British investment gradually increased until the start of the Channel 
Tunnel operation but that Eurotunnel spent almost the same amount every year until the 
completion of the project. Operation cost per year is almost fifth of the average of the 
capital cost per year.  
 
3.14 Traffic and Demand 
 
One of the most important parts of these studies is traffic and traffic forecasts because of 
their importance in calculating the benefits. The following sections show the actual traffic 
transported through the Channel Tunnel. 
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 Eurotunnel Passenger Service 3.14.1
 
The Eurotunnel passenger service consists of passengers carried by Eurostar between 
London and Paris or Brussels and passengers who use the tunnel to cross the channel with 
Le Shuttle in cars or coaches. Figure 18 shows the actual traffic carried by this service. 
 
 
 
 Eurotunnel Freight Service 3.14.2
 
The freight service consists of trucks that use the Le Shuttle Freight wagons or the through 
rail services which have been explained in the Operation Section 3.10. Figure 19 shows the 
actual traffic using this service. 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
P
a
s
s
e
n
g
e
r 
/ 
1
0
6
 
By foot - Eurostar By car - Le Shuttle Total Tunnel Passengers
Figure 18 : Eurotunnel Passenger Service traffic 
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As can be seen in the graph through rail services have increased in first few years of 
operation, possibly because of the excitement that the new service generated in the market. 
After 1998 it started to decrease until 2002 but was almost steady thereafter. There were 
two big drops in Le Shuttle freight in 1997 and 2008/2009, both being because of fires, one 
in November 1996 and one in 2008. More time was required to recover from the second 
drop probably because it had happened at the same time as the financial crisis. The shuttle 
market in 2012 reached its peak value after the large drop of 2008.  
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Figure 19 : Eurotunnel Freight Service traffic 
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 Sea Traffic 3.14.3
 
The Eurotunnel’s main competitors, the ferry companies, are using the port of Dover to 
cross the Channel. The Dover traffic is shown in Figure 20. There are many competitors 
such as Portsmouth that could have been included as well but the principal competitor is 
the Dover Strait. The assumption is that the other English ports are not in direct 
competition with the Channel Tunnel because of their locations and destinations. 
 
 
 
 Air Traffic 3.14.4
 
The air traffic data is collected from the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). The data is 
from all London airports such as Heathrow, Gatwick, Luton and Stansted to Brussels 
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airport and Charles de Gaulle, Le Bourget and Orly airports in Paris. Figure 21 shows the 
passengers. 
 
 
 
 Forecasted Traffic  3.14.5
 
The figures below show the comparison of the forecasted total cross channel market in the 
old studies versus the actual total market and also the comparison of the forecasted tunnel 
demand compared to the actual data after the operation of the tunnel. The actual traffic is 
shown in light blue.  The comparison for the total passenger market can be seen in graph 
below. Most of the forecasts before the tunnel are up to 60 Million passengers per year 
except the Eurotunnel estimations for 1987, 1990 and 1994. These overestimations may be 
attributable to inflating traffic forecasts so as to offset huge capital cost increases and 
hence control share prices.  
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The comparison for the tunnel passenger market can be seen in the graph below. The 
overestimation of Eurotunnel traffic data is evident. 
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Figure 23 : Tunnel passenger market 
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As can be seen in the passenger traffic graphs (Figure 22 and 23), there was a boost in 
expectations in the Eurotunnel forecasts in 1987 and to an even larger extent in 1990. For 
example, the estimated passengers in the DoT’s (1982) study in 2000 is 19.8 million, the 
Eurotunnel’s (1987) estimation for 2003 is 39.5 million and Eurotunnel’s (1990) for 2003 
is 44.6 million passengers. Compared to the actual tunnel’s operational data, which is 17.3 
for 2000 and 15.2 for 2003, the Eurotunnel’s prediction shows a huge overestimation. The 
Eurotunnel’s forecasted number of estimated tonnage of freight was not available, but a 
comparison of estimated units of freight compared to the actual operational data proves the 
same point. This considerable increase in forecasted data happened at the time of the cost 
overruns. Flyvbjerg et al (2003) mentioned that “by the need to preserve the confidence of 
the shareholders and of the banks when new cost overruns became apparent in the project”. 
Although Eurotunnel (1994) reduced the overestimation a little, there is still a big gap 
between the estimation and the actual traffic. 
 
This amount of overestimation may have occurred because of either overestimation of the 
whole cross channel market, or by calculations inaccuracy of the actual portion of the 
market caught by the new service, or by both (Anguera, 2006). 
 
The comparison for the tunnel tonnage freight market can be seen in the graph below. 
Unfortunately the total market comparison is not presented due to the unavailability of 
data. 
 
 - 74 - 
 
 
 
The comparison graph shows the differences between the data presented by Eurotunnel 
compared with the older studies and actual traffic. The huge overestimation of the 
Eurotunnel traffic forecasts suggests that the calculations had indeed been biased so as to 
retain the banks and shareholders’ confidence and keep the share price high. 
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3.15 Revenue 
 
Figure 25 shows the Eurotunnel actual revenue at current prices. It includes Le Shuttle, 
Eurostar, Europorte and other revenues. Other revenues consist of (a) revenue from retail 
shops in the terminals on both countries, (b) revenues in respect of the maintenance of 
telecommunication lines in the Tunnel, and (c) revenue from property activities. Note that 
all prices are actual prices. 
 
 
 
The Channel Tunnel revenue was not as expected, due to the previously mentioned 
reasons. Figure 26 shows the forecasted revenues just before the operation. The 
overestimation of the projected value versus actual revenue of the tunnel can be seen in the 
figure. The purple figure is the actual result. Considering the difference from the estimated 
traffic and the actual operation result, this difference between the total revenue is 
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understandable. As it can be seen, the forecast of revenue in 1990 is more than twice the 
actual outcome. 
 
 
 
The 1997 forecast was good for 5 years but again the actual revenue did not increase the 
same as the forecasts. The Actual revenue kept steady until 2010, rising again after the 
recession. 
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3.16 Conclusion 
 
This chapter explained about the Channel Tunnel project, one of the biggest, if not the 
biggest self-financed project of the time. The escalation in costs and the delay resulting 
from the misjudgement of the challenges of getting the logistical support for the boring 
machines and the cost control; some changes which occurred in the terminal and with the 
fixed equipment plan; the complexity and shortcomings of the rolling stock specified and 
delivered by TML; the enhancement in safety, security and environmental requirements 
and the changing of regulations by the governments; all caused more problems in the 
operation of the project. Moreover, the competitive cross channel market resulted in a 
reduction of prices charged by the ferry operators; Eurotunnel had not allowed for that in 
their estimations. This resulted in less than the forecasted traffic for the new services and 
therefore less than the forecasted revenue for the company. Having all these 
misjudgements and wrong calculations of the uncertainties, the question is “Was the 
Channel Tunnel a viable project? “ 
 
This chapter went through the decision making complexities, construction challenges, 
financing issues etc. Additionally, the operation of the tunnel with the exact operation 
value of traffic and a comparison of it with the channel market traffic; its revenue and its 
comparison with the forecasted revenue were studied. These data are the background for 
the next chapter; in which the viability of the tunnel is investigated via cost benefit 
analysis.   
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4 CHANNEL TUNNEL COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
With the information about the operation of the tunnel gathered, the CBA could be 
conducted. This chapter uses the collected data and goes through the calculation and 
analysis of generated traffic, user benefits, comparison with older studies, payback period, 
the net present value, the internal rate of return, sensitivity analysis and the capacity of the 
tunnel. In addition the summaries and conclusion about the project are demonstrated. 
 
4.2 Inflation Adjustments  
 
The inflation adjustments needed for the study in this chapter were calculated with 
reference to the Office for National Statistics (ONS) and the CDKO tag was used, being a 
long term indicator of the prices of consumer goods and services (Jan 1974=100). All the 
GDP per capita adjustments needed for the study were calculated from the ONS and the 
GDP per person non-inflation (IHXT) was used.  
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4.3 Period of the Project 
 
The period of the project for the construction was from 1987 to 1994 and operation from 
1994 to the end of the contract in 2086. 
 
4.4 Cost Benefit Model 
 
The model that was used to start the cost benefit analysis of the Channel Tunnel is shown 
below, highlighting the different stages that were considered. 
 
 
Figure 27 : Different Stages Considered in Conducting the CBA 
Stage 0 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 
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4.5 Generated Traffic Calculation  
 
Due to the extra supply for the cross channel market, a reduction in price and journey time, 
the demand for use of the service and crossings through the tunnel increased. This section 
shows the calculation of generated passengers for different market segments of the 
Channel Tunnel traffic.  
 
To calculate the generated passengers, the traffic of the market without the tunnel is 
considered. As can be seen in all types of market segments, the growth of the market is 
almost steady, therefore a linear regression line will be sketched using Excel and the 
formula for the line will be generated.
1
 As a result, the difference between the new actual 
market traffic data, minus the forecasted data without the tunnel, is the traffic generated for 
each year. The forecast base is air traffic from 1985 to 1993, a year before Eurostar started 
its operation. 
 
 Generated Eurostar Passengers  4.5.1
 
Figure 28 shows the generated passenger traffic between all London airports and Paris and 
Brussels.  
 
                                                 
1
 Note that the small differences from the trend line are the error factor but that is neglected. Another error is 
the unpredicted sudden events that affect the traffic for one year which is impossible to predict in forecasts. 
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As it can be seen, there is a big shift in market after the tunnel operation had started and 
there has been an increase of generated passengers every year ever since. This is because 
of adding a new service to the market. The excitement increased the traffic noticeably for 
the first few years but thereafter the increase was almost steady. The peak time for the 
number of generated passengers for this market is the year 2000 with 4.8 million 
passengers generated by Eurostar. It is also obvious that many consumers moved from 
planes to Eurostar every year just by looking at the air data. The peak time for air planes 
are before the operation of Eurostar in 1993. Moreover, Eurostar is increasing its traffic 
every year and therefore their peak is the latest data in 2012, with traffic of 9.9 million 
passengers.   
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Figure 28 : Generated Eurostar Passengers 
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 Generated Le Shuttle Passengers 4.5.2
 
Figure 29 shows the generated passenger traffic for the Le Shuttle service. It is the number 
of passengers using cars or coaches to cross the channel from the UK to France or vice 
versa. The forecast base is from 1985 to 1993 and it is almost steady with a small drop in 
1988.  
 
As can be seen in the graph, the first few years of the operation have an increasing trend 
for generated passengers, but the peak time is 1998 and then the generated number reduces 
every year until it reaches the zero point; after that, the ferries and Le Shuttle are just 
fighting for the existing customers. The total market is increased by the operation of the 
tunnel. 
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Figure 29 : Generated Le Shuttle Passengers 
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 Generated Le Shuttle Cars 4.5.3
 
Figure 30 shows the generated car traffic for the Le Shuttle service. It is the number of cars 
crossing the channel from the UK to France or vice versa. The forecast base is almost 
steady with a small drop in 1988.  
 
 
 
The graph shows the generated car market flies in the first few years of operation until 
1988 and then it starts to reduce. By 2005 there is almost no generated traffic added to the 
market and the total market is steady. The ferries and the tunnel are competing for the 
existing customers and the graph shows that Le Shuttle had the advantage in 1998 to 2000, 
but ferries got it back. For the first time in 11 years Le Shuttle reached 2.42 million cars in 
a year and passed the ferries’ traffic of 2.40 million cars a year by 2012. 
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Figure 30 : Generated Le Shuttle Cars 
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 Generated Le Shuttle Coaches 4.5.4
 
Figure 31 shows the generated coach traffic calculation for the Le Shuttle service. It is the 
number of coaches crossing the channel from the UK to France or vice versa. The forecast 
base is almost steady with a small drop in 1988 and a small increase in 1992.  
 
 
 
The data demonstrates that the coach market improved by the operation of the tunnel until 
1999 with 240 thousand coaches crossing and then declined to reach 140 thousand in 2012. 
This reduction could be because of the better services available for passengers, such as 
cheap flights and the Eurostar. The generated traffic occurred between 1994 and 2004 and 
tends to zero by 2005. Le Shuttle coach traffic is almost steady from 1997 to the present, 
but ferries are losing their users almost every year after 1997. It also can be seen that the 
coach market is in decline, possibly because of cheap flights and cheaper rail transport. 
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 Generated Le Shuttle Freight 4.5.5
 
Figure 32 shows the generated freight traffic calculation for the Le Shuttle service. It is the 
number of trucks crossing the channel from the UK to France and vice versa. This market 
is mostly business to business and very cost sensitive. The forecast base is very steady with 
a very small drop in 1988. The competition is between freight services and Le Shuttle in 
this market segment. 
 
 
 
The graph shows that the freight market crossing with Le Shuttle is still increasing every 
year and it is one of the main points and strengths of such a big construction project. The 
total market increased every year, except a big drop in 2008 and 2009 because of the world 
economic crisis. The generated truck line shows the effect of the Channel Tunnel to the 
market is still positive. This market looks optimistic for both competitors to benefit more 
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Figure 32 : Generated Le Shuttle Freight 
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every year; but it seems Le Shuttle started to come back better after the recession in 2008 
with an increase in traffic, rather than the ferries’ data that shows a reduction every year 
after the recession. Another important point that can be seen in the figures is that the 
generated data exceeds the shuttle services in most of the operational years. This means 
that the new service did not use any existing customers and has 100 percent generated 
customers for most of the years. Even the existing services had some generated customers 
because of the new prices. Anguera (2006) assumed there would be no generated market 
for Le Shuttle Freight; while the actual generated users are almost 100% on average until 
2012. 
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4.6 User Benefits 
 
There are a lot of benefits generated by the tunnel as well as the economic revenue. The 
two most important reasons for which the Tunnel was constructed were time-saving and 
passengers benefitting from fare reductions. Correspondingly, as well as the capital cost, 
operational cost and British Rail’s investments in improvements and stations, there is 
another cost impact which is the producers’ loss; this will be explained later in the thesis.  
 
There are other factors that may affect the costs or benefit of large transport projects; such 
as distance to Station/Airport, ride (comfort, space, etc.), environmental impacts 
(emissions, sound pollution, etc.), safety and security, reliability, effect on employment 
and energy saving factors. It is never easy to include all the impact factors of benefit or 
cost to the economy due to a project and therefore some of the factors will be neglected. 
 
This thesis will show the calculation of travel time saving, user benefits from fare 
reduction, producers’ loss and CO2 reduction as a benefit of the introduction of the tunnel. 
 
 Time Savings 4.6.1
 
One of the most important advantages of investing in transportation infrastructure is travel 
time saving. Metz’s (2008) simple definition of travel time saving is that “there are better 
things to do than travel, so if travel time could be reduced by improving the infrastructure, 
then there would be a quantifiable economic benefit to set against the cost of the 
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investment” (Metz, 2008). Gwilliam (1997) mentioned that 80% of the overall benefits of 
transport projects in developed countries comes from time saving (Gwilliam, 1997). On the 
other hand, the absence of enough information concerning the actual financial value of 
time saving means that it can occasionally be absent in evaluations (Institute for Transport 
Studies, University of Leeds, 2003).  
 
Travel time saving is calculated for the customers who switched from sea and air to 
Eurostar and Le Shuttle and also for the generated customers. 
 
4.6.1.1 Value of Time 
 
The tag unit 3.5.6 report in April 2011 demonstrates the latest value of time recommended 
by DFT for use in the appraisal (DFT, 2011). The values needed for the current study are 
in Table 10 below. 
 
Value of time per person (£ per hour, 2002 prices) from DFT 
Rail passenger working time 30.57 
Non-working time 4.46 
Working lorry driver  8.42 
 
Rail passenger working time is used for the business users of the service from the transport 
analysis guidance (DFT, 2011). The value of time for the business customer should be 
more than for those who use the tunnel for a leisure trip; this is also called ‘passengers with 
non-working time values’.  
Table 10 : Value of time per person 
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For freight the assumption is that each truck has one driver and therefore the value of time 
for a lorry driver will be used. In addition, the study of freight users’ benefits (BAH and 
ITS, 2004) shows the values of unitised freight for each truck or lorry and value of time for 
non-bulk freight, which is the value of time for each tonne of freight carried on through rail 
services. 
 
The DFT guidance (DFT, 2011) shows a way of expanding the value of time for other 
years by adding a factor of GDP per capita (GDP growth per head). Using this same way 
for calculating the expanded value of time for different years and by adding inflation, the 
values used in the study in 2012 prices are as Table 12. 
 
Freight value of time (£ per hour, 2003 prices) from (BAH 
and ITS, 2004) 
Unitised freight 1.20 
Other non-bulk freight 0.60 
 
 
Furthermore, another significant piece of research in the value of time shows that 
customers would rather to pay extra to save waiting time and walking rather than paying 
for the same saving in ride time. Therefore, spending for walking to/from and waiting for a 
trip is normally valued a lot greater than the actual travel time. Consequently, the DFT 
recommends that the value of time for each category should be calculated as two and a half 
times the waiting time in the study (DFT, 2011). 
 
Table 11 : Freight value of time 
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 Non Work 
Leisure (£/hr) 
Rail Passenger 
Working Business  
(£/hr ) 
Truck Driver 
(£/hr) 
Truck  
(£/hr) 
Tonne of Non-
bulk Freight 
(£/hr) 
1994 4.85 33.24 9.15 15.17 0.62 
1995 4.96 34.00 9.36 16.45 0.63 
1996 5.17 35.45 9.76 16.97 0.66 
1997 5.33 36.53 10.06 17.47 0.68 
1998 5.46 37.42 10.31 18.11 0.69 
1999 5.68 38.90 10.72 18.74 0.72 
2000 5.79 39.69 10.93 19.09 0.74 
2001 5.94 40.72 11.22 20.78 0.75 
2002 6.14 42.11 11.60 20.34 0.78 
2003 6.30 43.20 11.90 20.88 0.80 
2004 6.43 44.07 12.14 21.74 0.78 
2005 6.48 44.38 12.23 21.44 0.76 
2006 6.61 45.30 12.48 21.96 0.74 
2007 6.66 45.63 12.57 22.07 0.70 
2008 6.54 44.85 12.35 18.88 0.68 
2009 6.31 43.24 11.91 20.90 0.68 
2010 6.24 42.74 11.77 20.73 0.65 
2011 5.88 40.32 11.11 19.47 0.62 
2012 5.65 38.75 10.67 18.47 0.60 
 
4.6.1.2 Journey Time 
 
High Speed 1 has been constructed in two phases. The first phase from the tunnel 
and Fawkham Junction in north Kent was finished in September 2003; reducing 
London/Paris journey times to 2 hours 35 minutes (21 minutes reduction) and 
London/Brussels to 2 hours 20 minutes. The second phase was finished in 2007 and 
reduced the journey time of London/Paris by another 20 minutes to 2 hours 15 minutes and 
London/Brussels to 1 hour 51 minutes. The estimated journey time reduction used for 
Table 12 : Calculated Value of Time 
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future calculations are in Table 13. Appendix A shows the actual and estimated values that 
led to the calculations in Table 13. 
2
  
 
 1994 - 2003 2003 - 2007 2007 - 2012 
In-Vehicle Journey Time Reduction - Sea By Car 55 55 55 
Waiting Time Reduction - Sea By Car 30 30 30 
In-Vehicle Journey Time Reduction - Sea By Foot 153 174 197 
Waiting Time Reduction - Sea By Foot 15 15 15 
In-Vehicle Journey Time Reduction - Air -90 -69 -45 
Waiting Time Reduction - Air 60 60 60 
 
4.6.1.3 Passenger Time Saving 
 
Passenger time saving is calculated for passengers who used to use air and sea transport 
and now use Eurostar and Le Shuttle instead. Figure 33 shows the formula relations used in 
Table 14.  
 
For passengers without a car, the time saving is for the London to Paris/Brussels journey 
time by rail, in comparison to the former transport methods of rail-ferry-rail, coach-ferry-
coach and air services. The travel time savings for passengers with cars and coaches have 
been estimated in relation to the ferries. Each time saving is separated in journey time and 
waiting time. The waiting time reduction values are 2.5 times the journey time reduction 
(ITS, 2004). 
                                                 
2
 The negative value in the table means extra time for the trip. 
Table 13 : Journey Time Calculation 
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Following Anguera (2006) the assumptions for calculating time savings are: 
 
 Both Le Shuttle and Eurostar generated users’ benefit from time saving is half the 
value of the time savings because of rule of half. 
 The existing users of Le Shuttle are expected to have been directed from ferry 
services. 
 Eurostar business passengers are assumed to be 30% of the existing customers. All 
business users are assumed to be diverted from air services.  
 The other 70% of existing Eurostar customers are assumed to be leisure passengers 
and 50% of them are assumed to be diverted from air services and 50% from ferry 
services. 
Figure 33 : Eurotunnel Generated Passengers 
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 The generated traffic for Eurostar is assumed to be 50% from air and 50% from 
ferries. 
 The waiting time for the ferries and tunnels is assumed to be the same. 
 
Passenger Time Saving Formulas 
1 𝑇𝑆 = 𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆ℎ𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠 × 𝑆𝑒𝑎 𝐽𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑉𝑜𝑇𝐿𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 
2 𝑇𝑆 =
1
2
× 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑆ℎ𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠 × 𝑆𝑒𝑎 𝐽𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑉𝑜𝑇𝐿𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 
3 
𝑇𝑆 = 0.3 × 𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠 × [(𝐴𝑖𝑟 𝐽𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ (𝐴𝑖𝑟 𝑊𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 2.5)] × 𝑉𝑜𝑇𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 
4 
𝑇𝑆 =
1
2
× 0.7 × 𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠 × [(𝐴𝑖𝑟 𝐽𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ (𝐴𝑖𝑟 𝑊𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 2.5)] × 𝑉𝑜𝑇𝐿𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 
5 
𝑇𝑆 =
1
2
× 0.7 × 𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠 × [(𝑆𝑒𝑎 𝐽𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ (𝑆𝑒𝑎 𝑊𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 2.5)] × 𝑉𝑜𝑇𝐿𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 
6 
𝑇𝑆 =
1
2
× 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑆ℎ𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠 × [(𝑆𝑒𝑎 𝐽𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ (𝑆𝑒𝑎 𝑊𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 2.5)] × 𝑉𝑜𝑇𝐿𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 
7 
𝑇𝑆 =
1
2
× 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠 × [(𝐴𝑖𝑟 𝐽𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ (𝐴𝑖𝑟 𝑊𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 2.5)] × 𝑉𝑜𝑇𝐿𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 
 
It should be mentioned that the time reduction is underestimated because the ferry 
competitor assumed the shortest route from Dover to Calais. These assumptions will 
produce different and complicated formulas to calculate the travel time saving. The 
formulas are numbered the same as Figure 33. Ricard Anguera (2006) used similar 
formulas to find passenger time savings but he assumed that the generated passengers were 
20% for Le Shuttle and 30% for Eurostar, which in reality is not true. Firstly, this is 
because the number of generated passengers is different to these estimates for each year 
Table 14 : Passenger Time Saving Formulas 
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and secondly, the generated passengers will become existing traffic after a few years of 
operation and the generation of passenger is not continuous for all periods of the project. 
The trends in Figures 28 and 29 suggest traffic increases in every year and furthermore that 
these would have occurred even without the tunnel; but in some cases, the rate of that 
growth escalated, which resulted in generated traffic. Moreover, there are some differences 
between Anguera’s calculations and the calculations derived from Table 12 of the value of 
time, journey time’s values and the waiting time’s values. These differences have been 
discussed in their specific sections. Figure 34 shows the passenger time saving benefits 
resulting from the construction of the tunnel and they are adjusted to 2012 prices. As can 
be seen in the figure, the travel time saving increased in the first few years after 
construction of the tunnel and it became steady until 2006. The monetised value of time 
savings has continually risen since the start of operations, rising particularly sharply in 
2003 and 2007. 
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Figure 34 : Passenger Time Saving 
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4.6.1.4 Freight Time Savings 
 
The calculation of freight time saving is similar but simpler to passenger time saving. The 
Eurostar is not in the freight market and therefore just Le Shuttle and through rail services’ 
time savings will be calculated. For truck shuttle services, both truck driver and cargo time 
savings are calculated. Through rail freight time saving is only applied for cargo 
transported by the service. 
 
The time savings are only applied for the cross channel journey, which is in direct 
competition between sea transport and the tunnel. The calculation is underestimated 
because the chosen route for the ferries is the shortest route in the channel market. 
Formulas used in the calculation are numbered the same as Figure 35. 
 
 
 
Figure 35 : Eurotunnel Generated Freight 
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The formulas used are the same as Anguera’s (2006) framework but he assumed no 
generated passengers for freight, which is not true. As explained in Section 4.6.4 
(Generated Le Shuttle Freight), the freight market is all generated and also there is some 
generated market for ferries in some years as well. 
 
 
 Freight Time Saving Formulas 
1 𝑇𝑆 = 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘 × 𝑆𝑒𝑎 𝐽𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑉𝑜𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑 
2 𝑇𝑆 = 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘 × 𝑆𝑒𝑎 𝐽𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑉𝑜𝑇𝐷𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟 
3 𝑇𝑆 = 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 × 𝑆𝑒𝑎 𝐽𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑉𝑜𝑇𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝐵𝑢𝑙𝑘𝑡 
 
Figure 36 shows the freight time saving benefits resulting from the construction of the 
tunnel and it is adjusted to 2012 prices.  
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Table 15 : Freight Time Saving Formulas 
Figure 36 : Freight Time Saving 
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Now with all travel time saving calculations, it is possible to sketch the total time saving 
graph. The majority of the total of the travel time savings are for passenger travelling time. 
The reason for this is the high number of passengers using the service and also the greater 
journey time reduction in comparison to the freight services. Total time saving comparison 
can be seen in Figure 37. 
 
 
 
 Fare Reductions’ Savings 4.6.2
 
In a competitive market, the reduction in the price of a service or improving the quality of 
the service will increase the demand for that service or product. So the introduction of a 
new package into the competitive cross channel transport market will affect the market 
share and the usage of the existing services. The ferry services had had something of a 
monopolised cartel over the freight and car market for years and had been able to charge 
their customers more than the actual cost of their services. As demonstrated by the sudden 
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Figure 37 : Total Time Saving 
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reduction in ferry prices after tunnel opened. So the new option for the consumers with a 
better service, less journey time and a better price attracts them to change their operator 
and also attracts new customers as well. The following graph shows the effect of the new 
service added to the market and can be used to calculate the surpluses. 
 
 
  
The consumer surplus is produced when there is a difference between what a customer 
wants to pay for a product (willingness to pay) and the actual price that they pay. There is 
usually a difference between different users; some will benefit from a huge surplus and 
some will benefit less. The Figure 38 shows the consumer surplus as a result of the new 
supply of the Channel Tunnel. The advantages of the new service such as time savings, 
better price and availability will change the consumer’s behaviour. In this type of 
calculation, the surplus for users who used to use the service before (existing) but now 
Figure 38 : Surplus Calculation 
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enjoy the new advantages such as price, will gain the full value of the benefits; but the new 
customers that are using the service because of the new advantages (generated) will only 
benefit form half the total benefit because of the rule of half. Figure 38 shows the 
calculation of consumer benefits and producers’ loss. Note that there is no need to include 
the supply curve because the price is known already. The calculation of the average price 
used to calculate the surplus for each year is explained in Section 4.6.2.1.  
 
The horizontal axis is the actual number of journeys of the users and the vertical axis is the 
price of the service. The D0 line is the total demand for consumers using the cross channel 
transport market since the opening of the tunnel and the D1 line is the producers’ (ferry) 
demand after the tunnel construction. Before the Channel Tunnel was invited to the market 
the price that the consumer used to pay was P0 and the new lower price is P1. Due to the 
lower price of the service more customers will be attracted so the number of journeys will 
be more. The number of journey for ferries used to be J0 and because of the new demand 
will decrease and become J1. The number of journeys for the whole market will be J2. 
Therefore the ferry market will be 0 to J1, existing customers moving to the new tunnel 
service will be J1 to J0 and the generated customers will be J0 to J2. Furthermore, the yellow 
area will be the producer’s revenue, the green will be Eurotunnel’s gain and the red zone 
will be the consumers’ benefit. As can be seen, the generated consumer benefit is a triangle 
and will be half the value of the generated consumers multiplied by the price difference; 
this triangle will explain the rule of half. The black covered area in the red and green zone 
is the ferries’ loss because of the new service or can be called the producers’ loss. The 
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calculation of each area for the cross channel market will be analysed and discussed in the 
following related sections. 
 
4.6.2.1 Passenger Fare Reduction Benefit 
 
The average fares are calculated from Eurotunnel’s revenue and traffic data, as published 
by Eurotunnel in their annual reports. Revenue split data, numbers of trips per category and 
weighted averages (cars and coaches) have been used. Note that the ferries’ average fares 
have been assumed to be equal to those of the tunnel. Figure 39 shows the change of 
average fares in 2012 prices for all the operational years. 
 
 
 
The amount of passenger traffic has been discussed in Section 3.14. There are two types of 
passengers using the new service and those should be considered in order to calculate the 
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Figure 39 : Average Tunnel/Ferry Fare per vehicle 
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benefit resulting from the fare reduction for passengers. They are customers who are using 
coaches to cross the channel and those who use their own cars. The number of generated 
passengers (new customers) and the number of consumers who are changing their mode of 
transport to the tunnel (existing customers) are calculated in section 4.5.   
 
In addition, the rail-sea-rail and walking passengers are not calculated in this analysis 
because the connected service ceased before the tunnel operation and the walking 
passengers are neglected because of the very small amount that uses the service. Moreover, 
the passengers using air transport are neglected because there is no evidence to show the 
effect of the tunnel on air price and the price of air transport is very complicated (Anguera, 
2006).  
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Figure 40 : Total Passenger User Benefit 
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The average price reduction for each year from the start of operation is used to calculate 
the user benefit for existing consumers. The generated consumer benefit is half of the 
average price reduction multiplied by the number of new consumers for each year.  
Figure 40 shows the estimated passenger user benefits from the fare reduction in 2012 
prices. The amount of user benefits varies, but the drop after 1998 is because of the 
abolition of duty free; which increased the price of both the ferries and the tunnel. Another 
drop in 2000 was because of the recession, which occurred in that year and the number of 
trips decreased. 
 
4.6.2.2 Freight Fare Reduction Benefit 
 
The calculation of the consumers’ benefits was approached in the same manner as the 
passengers’ benefits, due to the fare reductions. The analysis just took unitised freight into 
account, due to the unavailability of data and the small size of through-rail market relative 
to unitised freight.  
 
The generated traffic calculation has been discussed in Section 4.6 and amounts to half the 
benefit because of the rule of half. 
3
 Note that Eurotunnel’s freight market after 1997 is 
generated traffic and calculated by the rule of half. Moreover, there is some generated 
                                                 
3
 Eurotunnel’s freight market after 1997 is generated traffic until 2011.  
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traffic carried by producers as well, because of the new reduced prices. The generated 
traffic carried by the ferries is using the benefit by rule of half as well. 
4
 
 
The result of unitised freight surplus is shown in Figure 41. The data of the benefits from 
the opening of the tunnel is highlighted. The freight market is mostly a business to business 
market and therefore very price sensitive. It is obvious that the opening of the new service 
helped the growth of the transport market. The calculation shows that as the market is 
growing every year, the benefit is growing with a good pace annually. It also shows how 
ferry operators used to use their monopolised cartel to increase the price in the market. If 
they could not compete with Eurotunnel they would have vanished from the market. 
 
 
                                                 
4
 Ferries (Producers) freight market has generated traffic from 1997 until 2011. 
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Figure 41 : Total Freight User Benefit 
 - 105 - 
 
 Producers’ Losses 4.6.3
 
Producer’s loss is the loss of the ferry operators as a result of the opening of the new 
transport service. The new service resulted in a loss of the producers’ customers and also 
forced them to reduce the fare in a price competition with the tunnel. Figure 42 shows the 
producers’ loss resulting from the opening of the tunnel. 
 
 
 
 CO2 Emission Savings 4.6.4
 
It is important in urban areas with a high population and vehicle density to reduce 
emissions of substances that can affect health and the environment. Every growing 
industry is required to lower the emissions from its industrial processes and improve 
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Figure 42 : Total Producers’ Losses 
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energy efficiency (Rail Transport and Environment, 2008). Moreover there is pressure 
from customers for green services including businesses using greener freight services. 
 
As a result the governments are trying to increase public transportation with fewer 
emissions and are trying to build green vehicles such as electric trains. This will result in 
taxing companies more every year and the effect on revenues will rise. Therefore the 
importance of green transport is going to grow every year.  
 
The estimated production of CO2 produced by the channel market transport companies is 
calculated. The following graphs show the differences between Eurotunnel production and 
the competitors. The CO2 savings are also calculated as if the Channel Tunnel had never 
been built. Unfortunately it is not easy to calculate the monetised savings of CO2 reduction, 
due to the inconsistency of the monetised effect of CO2 emissions in different research. 
The research shows different values for the cost of a carbon footprint, such as $5 to $100 
per tonnes of CO2 (Litterman, 2013); $25 per tonne (Morgenstern, 2002); $348 per tonne 
(Vandoren, 1999). 
 
The average CO2 emissions per person from travel by air is derived from the annual 
average CO2 emissions per person from London-Paris and London-Brussels flights and the 
proportion of passenger trips. The return trip emissions are calculated in the same way 
because the external factors affecting the emissions are negligible. The average CO2 
emissions for Eurostar are 14.6 Kg per trip (calculated from Eurostar’s website) and are 
split in a 50 percent proportion between London-Paris trip and London-Brussels. The 
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estimation of CO2 savings for Eurostar and the air travel market is calculated and is shown 
as Figure 43.  
 
 
 
 
As can be seen in Figure 43 the CO2 emissions are reduced every year after the tunnel 
construction. The tunnel CO2 saving line shows the saving is increasing every year 
compared to the market forecast without the tunnel. The estimated total savings until 2012 
for the Eurostar passenger market is 7.7 Mt of CO2 emissions. 
 
Average CO2 emissions per passengers on ferries (Dover-Calais) are estimated at 5Kg per 
passenger trip (Richard Hammond, 2007). Average CO2 emissions per passenger on Le 
Shuttle (Dover-Calais) are estimated at 4.4 Kg per passenger trip (UIC Ecopassenger 
website, 2014). The estimation of CO2 savings for the passenger shuttle and the ferry 
market are calculated and are shown in Figure 44.  
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As shown in Figure 44 the first few years of the shuttle operation caused more CO2 
production rather than savings until 2002, because of more generated passengers to the 
market and the number of existing ferry users. After that the savings start to build until the 
present. The total estimated savings of the shuttle passenger service is 85.6 Kt until 2012. 
 
Average CO2 emissions per truck on the ferries (Dover-Calais) are estimated at 158Kg per 
trip (Eurotunnel Carbon Counter). Average CO2 emissions per truck on the shuttle (Dover-
Calais) are estimated at 8.8 Kg per trip (Eurotunnel Carbon Counter). The estimation of 
CO2 savings for the freight shuttle and the ferry market are calculated and shown as Figure 
45. 
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Figure 45 shows that there is mostly production of CO2 emissions in the freight market due 
to the huge number of generated customers using the new freight services. The emissions’ 
saving line shows that although there are no savings now, as the market is steady and also 
more existing customers are going to use the new service, therefore the savings are going 
to be positive in the next few years. The total CO2 production because of the new service 
until 2012 is 6.9 Mt and it is increasing every year. 
 
4.6.4.1 CO2 Comparisons 
 
Figure 46 shows the estimated total emissions’ saving because of the operation of the 
tunnel. The saving increases every year on comparing it to the old monopolised market.  
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Figure 47 shows the amount of CO2 production by the tunnel’s competitor. As can be seen 
the air travel’s emissions are more than both the freight ferries’ and the passenger ferries’ 
emissions.  
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Figure 48 shows the comparison of emissions’ savings with the tunnel and the competitors’ 
emissions production annually. 
 
 
 
Unfortunately this huge amount of saving cannot be added to the user benefit because still 
there is no approved research to monetise the savings in emissions. 
 
 Total Users’ Benefits 4.6.5
 
Figure 49 shows the comparison of all unitised benefits because of the tunnel’s 
construction. As can be seen, passenger users’ benefit from fare reduction has the highest 
saving every year with the total benefit of £12.4 Billion. Freight time saving has the lowest 
saving of £230 million. Passengers’ travel time saving saved £ 3.2 Billion in total and 
freight users’ benefit from fare reduction saved £6.1 Billion. All savings are based on 2012 
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prices and calculated until 2012. It can be seen that the benefit of the fare reduction is 
almost 5.5 times the benefit of time savings. Due to the competitive nature of the market, 
this shows the impact of the opening of the tunnel was enough to break the monopolised 
cartel of the ferries in the cross channel market.  
 
 
 
4.7 Cost Benefit Analysis 
 
Channel Tunnel costs, revenues and benefits have been calculated and analysed. Therefore 
it is now appropriate to commence a transport cost benefit analysis and financial 
calculation to examine the project’s worth in the short and long term. The analysis is 
applied exclusively based in transport relations, with the scope of the study being narrowed 
to the direct supply costs concerned with the construction and operation of the rail link.  
The cost benefit analysis (CBA) has been applied to all transport terms such as time 
savings, fare reduction benefit and producers’ loss with the range of the study limited to 
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the direct supply costs including construction and operation of the new service. The CBA 
excludes the broader impacts such as environmental factors, employment, regional effects 
and energy savings, due to the unavailability of data. 
 
 Cost Benefit until Now 4.7.1
 
The cost benefit analysis neglects any financing costs (interest charges, etc). All figures are 
in 2012 prices and millions of pounds (£M). The figure below shows the costs, producers’ 
loss, benefits and the sum of them for each year in 2012 prices. As can be seen, after the 
operation of the tunnel from 1995, the benefit makes the total positive, although the 
producer’s loss hugely affects it as a negative factor. Now the effect of the construction 
cost should be calculated to see if the project is viable in the longer term. 
 
 
-4000
-3000
-2000
-1000
0
1000
2000
3000
1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
£
/1
0
6
 
Total Costs Total Benefits + Revenue
Total Producers' Loss Each Year Cost Benefit with Producers' Loss
Figure 50 : Cost Benefit until Now 
 - 114 - 
 
In addition the internal rate of return (IRR) is calculated until the year 2012. Moreover, the 
NPV and IRR have been calculated with and without the producer’s loss. The net present 
value (NPV) uses the discount factor of 3.5% from the HM Treasury Green Book (2003). 
In the sensitivity analysis section the other discount rate has been calculated as well.  
 
 Payback Period 4.7.2
 
The simplest way of looking at a project is the payback period method. The payback period 
method is easy to use, suitable for short-term decision making, suitable if returns are 
precise, but the income stream is not time related. The length of time taken to repay the 
initial capital cost is the result of this method.  
In the case of the Channel Tunnel the capital cost including British Rail’s investment, in 
2012 prices is £15.1 Billion and so the three plotted results are:  
 
 Pure Financial Profit of Each Year (Revenue – Operating Cost) 
 Financial Profit plus Benefits 
 Financial Profit plus Benefits minus Producers’ Loss. 
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The graph illustrates that the benefits help to show that the investment is more rational. 
The next figure shows the analysis of the payback period for each type of assumption. 
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Figure 52 : Payback Period Calculation 
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Figure 52 shows the huge investment costs relative to the revenue and benefits of the 
service. The payback 1 line (green) shows only the benefit from a financial point of view. 
It shows that the investment is not returned yet and the forecast of the payback period is 
the year 2040. The payback 2 line (red) shows all other monetised benefits added to the 
financial benefits. As can be seen, the return on the investment is in the year 2005 as the 
graph changes from negative to positive. The payback 3 line (blue) includes the producer’s 
loss as well. The trend of the line shows that the payback period is going to be in the year 
2018. 
 
 
 
 Net Present Value 4.7.3
 
NPV is defined as the sum of the present values (PVs) of the individual cash flows of the 
same unit. NPV gets rid of the changing value of money over time problem and allows 
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consideration of comparisons at different interest rates. NPV is useful for comparing 
similar projects with the same capital cost. Positive NPV is necessary for each project.  
 
In the case of the Channel Tunnel there are two timeframes to calculate the NPV. The first 
one is to consider just the actual operation of the tunnel until 2012 with real numbers to see 
if the tunnel is on track. The second considers the whole period of the contract with 
different assumptions on benefits. This is the main purpose of the analysis to see if the 
project is viable considering the same operation of the company through the period of the 
contract. 
 
4.7.3.1 NPV Short Term 
 
The short term NPV shows the net present value with real data for the actual operation of 
the project. The same three aspects as the payback period: pure financial profit of each year 
(revenue – operating cost); financial profit plus benefits and financial profit plus benefits 
minus producers’ loss will be considered for the NPV. 
 
The result of the NPV until 2012 for each type of consideration is in Table 16 below. 
 
NPV (Until 2012, 3.5% Discount Rate, 2012 Prices, £M) 
Pure Financial Profit of Each Year (Revenue – Operating Cost) -10526 
Financial Profit plus Benefits 1899 
Financial Profit plus Benefits minus Producers’ Loss -7043 
 
Table 16 : NPV until 2012 
 - 118 - 
 
Table 16 shows the differences from the assumptions are huge. For better understanding of 
the Channel Tunnel project’s viability and also in order to expand the data for the long 
term period, a yearly NPV is calculated as well. Figure 54 shows the NPV for each 
perspective in every year of the project’s operation. 
 
 
 
As can be seen in the figure, in the construction zone (years 1987 to 1994), the NPV 
reduces every year as the cost of the tunnel is added annually and no profit or benefit is 
generated. After 1994, this is the start of the operation, the slope of the graph changes to 
positive because of revenues and benefits being generating.  Just considering the revenues, 
the blue plot line shows that there are not any returns until 2012. In addition, the trend of 
this plot does not show a good positive slope to expect a good return soon. In the section 
concerning the long term NPV, the time will be forecast when the NPV of this perspective 
is going to be positive. Looking at the benefit added plot (red), the slope is quite good and 
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there is a good return every year and as can be seen in the graph, it is positive after 2010. 
The middle plot (green) is with the producer’s loss added and it does not have a return on 
the investment yet, but the trend is better than the first plot.  
 
4.7.3.2 NPV Long Term 
 
To be able to see when the project will have a return and also to compare the actual 
operating of the tunnel to the studies, the trend of the project should be calculated and then 
the NPV forecasted to the end of contract. Forecasting the NPV on a yearly basis will 
demonstrate a good trend of each perspective. To forecast the NPV the trend of the yearly 
cost benefit can be used and then it is possible to calculate the NPV of the forecast. The 
long term NPV on a yearly basis and a comparison to other studies is shown in Figure 55 
below. 
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As can be seen in the figure the “only financial” perspective (purple) is not reaching 
positive for the whole period of the contract. This is because of the huge capital cost of the 
tunnel so that the revenue coming from the operation is not enough to produce a return on 
the investment. The “plus benefit” perspective (blue) is in good shape and shows a huge 
NPV for the whole time of the contract. The “minus producers’ loss” perspective (green) is 
starting better and reaches the zero point before the end of the contract time in the year 
2042. It is the closest to the previous mentioned studies in Section 3.3 because of the 
chosen impacts. The final NPV of all types in 2086 are in Table 17 below.  
 
Forecasted NPV until the end of the contract 
 (Until 2086, 3.5% Discount Rate, 2012 Prices, £M) 
Pure Financial Profit of Each Year (Revenue – Operating Cost) -3254 
Financial Profit plus Benefits 35370 
Financial Profit plus Benefits minus Producers’ Loss 4771 
  
The figure shows the huge benefit for the customers for the whole period of the contract. 
The meaning of each perspective will be discussed later. 
 
 Internal Rate of Return 4.7.4
 
IRR is a rate of return to measure and compare different investments. It is the discount rate 
where the NPV is equal to zero. It is time value related and enables a comparison of 
projects with different values.  
 
Table 17 : NPV until the end of the contract 
 - 121 - 
 
In the case of the Channel Tunnel, the IRR needs to be calculated as well as the NPV. The 
NPV is a good comparison to see the profitability of same capital cost size projects; but it 
is bigger if the project is bigger. Therefore there is a need to calculate the IRR as well to 
complement the NPV and to be able to compare the project to other sized projects. 
The figure below shows the IRR calculation. The calculation until 2012 is from real data 
and afterwards is from the cost benefit forecast as explained in the long term NPV section. 
This figure shows the effect of time on IRR. 
 
 
 
Each point in the graph shows the calculation of the IRR from the start of construction 
until the year of that point. As can be seen, all three perspectives start negative because of 
the big capital cost, but as the operation continues the IRR gets better and it will settle on a 
number after different years of operation. Table 18 below shows the real IRR until 2012 
and the forecasted IRR until the end of the contract.  
-80.0%
-70.0%
-60.0%
-50.0%
-40.0%
-30.0%
-20.0%
-10.0%
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Just Revenue - Cost With Producers Loss Without Producers Loss Others
Figure 56 : IRR until the end of the contract 
 - 122 - 
 
 2012 2086 
Pure Financial Profit of Each Year (Revenue – Operating Cost) -6.9% 2.8% 
Financial Profit plus Benefits 4.6% 8.4% 
Financial Profit plus Benefits minus Producers’ Loss -2.3% 4.4% 
 
As is shown, all figures are positive in the long term, but these figures are not usually seen 
as a good return on an investment for a private company. The private sector usually invests 
in a project with an IRR of 12% or higher in the UK (Vecchi et al., 2012 and Anguera, 
2006). 
  
Table 18 : IRR Results 
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4.8 Ex post Financial Appraisal 
 
The “Pure Financial” perspective in the last section includes both capital cost of the project 
and also British Rail’s investment because of the Channel Tunnel. Therefore an actual 
financial appraisal for showing the return on investment for the private company of 
Eurotunnel can be calculated as well, to see if the extension of the contract helped to return 
enough profit for shareholders. Therefore the same calculation has been applied without 
the investment of British Rail and the results can be seen in Figure 57.  Note that all of the 
axes in this Section have been chosen the same for better visual comparison of the figures. 
The starting year is 1987 so as to match the start of construction. 
 
 
 
The long term NPV figure shows that the NPV will not be positive until the end of the 
contract; although it is closer than the figure based purely on the financial perspective. The 
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NPV in the year 2012 is £-8103 and in the year 2086 at the end of the contract is forecast at 
£-831. 
 
 
 
The IRR is a bit higher than the “pure financial” figure but is still not a good rate of return. 
The IRR in the year 2012 is -5.6% and in the year 2086 at the end of the contract is 
forecast at 3.3%. 
 
4.9 Subsidy Option 
 
In terms of financial appraisal for a private company the operation of the tunnel does not 
look like a viable project; although looking at the huge benefit for the consumers, the 
project looks really convincing for the government to invest. Therefore the assumption of a 
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full capital cost subsidy from the government is applied and the results can be seen as 
Figure 67 below. 
  
 
 
Figure 59 shows the NPV forecast without capital cost until the end of the contract. As can 
be seen, the operation of the tunnel is generating a good NPV value of £2874 M until 2012 
and the forecasted NPV until the end of the contract is £9591 M.  
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The IRR figure (Figure 60) is stable sooner than the other figures because there is no 
capital cost. The IRR until 2012 is 33.3% and is forecast at 33.5% at the end of the 
contract.   
 
4.10 Comparison 
 
The comparison between the historical users’ benefits and current results is quite difficult. 
There has been a lack of consistency in analysis in the past that makes it hard to compare 
the exact results. The lack of consistency in choosing the discount rate, appraisal periods, 
benefits’ and costs’ impacts shows the different approaches used by different groups to 
calculate the project’s benefits at different times. Moreover, the difficulties also increase 
with the way the results have been offered over the years. The next two tables show the 
differences between the previous studies and the most recent. An attempt has been made to 
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show the obvious differences and similarities in the best possible way. The first table 
(Table 19) summarises the result of the costs and benefits. The second table (Table 20) is 
focused on differences between the CBA results of the studies presented in NPV and IRR. 
Table 19 compares the impacts for the current analysis with the other studies. It also shows 
the differences in base year used for each analysis, proposed start year of the project, 
chosen discount rate, projected construction period, suggested operation period and the 
differences in anticipated end of contract used in studies. The comparison of the last result 
is more difficult but it is the base for calculation of NPV and IRR in the next table. 
 
Table 20 compares the NPV and IRR. The 2012 base year was used  for ease of 
comparison. The comparison shows the values from the other studies that are shown in 
Figures 55 and 56. It can be seen that although there are differences between the 
assumptions of the project and the studies had been conducted in different years but the 
value of IRR has been from 2.4% to 17.6% in the ex-ante studies.  The ex-post studies 
including the current analysis show the value of IRR for the long term from 4.4% to 8.4%. 
The NPV value is between £-3.3 Billion and £4.7 Billion in 2012 prices for ex ante studies. 
The ex-post studies including the current analysis show the value of NPV for long term 
from £4.7 Billion to £9.9 Billion but the ex post have used longer period of analysis and 
therefore larger NPV is produced. Note that assuming the same appraisal period for ex-post 
will produce negative NPV.  
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Studies Name MoT 
 (1963)  
 C&L 
 (1973)   
CTAG 
 (1975) 
DoT 
(1982)  
Anguera 
Thesis  
Anguera 
Paper  
Naghashian 
Scenarios Very High, 
Upper, Lower, 
Very Low 
Low-Forecast, 
Central-
Forecast 
Tunnel with Different 
Investment in Existing 
Services  
Scenario A 
Central B 
Scenario C 
Short & 
Long 
Term 
Short 
Term 
Short Term, 
Long Term, 
Without PL 
Comments  Just uk Share Just uk Share     
Base Year 1969 1973 1973 1981 2004 2004 2012 
Start Year 1963 1973 1975 1991 1987 1987 1987 
Discount Rate 7.0% 10.0% 10.0% 7.0% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 
Construction Period 5 7 5 11 7 7 7 
Operation Period 50 50 50 39 9 9 92 
End of Contract 2018 2030 2030 2041 2003 2003 2086 
End of Contract if starts at 1987 2042 2044 2042 2037 2003 2003 2086 
Channel Tunnel Costs - -158.4 - -2020 -10885 -10885 -15692 
-208 -159.5 -     
-199  -439     
-  -     
Capital Cost Avoided  129.9 136     
 156.1      
BR Investment Costs     -1784 -1784 -2423 
Channel Tunnel Benefits - 374.8 - - 6367 6333 20015 
362 518 - 2107 -   
273  387 -    
-  -     
Avoided Benefit/Cost  246.6 -194 1924    
 347.1      
Producers’ Losses  -99.9    -3669 -8942 
 -121.5      
Table 19 : Comparison with other studies 
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Studies Name Unit MoT  
(1963)  
 C&L 
(1973)   
CTAG  
(1975) 
DoT 
(1982)  
Anguera 
Thesis  
Anguera 
Paper  
Naghashian  
Scenarios  Very High, 
Upper, 
Lower, Very 
Low 
Low-
Forecast, 
Central-
Forecast 
Tunnel with Different 
Investment in  
Existing Services  
Scenario A 
Central B 
Scenario C 
Short 
Term, 
Long 
Term 
Short 
Term 
Short Term, 
Long Term, 
Long Term 
without PL 
Comments   Just UK 
Share 
Just UK Share     
Base Year  1969 1973 1973 1981 2004 2004 2012 
Start Year  1963 1973 1975 1991 1987 1987 1987 
Discount Rate  7.0% 10.0% 10.0% 7.0% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 
Construction Period  5 7 5 11 7 7 7 
Operation Period Years 50 50 50 39 9 9 92 
End of Contract  2018 2030 2030 2041 2003 2003 2086 
End of Contract if starts at 
1987 
1987 2042 2044 2042 2037 2003 2003 2086 
Net Present Value £ Million 
2012 Prices  
2593 1515 -297 4726 -8195 -13009 -7043 
2147 2989 61 282 9995   4771 
1031   860 -3431     35370 
153   1157        
IRR % 14.4% 14.6% 8.0% 12.3% -7.0% -26.8% -2.3% 
13.3% 17.6% 11.0% 7.3% 5.8%   4.4% 
10.4%   12.0% 2.4%     8.4% 
7.4%   14.0%        
Table 20 : NPV/IRR Comparison with other studies 
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4.11 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Uncertainty in cost benefit analysis can be assessed with a sensitivity analysis that 
demonstrates in what way results respond to the parameter changes.
 
Although a type of 
sensitivity analysis has been conducted in the previous sections (e.g. having every year’s 
NPV and IRR, using different scenarios), there is still a need to work on some other types 
of sensitivity to reduce the uncertainty of the analysis.  
 
 NPV-Discount Rate 4.11.1
 
With the intention of certifying that the discount rate used in the calculation is appropriate 
and is not exclusively accountable for the result of the analysis, the following sensitivity 
analysis is implemented. An “NPV-Discount rate” sensitivity analysis is beneficial where 
there is uncertainty over the discount rate. Although The Green Book offered 3.5% for 
short term calculations and 2.5% for long term, this can be used to improve the CBA 
robustness. Four discount rates are used with four different graphs to show the differences 
between the NPV values. The discount rates used are 2.5% and 3.5% as per DFT 
guidelines, 7% and 12% for comparison with old studies. Note that while having less effect 
on the capital costs a higher discount rate decreases the present value of benefits that are 
accrued over time (CBA Builder, 2011). 
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The sensitivity analysis shows the effect of discount rate on the NPV figures. The first 
graph with 2.5% discount rate shows a really good NPV figure for all perspectives. Even 
the “Pure Financial” perspective is positive at the end for this discount rate. This shows the 
effect of discount rate on present values is less and makes the graph more positive. The 
discount rate of 3.5% is shown as the second graph to compare the others to the actual 
calculation of the analysis. The third uses 7% as the discount rate. The only positive figure 
will be the benefit figure and the other two are showing negative NPV. The 10% discount 
rate affects greatly the present values of benefits and revenues. All graphs remained 
negative with this discount rate; although the 7% and 10% are not realistic, they show the 
risk of the project with different discount rate values.  
 
Figure 61 : Sensitivity Analysis on Discount rate 
2.5% 3.5% 
7.0% 12% 
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NPV-Discount Rate Sensitivity Analysis (End of Contract) 2.5% 3.5% 7% 10% 
Pure Financial Profit  1993 -3254 -8747 -9207 
Financial Profit plus Benefits 61469 35370 3989 -2525 
Financial Profit plus Benefits minus Producers’ Loss 13630 4771 -5594 -7376 
 
 
 Capacity 4.11.2
 
The quantity of trains or shuttles that can pass through the tunnel is limited. Therefore an 
analysis is needed to see if the current analysis has not overestimated the capacity of the 
tunnel. The capacity of the tunnel is analysed by calculating the quantity of standard trips 
per hour in each direction. The standard path defined by Eurotunnel is “the time it takes a 
shuttle train operating at 140 km/h to proceed over that portion of the system that, under 
normal operating condition, is used by all other trains using the tunnel”. Signalling is one 
of the important factors that change the capacity in a railway network. By 2012 the system 
authorizes 20 standard paths per hour in each direction. There are some differences 
between types of trains, but at peak times speed can be adjusted to increase the number of 
trains and shuttles to travel through the tunnel in each direction. Eurotunnel can use only 
50 % of the tunnel capacity by its current contract and therefore their maximum trips in 
2012 were 10 per hour in each direction. Eurotunnel suggests the following options to 
increase the tunnel capacity in the short term and long term future: 
 
 Choosing a uniform operating speed for all trains 
Table 21 : Discount Rate Sensitivity Analysis Result   
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This will allow more trains to run on the same number of standard paths. 
5
 The different 
operating speeds are increasing the intervals between trains and therefore reduce the 
capacity. 
 
 Increasing the power of the locomotive for shuttles 
This will increase the ability of each locomotive to pull a longer train. 
 
 Reducing the distance between trains 
Currently the distances between trains are 3 minutes. If the authorities reduce that to 2 
minutes and 30 seconds the capacity of the tunnel will increase to 24 paths per hour. 
 
 Improving the signalling system (Eurotunnel reference document 2012) 
 
The capacity of the tunnel needed for the current study uses the following formula:  
– Paths per Hour in each direction (PPH): 
 
𝑃𝑃𝐻 =
𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠,  𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑟 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑠 𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟
𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 × 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑎𝑦 × 𝑇𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙 𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(%) × 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠,  𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑟 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ × 2
 
 
 
The figure below shows the estimated capacity of the tunnel until 2012 and the forecast 
based on the CBA analysis until the end of the contract. The tunnel limits per hour are 20 
                                                 
5
 At the time of the registration document of 2012 by Eurotunnel, passenger trains could reach 160 km/h 
compared to freight trains that could travel at 100 to 120 km/h. (Eurotunnel reference document, 2012) 
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paths per hour in each direction at the moment and Eurotunnel limits per hour are 10 paths 
per hour in each direction. 
 
 
 
 
As can be seen in the figure, there is no need for improving the capacity until 2067 and the 
capacity needs to increase to 13 by the end of the contract; which is achievable by 
Eurotunnel’s suggestions, as discussed. Note that this is not the whole capacity of the 
tunnel because Eurotunnel can only use half of the tunnel’s capacity by the current 
contract. Also it is necessary to mention that there should be differences between peak 
times and off peak times, but this study assumed that Eurotunnel will manage that by using 
more paths for passengers in peak times and more freights paths in off peak. 
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Figure 62 : Capacity Calculations 
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4.12 Summaries 
 
Chapter 4 is concerned with the Cost Benefit Analysis of the Channel Tunnel. The 
calculation of generated traffic, user benefits, comparison with previous studies, payback 
period, net present value, internal rate of return, sensitivity analysis and the capacity of the 
tunnel have been part of the study. The comparison of different situations shows that the 
Channel Tunnel project could never have been economically viable for a private company. 
Even the longer period of the contract did not help because of the huge capital cost of the 
project. The Eurotunnel Company had to start thinking ‘outside the box’ by adding 
Europorte and the ‘My Ferry Link’ section to increase their revenue. On the other hand, the 
project is helping the economy because of its huge benefits. The results show that without 
considering the producer’s loss, the customers are the big winners in this competitive 
market. This market has given customers a choice of services, reduced prices for the 
service, reduced journey times, more environmentally friendly options, safety and a better 
quality of services because of the competition. Existing services such as the ferries are the 
losers in this situation. The significant amount of producer’s loss demonstrates this, but 
they have had a long run enjoying the monopolised cartel market before the tunnel opened. 
The other losers are Eurotunnel’s shareholders who lost money because of miscalculations 
of the project in terms of capital costs and traffic and revenue overestimation.  
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4.13 Conclusions 
 
The Channel Tunnel construction has been one of the big challenges of its time in terms of 
engineering, investment, financing and operation. This chapter explained the result of the 
project from different views and perspectives.    
 
The comparison of different situations shows that the Channel Tunnel project is not an 
economically viable project for a private company. Even the longer period of contract did 
not help because of the huge capital cost of the project. The Eurotunnel Company had to 
‘start thinking outside the box’ by adding Europorte and the ‘My Ferry Link’ section to 
increase their revenue. 
 
On the other hand, such a project is helping the British economy because of its huge 
benefits. The results show that without considering the producer’s loss, the customers are 
the big winners in this competitive market. This market gives customers the choice of 
services, reduced prices for the service, reduced journey times, more environment friendly 
options, safety, a better quality of services, because of the competition etc…  
 
Existing services such as ferries are the big losers in this situation. The big amount of 
producer’s loss proves this statement, but they have had such a long run enjoying the 
monopolised cartel market before the tunnel’s operation. Other losers are Eurotunnel 
shareholders who lost lots of money because of miscalculations of the project in terms of 
capital costs and traffic and revenue overestimation. The banks obtained their loan interest 
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from shareholders money when the shares reduced from £3.50 to £1.42 after 1 year of 
operation. Such events will reduce the publics’ trust in governments and can have 
important effects on the economy.  
 
Considering the full subsidy option, suggests that the Government finances the project 
instead of spreading the risk to the shareholders. The Government could finance the project 
with the high risks of investment and a big degree of uncertainty and then put the 
construction and operation in two different tenders.  
 
The project has been a piece of engineering but at an expensive cost. With all the problems 
after starting the operation, the Eurotunnel Company looks in a better shape now and the 
tunnel is working properly.   
 - 138 - 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
 
TOWARDS BETTER  
COST BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS 
 
 - 139 - 
 
5 TOWARDS BETTER COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The first task for a potential project is to check its feasibility. Performing a cost benefit 
analysis is important to any project. Performing a CBA means making a relative analysis 
of all the benefits expected from the project and also all the costs produced by the project. 
A CBA helps to choose whether to undertake a project or not. It structures the suitable 
project’s objectives and develops a ‘before and after’ measure of the project’s 
accomplishments. It also calculates the approximations of the resources needed to 
accomplish the project, the amount of risk of the project and the speed of returning the 
investment. As discussed in Section 2.12 although there are lots of cost benefit research 
and publications in the literature, a comprehensive ‘big picture framework’ is missing. The 
following suggested framework is a DFD base for all inclusive Cost Benefit Analyses of 
any project; based on the experience of the Channel Tunnel case study. The consideration 
for the flow chart (Figure 63) looks at ‘the big picture’ and making a CBA, a step by step 
procedure. 
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5.2 Generalised CBA Process Model 
 
To demonstrate the framework in the best way the DFD (Data Flow Diagram) technique 
has been used. DFD is an understandable, simple graphical method and beneficial as a 
communication system giving information to the users. The Gane-Sarson DFD method was 
used to demonstrate the CBA framework because their approach is one of the most 
common systems for organized analysis and design of a system since the late 1970s. Their 
technique is based on the construction of a logical framework of the system; by sketching 
graphical methods to allow users and designers to get a clear and mutual image of the 
system and understand in what way its different parts connect together to meet the user's 
requirements (IBM Website). The designed stages of the CBA considering the literature 
and experiment of the Channel Tunnel case study are: 
 
 Stage 0 - Project identification 
 Stage 1 - Setting the framework 
 Stage 2 - Technical analysis 
 Stage 3 - Economic evaluation 
 Stage 4 - Evaluation of results and decision making. 
 
Figure 63 shows the complete flow chart with the relationship between each stage. 
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Figure 63 : Generalised CBA Process Flowchart 
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5.3 Stage 0 – Project Identification 
 
To start the CBA process there is a need for project identification. This stage has been 
assumed as stage 0 because the actual cost benefit analysis has not started yet, but this 
stage is required for a CBA process. In this section the project goal (aim) and objectives 
are to be defined. The goal of the project is a high level statement that provides the general 
context for what the project is going to achieve. The objectives are lower level statements 
that describe the precise and tangible products and services that the project is going to 
provide.  
 
5.4 Stage 1 - Setting the Framework 
 
As can be seen in the Channel Tunnel case study the first stage of starting a CBA is setting 
the framework. Setting the framework includes the following and each one is explained 
later; bear in mind that to be able to set the framework the analyst needs to know the 
purpose of the CBA and to have an idea of the timeframe: 
 
 Decide whose cost and benefit, 
 Data collection, 
 Choose the appropriate tool for analysis of the project. 
 
Figure 64 is the DFD for this section. 
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1A 1B 1C
 
 
 
 Decide Perspective (1.16) - Whose Cost Benefit Analysis? 5.4.1
 
The perspective means deciding whose cost and benefit should be considered. The case of 
the Channel Tunnel showed that different perspectives play a huge part in cost benefit 
analyses. As a matter of fact, some events can be a benefit for one perspective and a cost to 
another. The analyst’s duty is to choose who has standings; this means whose benefit and 
costs must be calculated. Typically the perspective refers to the investor’s point of view, 
but sometimes a bigger perspective like the consumers’, the country’s, the regional or 
                                                 
6
 Note that these values are referring to the same value in DFD diagrams. 
Figure 64 : Stage 1 - Setting the Framework 
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global is used to attempt to substantiate’ here the viability of a project. An example is the 
environmental factors that are a consequence of global climate change. 
 
 Scoping Study (1.2) 5.4.2
 
The gathering of and measurement of information needed for the CBA should happen in 
this section. One of the main starting points of a CBA is finding the correct and 
comprehensive information needed. The accuracy of the data is really important. Note that 
a sensitivity analysis will be carried out for the unsure and assumed collected data for the 
ex-ante and in medias res.   
 
 Choose Level of Detail (1.3) 5.4.3
 
Brooks and Tobias (1996) have an extended paper on level of detail and complexity. The 
level of detail of a project, when applying it on a model, “usually means an assessment of 
the extent to which the observable system elements and the assumed system relationships 
are included in the model.” Of course the level of detail refers to the structure that the 
model symbolizes (for instance, in the case of the Channel Tunnel, the number of business 
travellers and leisure travellers, should be included in the model), instead of the exact way 
that the model is applied (for example just considering the train loads or differentiating 
between whether to consider the average mix or separate them, or the time frame). 
“Models are often described as being detailed; meaning that the model contains most of the 
elements and interactions thought to exist in the system being modelled” but “the trick is 
not simply to create an artificial copy of the system under study.” To be able to build a 
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framework for the study the analyst should be “motivated by wanting insight and 
understanding (rather than skill or expertise)”. Also the focus should be on “simplification 
and abstraction” rather than “just realism”. Additionally the analyst should pay more 
attention to the behaviour of the organization as a whole, rather than to that of its 
components. “In model building, we therefore need to take account very carefully of 
whatever connectedness and interactions are at play but without including absolutely 
everything.” (Brooks and Tobias, 1996) 
 
 Choose Tool(s) (1.4) 5.4.4
 
CBA tools have been explained in Section 2.8. The appropriate tool for the project type, 
period of construction, period of operation, sometimes the recommendations of the top 
management team (senior executives or even board members) are going to be chosen at 
this point. Note that sometimes some tools have been chosen to be able to compare the 
project with the alternative projects, because that project used a specific tool the analyst 
has to choose the same CBA tool as well.   
 
5.5 Stage 2 - Technical Analysis 
 
The next stage is Technical Analysis which includes: 
 
 Cataloguing the impacts 
 Forecasting 
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 Analysing the benefits. 
 
The DFD for this stage is as shown in Figure 65. 
 
2.1
Catalogue 
Impacts
Top Level Data
2.3
Analysis of 
Benefits
Impacts
Technical Data Data
2.2
Forecasting
Benefits
Forecasts
1C
2B2A
Level of Detail
1B
Chosen Analysis
 Tool(s)
1A
 
 
 Catalogue Impacts (2.1) 5.5.1
 
Cataloguing the impacts is listing the physical impacts as benefits or costs from the start of 
the project and specifying the unit of each impact. The impacts’ list depends on the project 
and it should be measurable. Usually impacts on people will be calculated. They should 
have a cause and effect relationship to project the outcome and they should not be too 
general. Note that some impacts can be a cost to some and a benefit to others. In addition 
the choice of measurement indicator depends on data availability and ease of monetization. 
Figure 65 : Stage 2 - Technical Analysis 
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This thesis’s case study is a railway project; therefore, the explanation of the impacts uses 
the same field as an example. As railways affect most sectors of society, it was considered 
that this general objective could be further specified from the following general 
viewpoints: economic, safety, ride, environmental impact, speed, reliability, resilience, 
socio-political factors etc. From the economic viewpoint, the main objective is the 
minimisation of the total transport costs. Therefore the project can be comparable to others 
and the operator can have a competitive fare. The main objective from the environmental 
viewpoint is the minimisation of all the unwanted effects on the environment caused by 
building and operations. Either engineers or social scientists have not sufficiently dealt 
with the socio-political impact of transport operation. Each factor can be in different 
categories of passenger, freight, infrastructure and vehicle. Note that some factors can be 
related to all types of transport modes.  
 
 Forecasting (2.2) 5.5.2
 
Forecasting is always difficult, supply-demand figures are generally unknown and this 
makes it tough to calculate a good estimation of the impacts. Generally it is more 
challenging to forecast impacts if the project has a long period of construction and 
operation or if the connections between variables are not simple; but to make good forecast 
the analyst should: 
 
• Analyse the operation data 
• Forecast current operation data to the end of the project’s life time 
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• Forecast benefits and costs  
• Forecast alternative data, costs and benefits. 
 
The difficulties are: 
 
• Different individual behaviour 
• Policy can have different effects on behaviour of third parties that can change the 
CBA and it is hard to predict. This is called the spill over effect in the literature 
(Boardman et al., 2001). 
• Scientific knowledge can be uncertain. 
 
 Analysis of the Benefits (2.3) 5.5.3
 
This step is to calculate the benefits of the project. The input of the impacts, forecasting 
and technical information of the project will enable the analyst to calculate the benefits and 
costs. This is not the end result of the benefit because it should go through the next stage to 
calculate the value of the benefit in time, considering the economic aspects of it. 
 
5.6 Stage 3 - Economic Evaluation 
 
The next stage is Economic Evaluation which includes: 
 
• Monetising and quantifying 
 - 149 - 
 
• Discounting 
• Cost Benefit Analysis. 
 
The DFD figure for this stage is shown as Figure 66 below. 
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Monetisation
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Benefits
3.2
Discounting
3.3
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Chosen Analysis
 Tool(s)
Economic Data
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1A2B2A
Investment & 
Operational Costs
3A
 
 
 Monetisation (3.1) - or Quantifying 5.6.1
 
Monetizing means attaching a money unit to all impacts (Pounds sterling in CT case). In a 
CBA, the value is calculated in terms of willingness to pay. Willingness to pay is explained 
Figure 66 : Stage 3 - Economic Evaluation 
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in Section 2.5. Several impacts are difficult to value in currency as they do not trade in 
markets (i.e. life, safety, time) and if no one is willing to pay for an impact then its value 
will be zero. In some CBA’s, a comparable way for non-monetised impacts will be 
produced as explained in Section 2.8. 
 
 Discounting (3.2) 5.6.2
 
After monetising all the benefits and costs, all the monetised values should be discounted 
to the present values. Investopedia explains discounting as “The process of determining the 
present value of a payment or a stream of payments that is to be received in the future. 
Given the time value of money, a dollar is worth more today than it would be worth 
tomorrow given its capacity to earn interest. Discounting is the method used to figure out 
how much these future payments are worth today” (Investopedia, 2014). The analyser 
should use discounting as practically everyone prefers to consume now rather than in the 
future (Caplan, 2005). There are different discounting methods in the literature and it has 
been discussed extensively in Section 2.7.1. Note that all the alternatives should use the 
same discounting value and methods for comparison. Usually the discount rate is 
instructed by a government agency accountable for economic and financial oversight for 
other agencies. 
 
 Cost Benefit Analysis (3.3) 5.6.3
 
Now that the analyser has everything in hand in the present value, the CBA should be 
performed. Therefore the analyser should calculate the net present value of the project as 
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the first step. NPV is usually the first step and the main result of a CBA, but it is not 
usually enough. The question that the decision maker is going to ask is “which of these 
many methods to apply in a CBA of large infrastructure projects?” Using the NPV brings 
up the question of the suitable discount rate. However, the NPV illustrates an effective 
technique to be used as it is both consistent and satisfactory. Although a CBA focuses just 
on either the mean or mode of the NPV, Barker and Button (1995) argued that it struggles 
to deliver sufficient evidence for an effective conclusion when there are big uncertainties 
for projects. On the other hand, there are some improvements to the NPV and IRR which 
makes them a better measure to compare projects in different situations. 
 
5.6.3.1 Net Present Value (NPV) 
 
As discussed in Section 2.7.1, the net present value (NPV) equals the present value of all 
benefits minus the present value of all costs:  
 
NPV = PV (B) – PV(C) 
 
The option with the biggest NPV illustrates a more capable allocation of resources at least; 
there is a need to mention that it is not the best allocation, because not all probable options 
are necessarily investigated in the CBA.  
The idea is the larger the NPV, the better the project is in which to invest; but there are 
some down sides, to which the analyzer should pay attention. Although net present 
value (NPV) analyses are beneficial when you are valuing investment opportunities, the 
process is by no means perfect. The first important disadvantage of the NPV is that the 
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bigger the investment equals the larger the NPV value. This means the comparison is only 
rational if the options have the same investment budget in hand, otherwise the other CBA 
tools should be used in order to compare projects with different investment needs. The 
second big disadvantage is that the NPV is hugely dependent on the discount rate, as seen 
in the case study. This makes a huge difference for different projects. Consequently, the 
NPV is suitable to value investments at an initial stage; however, it is not a conclusive 
result for the investor to be able to rely on for all investment judgments. On the other hand, 
there are some suggestions for improvements to the NPV which will be explained next 
(Sinha, 2008). 
 
To avoid the first problem - comparing projects with different initial investment, the 
recommendation is to compare the rate of NPV/Capital Cost. In this case this rate can be 
the measure for the comparison of the projects. To avoid the second problem - the 
sensitivity analysis for different discount rates is the solution. Also having an NPV graph 
can show the trend and slope of the NPV for all years of operation. A comparison of this 
graph can make the judgments a lot easier.  
 
5.6.3.2 Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 
 
As discussed in Section 2.7.2, there is another method that is irrelevant to the discount rate 
and calculates the speed of returning the investments: it is called the Internal Rate of 
Return (IRR). The Internal Rate of Return or Economic Rate of Return is the discount rate 
when the NPV becomes zero. 
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𝑁𝑃𝑉(𝐶𝐵) = ∑
𝐶𝐵𝑡
(1 + 𝑟)𝑡
= 0
𝑛
𝑡=0
 
 
• 𝑡 is the year of cost and benefits occurrence 
• 𝑟 is the rate of return 
• 𝐶𝐵𝑡 is the benefit or cost in year t 
• 𝑛 is the life time period of the project. 
 
The advantages of the IRR are that it is independent of the discount rate, inflation and 
interest rates and also can be used to compare projects with different start times and life 
times. 
 
The shortcoming of the IRR is that it might produce inconsistent results when related to the 
NPV. This problem will be solved by using the rate of NPV method as discussed 
previously. Also having an IRR graph for all years of operation can show the trend and 
slope of the IRR and that can make the comparison of projects a lot easier. Note that this 
method has been used in the Channel Tunnel case study. Another problem with the IRR is 
that some literature (e.g. Rousse, 2008) suggests that it should be used for projects with the 
same duration, but sketching the graph will solve the problem by showing the trends of 
each project and comparison will be made possible. 
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5.7 Stage 4 - Evaluation of Results 
 
The next stage is Evaluation of Results which includes: 
• Sensitivity analysis 
• Comparison between the alternatives. 
 
The DFD figure for this stage is as Figure 67 below. 
 
ROI, Payback, NPV, etc...
4.1
Sensitivity 
Analysis
4.2
Assessment of  
Alternatives
Sensitivity Result
Assesments
CBA Information 
from other projects
3A
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 67 : Stage 4 - Evaluation of Results 
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 Sensitivity Analysis (4.1) 5.7.1
 
Sociologists such as Ulrich Beck (1992) and Anthony Giddens (1990) have argued that in 
modern society, risk is increasingly playing a big part in human affairs. They say this 
‘risky society’ will fail in any aspect of life if does not take risk into account. 
“Sensitivity analysis is a way to predict the outcome of a decision if a situation turns out to 
be different compared to the key prediction(s)” (Investopedia, 2014). There is typically 
some uncertainty about projected impacts, the monetary calculations, forecast of the 
project etc. To make it clear for decision makers and the uncertainties’ effects on the CBA 
results, a sensitivity analysis should be performed.   
 
Two types of sensitivity should be performed in the CBA analysis: 
 
• When there is a level of uncertainty in one section the special sensitivity will be 
carried through that part to show the effect on the end result.   
• Making different scenarios to show the risk of the project at different situations in 
all sections. 
 
A sensitivity analysis can include approximately all variables and assumptions, but time 
and resource restrictions will pressure the analysts to pay attention to the most important. 
Note that the “level of detail” Section should clarify the need for sensitivity analysis items 
as well. 
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 Assessment of Alternatives (4.2) 5.7.2
 
To compare the alternatives fairly the included impacts should be the same. It can be said 
that the perspectives should be the same. They should all use the same CBA tools as well; 
otherwise the comparison will be impossible. The case of the Channel Tunnel showed that 
comparison of the studies was not possible because the different perspectives and chosen 
impacts.  
 
5.8 Stage 5 - Decision Making 
 
After the comparison the alternatives that pass the minimum requirement (eg. Standard 
minimum IRR for private company) for an investment will go through the decision making 
process. In its simple definition: 'Decision Making is the action of picking among two or 
more paths of actions'.  The decision making result is not perfect and the decision maker 
might have to have a better choice that is not considered, or the correct data might not have 
been accessible at the time but the best decision should be made with the information and 
alternatives available. Decision making necessity is getting the broadest information and 
analysing it at the quickest time (Harris, 1980). 
 
CBA models generally recommend the option with the best NPV, but also take into 
account the sensitivity analysis as well (Boardman, 2006). As shown in the Channel 
Tunnel case study, only considering the NPV is not enough. Also there are different 
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backgrounds of calculation of the NPV for different projects. The ‘must have item’ for 
choosing between the alternatives is the same approach and calculation for all options. 
 
With the proposed model the decision maker can compare the alternatives easily with a 
straight forward path. The new methods for the NPV and IRR can be used to show the 
better projected performance for all the alternatives. This will ease the calculation of the 
CBA and also the decision making process. 
 
5.9 Conclusions 
 
As explained in this chapter, although there are lots of cost benefit research and 
publications in the literature, a comprehensive ‘big picture’ CBA framework is missing. 
This chapter introduced a generalized cost benefit analysis model for large infrastructure 
projects. The suggested framework is a DFD base for all inclusive Cost Benefit Analyses 
of any projects; based on the experiment of the Channel Tunnel case study.  
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides the conclusions and summaries of the entire thesis. The objectives 
and research questions of the study are reviewed and the answers are summarised. In this 
chapter, the research recommendation for High Speed 2 is proposed. The thesis closes with 
recommendations for future works and the future adoption of the outcomes in practice.  
 
6.2 Research Conclusions  
 
CBA is a broad range of methodologies to help decision making for investment in projects 
before, in the middle and at the end of the operation to measure costs and benefits. This 
thesis presented a new methodology for a generalised cost benefit analysis process for 
large infrastructure projects. In order to achieve the new methodology a proper case study 
for the Channel Tunnel project has been chosen and the following objectives needed to be 
dealt with: 
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1. Review the use of the established concept for cost benefit analysis. 
2. Determine whether the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL) was justified; was it really 
on time and on budget; did it deliver the fare reductions and travel time savings? 
3. Present an improved methodology/framework for cost benefit analysis including 
hitherto neglected items.  
 
A summary of the findings and conclusions of the above objectives are as follows. 
 
 Review the Use of the Established Concept for Cost Benefit Analysis. 
 
The literature review chapter of the thesis explained about the current methods and process 
of cost benefit analysis and provided a comparison of different models and methods. 
Additionally, the reasons why most projects have cost overruns and delays have been 
identified. It has been explained why there is a need for a new comprehensive framework 
for a cost benefit model. 
 
 Determine Whether the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL) was justified; - was it really 
on time and on budget; did it deliver the fare reductions and travel time savings? 
 
The chosen case study was a CBA assessment of the Channel Tunnel, one of the biggest 
projects in the 20
th
 century between the UK and France. This thesis described the stormy 
history of the project from the fears of invasion the early 19
th
 century, when the idea came 
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to mind for the first time, to today’s concerns about financial viability, actual traffic and 
future forecasts.  
 
The Channel Tunnel project was completed successfully although the construction cost and 
deadlines were exceeded. Chapter 3 described the Channel Tunnel project, one of the 
biggest, if not the biggest self-financed project of the time. The escalation in costs and the 
delay resulting from the misjudgement of the challenges of getting the logistical support 
for the boring machines and the cost control; some changes which occurred in the terminal 
and with the fixed equipment plan; the complexity and shortcomings of the rolling stock 
specified and delivered by TML; the enhancement in safety, security and environmental 
requirements and the changing of regulations by the governments; all caused problems in 
the operation of the project. Moreover, the competitive nature of the cross channel market 
resulted in a reduction of prices charged by the ferry operators; Eurotunnel had not 
calculated for that in their estimations. This resulted in less than the forecasted traffic for 
the new services and therefore less than the forecasted revenue for the company. Having 
all these misjudgements and wrong calculations of the uncertainties, the question is - was 
the Channel Tunnel a viable project? The chapter went through the decision making 
complexities, construction challenges, financing issues etc. Additionally, the operation of 
the tunnel with the exact operational value of the traffic and a comparison of it with the 
channel market traffic; its revenue and its comparison with the forecasted revenue, were 
studied.  
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Chapter 4 basically went through the Cost Benefit Analysis of the Channel Tunnel. The 
calculation of generated traffic, user benefits, comparison to previous studies, payback 
period, net present value, internal rate of return, sensitivity analysis and the capacity of the 
tunnel have been part of the study. The comparison of different situations demonstrated 
that the Channel Tunnel project is not an economically viable project for a private 
company. Even the longer period of the contract did not help because of the huge capital 
cost of the project. The Eurotunnel Company had to start thinking ‘outside the box’ by 
adding Europorte and the ‘My Ferry Link’ section to increase their revenue. On the other 
hand, such a project is helping the economy because of its huge benefits. The results 
showed that without considering the producer’s loss, the customers are the big winners in 
this competitive market. This market has given the customers a choice of services, reduced 
prices for the service, reduced journey times, more environmentally friendly options, safety 
and a better quality of services because of the competition. Existing services such as the 
ferries are the big losers in this situation. The big amount of producer’s loss proved this 
statement but they have had such a long run enjoying the monopolised cartel market before 
the tunnel’s operation. Other losers are Eurotunnel shareholders who lost lots of money 
because of miscalculations of the project in terms of capital costs and traffic and revenue 
overestimation. The banks obtained their loan interest from shareholders money when the 
shares reduced from £3.50 to £1.42 after 1 year of operation. Such events will reduce the 
publics’ trust in governments and can have important effects on the economy. Considering 
the full subsidy option, suggests that the Government finances the project instead of 
spreading the risk to the shareholders. The Government could finance the project with the 
high risks of investment and a big degree of uncertainty and then put the construction and 
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operation in two different tenders. The project has been an outstanding piece of 
engineering but at great expense. With all the problems after starting the operation, the 
Eurotunnel Company looks in a better shape now and the tunnel is working properly.  
 
 Present an Improved Methodology/Framework for Cost Benefit Analysis including 
Hitherto Neglected Items.  
 
It is not an easy task to provide a response on whether a project is successful or 
unsuccessful. It is dependent on many factors such as perspective and timing. Nonetheless, 
it is also dependent on with what you compare it. Frequently there is a tendency to 
compare success with the anticipated outcomes; although, that speaks more about the 
anticipation rather than the success of the projects. Projects are different - but in what ways 
do they differ? Different frameworks and models have been recommended in this thesis for 
analysing differences among projects. Generally frameworks express the necessity to adapt 
project management to the situation (Söderlund, 2011). This thesis tried to gather all the 
aspects that are important for decision making in large infrastructure projects. Chapter 5, or 
the main results of this thesis, presented the new model. As clarified in the chapter, 
although there are lots of cost benefit research and publications in the literature, a 
comprehensive ‘big picture’ CBA framework was missing. This chapter introduced a 
generalized cost benefit analysis model for large infrastructure projects. The suggested 
framework is a DFD base for all inclusive Cost Benefit Analyses of any projects based on 
the experiment of the Channel Tunnel case study. The designed stages of the CBA 
considering the literature and experiments on the Channel Tunnel case study include: 
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project identification; setting the framework; technical analysis; economic evaluation; 
evaluation of results and decision making. Each section has its own DFD diagram with 
linked but separated subsections. Each subsection has been explained and the link to the 
next section is clarified.  
 
As noted throughout the thesis, effective cost benefit analysis models are helpful for 
improvement in project performance. The new model can, therefore, be used to assist 
promoters in their decision making of all large infrastructure projects. This finding could 
be used as a foundation for developing an appropriate decision making tool for different 
categories as well. 
 
6.3 Recommendation for High Speed 2 
 
The Channel Tunnel can be considered to have been beneficial to the economy l when 
including its benefits and long term of operation. Although it had its own ups and downs, 
generally it is a very long term project and future generations will continue to use it. The 
expansion of the tunnel route from different parts of the UK to different parts of Europe 
will increase the closeness of Britain to continental Europe and will help both economies. 
The project helped to break the monopoly of the ferry service and made the market 
competitive, which lowered the price of the cross-channel service. 
 
High Speed 2 is the plan for the extension of High Speed 1 from London to Birmingham 
and then Leeds and Manchester. Although the plan looks promising, the Government 
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should not repeat the mistakes of HS1 and the Channel Tunnel. The best option is to use 
the proposed generalised cost benefit analysis process model for large infrastructure 
projects. The forecasts (including cost, traffic, revenue etc.) should be as accurate as 
possible with an error factor in order to avoid overestimations. The project can increase the 
use of the other 50% of the tunnel and can compete with planes in the passenger market 
and even more in the freight market. The cost is another big factor which should not be as 
difficult as the Channel Tunnel to calculate because the uncertainties are not that great and 
similar projects have been handled previously.  
 
6.4 Contribution to Knowledge  
 
The significant concern in any doctoral study is an original contribution to knowledge. The 
difficulty is that the idea of originality might be arbitrary (Fellows and Liu, 1997). Walker 
(1997) recommended numerous originality examples; for instance, new methodology 
development, tools and/or techniques, new fields of investigation, new explanation of 
existing material and new application of current theories. Based on this definition, the 
contribution to knowledge for the current study can be regarded in respect of its direct 
influence and the future potential as/if additional work is carried out. 
 
It was realised from the literature review that a generalized CBA model for large 
infrastructure projects needs to be developed for the use of promoters, researchers etc. 
Whereas wide research on cost benefit in different industries has been commenced, it 
seems that no effort has focused on the comprehensive model of a CBA to highlight the 
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potential benefits that come from such research for investors, scientists and society as a 
whole. By paying attention to this specific gap, this research builds on the present 
knowledge of cost benefit analysis and highlights changes and different perspectives on the 
application of the present methods to a new area. Consequently, this demonstrates a major 
contribution to knowledge. A model has been proposed that can be useful for investors and 
researchers to calculate costs and benefits of a project systematically and that can be used 
for comparing different projects. The model will assist promoters to take proper measures, 
make appropriate decisions and allocate the resources necessary for projects. It can also be 
a base upon which to build comprehensive computer software for cost benefit analysis of 
large infrastructure projects. Some highlights of different contributions are as follows: 
 
 Channel Tunnel cost benefit analysis  
o Ex-post CBA 
o 2012 prices 
o Actual value calculations until 2012 
o CO2 emissions’ calculations 
o New proposed generated traffic calculations 
o New NPV figure calculation 
o New IRR figure calculation 
o New perspective on sensitivity analysis by comparing graphs of NPV with 
different discount rates 
o Comparisons to previous studies 
 New generalised cost benefit analysis model based on DFD 
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6.5 Future Work 
 
Based on the outcomes of the study and its limits, three recommendations are proposed to 
deliver a path for attempted future studies in this area as follows.  
 
1. Within the scope of this study, it was not possible to consider social costs and 
benefits such as environmental impacts, safety, effect on employment and energy 
savings. Future studies could helpfully be carried out in these mentioned areas. It is 
believed that these costs and benefits are noteworthy and can affect comparisons 
and future decision making; although, this needs additional data collection and 
research in each of the recommended areas. 
 
2. This study has revealed a significant analysis and conclusions of the costs and 
benefits of the Channel Tunnel project and High Speed 1, for decision making. It is 
recommended that further studies can be undertaken for High Speed 2 projects with 
the proposed model.  
 
3. The study can be advanced to develop generalised cost benefit analysis computer 
software.  
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APPENDIX A: Journey Time 
 
The calculated and estimated journey times and waiting times in minutes can be seen in 
Table below. 
 
Passenger Journey Time  1994 - 
2002 
2002 - 
2007 
2007 - 
2012 
Journey Time - Eurostar London-Paris Min 176 155 135 
Journey Time - Eurostar London-Brussels Min 161 140 111 
Journey Time - Eurostar London-Paris/Brussels Average Min 173 151 128 
Journey Time - Eurostar Dover-Calais Min 35 35 35 
Journey Time - Le Shuttle Dover-Calais Min 35 35 35 
Journey Time - Air London-Paris Min 85 85 85 
Journey Time - Air London-Brussels Min 75 75 75 
Journey Time - Air London-Paris/Brussels Average Min 82 82 83 
Journey Time - Coach London - Dover average Min 160 160 160 
Journey Time - Sea Dover-Calais Min 90 90 90 
Journey Time - Coach Calais-Paris est 130 130 130 
Journey Time - Coach Calais-Brussels est 130 130 130 
Waiting Time - Eurostar Min 60 60 60 
Waiting Time - Le Shuttle Min 30 30 30 
Waiting Time - Air est 120 120 120 
Waiting Time - Coach est 30 30 30 
Waiting Time - Sea est 60 60 60 
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APPENDIX B: Passenger Travel Time Saving Calculation 
 
Year  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Base Year 2012                    
Eurostar Passengers                     
Generated carried by Eurostar Millions 0.1 1.8 3.3 4.2 4.4 4.6 4.8 4.0 3.5 2.8 3.5 3.0 3.2 3.1 3.4 2.9 2.8 2.9 2.8 
Existing Eurostar Millions 0.0 0.9 1.6 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.3 3.0 3.1 3.5 3.8 4.4 4.7 5.1 5.8 6.3 6.7 6.8 7.1 
Business (Estimate) 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.1 
Leisure (Estimate)  0.0 0.7 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.6 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.7 3.1 3.3 3.6 4.0 4.4 4.7 4.8 5.0 
Shuttle Passengers                     
Passenger Generated carried by shuttle Millions 0.2 3.4 7.4 8.6 10.9 8.0 4.2 2.9 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Passenger Existing Shuttle Millions 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.0 1.2 3.0 5.7 6.5 6.7 8.6 7.8 8.2 7.8 7.9 7.0 6.9 7.5 10.3 10.1 
Value of time per passenger                      
Value of Time per Person - Leisure (£/hr) 2012 4.8 5.0 5.2 5.3 5.5 5.7 5.8 5.9 6.1 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.5 6.3 6.2 5.9 5.7 
Value of Time per Person - Business (£/hr) 2012 33.2 34.0 35.5 36.5 37.4 38.9 39.7 40.7 42.1 43.2 44.1 44.4 45.3 45.6 44.9 43.2 42.7 40.3 38.8 
Travel Time Saving                     
Diverted from Air Service to Eurostar                     
In vehicle added  min -90 -90 -90 -91 -91 -91 -90 -90 -90 -69 -69 -69 -68 -46 -46 -45 -45 -45 -45 
Waiting time min 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Existing Business Passengers  0.0 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.1 
Existing Business Passengers Benefit/Loss per crossing                     
in vehicle added penalty £ -49.9 -51.1 -53.4 -55.2 -56.6 -58.9 -59.9 -61.2 -63.0 -49.4 -50.4 -50.8 -51.7 -34.9 -34.2 -32.8 -32.3 -30.3 -29.3 
waiting time saved benefit £ 33.2 34.0 35.5 36.5 37.4 38.9 39.7 40.7 42.1 43.2 44.1 44.4 45.3 45.6 44.9 43.2 42.7 40.3 38.8 
Net journey time benefit/loss per crossing £ -16.6 -17.1 -18.0 -18.7 -19.2 -20.0 -20.2 -20.4 -20.9 -6.2 -6.3 -6.4 -6.4 10.7 10.6 10.5 10.5 10.0 9.4 
(3) Total Existing Eurostar business passengers from Air 
Annual benefit/loss 
£/10^6 0.0 -4.8 -8.4 -9.9 -10.8 -12.2 -13.8 -18.3 -19.3 -6.5 -7.3 -8.5 -9.0 16.5 18.4 19.8 21.2 20.4 20.1 
Existing Leisure Passengers  0.0 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.5 
Existing Leisure Passengers benefit/loss per crossing                                                                                                                                  
In vehicle added penalty £ -7.3 -7.5 -7.8 -8.1 -8.3 -8.6 -8.7 -8.9 -9.2 -7.2 -7.4 -7.4 -7.5 -5.1 -5.0 -4.8 -4.7 -4.4 -4.3 
waiting time saved benefit £ 12.1 12.4 12.9 13.3 13.6 14.2 14.5 14.9 15.4 15.8 16.1 16.2 16.5 16.6 16.4 15.8 15.6 14.7 14.1 
Net journey time benefit/loss per crossing £ 4.8 4.9 5.1 5.3 5.4 5.6 5.7 5.9 6.2 8.5 8.7 8.8 9.0 11.5 11.4 11.0 10.9 10.3 9.9 
(4) Total Existing Eurostar Leisure passengers from Air 
annual benefit/loss 
£/10^6 0.0 1.6 2.8 3.2 3.5 4.0 4.6 6.2 6.6 10.5 11.7 13.5 14.7 20.8 22.9 24.3 25.7 24.4 24.6 
Diverted from Sea service to Eurostar                     
In vehicle added  min 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 
Waiting time min 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
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Leisure Passengers  0.0 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.5 
Leisure Passengers benefit/loss per crossing                     
in vehicle saved benefit £ 4.4 4.5 4.7 4.9 5.0 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.6 5.8 5.9 5.9 6.1 6.1 6.0 5.8 5.7 5.4 5.2 
waiting time saved benefit £ 6.1 6.2 6.5 6.7 6.8 7.1 7.2 7.4 7.7 7.9 8.0 8.1 8.3 8.3 8.2 7.9 7.8 7.4 7.1 
Net journey time benefit/loss per crossing £ 10.5 10.7 11.2 11.5 11.8 12.3 12.5 12.9 13.3 13.7 13.9 14.0 14.3 14.4 14.2 13.7 13.5 12.7 12.2 
(5) Total Existing Eurostar Leisure passengers from Sea 
annual benefit/loss 
£/10^6 0.0 3.5 6.1 7.1 7.8 8.7 10.0 13.4 14.3 16.7 18.7 21.6 23.5 26.0 28.6 30.2 31.9 30.3 30.5 
Eurostar Generated passengers  0.1 1.8 3.3 4.2 4.4 4.6 4.8 4.0 3.5 2.8 3.5 3.0 3.2 3.1 3.4 2.9 2.8 2.9 2.8 
(6) Eurostar Generated passengers as if from Air £/10^6 0.1 2.2 4.2 5.6 6.0 6.4 7.0 5.9 5.4 6.0 7.5 6.7 7.1 9.0 9.5 8.0 7.6 7.4 6.9 
(7) Eurostar Generated passengers as if from Sea £/10^6 0.3 4.7 9.3 12.3 13.1 14.0 15.2 12.8 11.7 9.6 12.0 10.7 11.3 11.2 11.9 9.9 9.4 9.2 8.6 
(6,7) Eurostar Generated passengers annual benefit/loss 
(1/2 benefit from rule of half) 
£/10^6 0.5 6.9 13.5 17.9 19.1 20.4 22.2 18.6 17.2 15.7 19.5 17.4 18.4 20.2 21.4 17.9 17.0 16.6 15.4 
Diverted from sea services to the Shuttle                     
In vehicle added  min 152 152 152 153 153 153 153 153 153 174 174 174 174 197 197 197 197 197 197 
Waiting time min 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
All are Leisure Passengers                     
Leisure Passengers benefit/loss per crossing                     
in vehicle time saved benefit £ 12.3 12.6 13.1 13.6 13.9 14.4 14.7 15.1 15.7 18.3 18.6 18.8 19.2 21.8 21.5 20.7 20.5 19.3 18.6 
Existing Shuttle Passengers  0.0 1.0 0.5 0.0 1.2 3.0 5.7 6.5 6.7 8.6 7.8 8.2 7.8 7.9 7.0 6.9 7.5 10.3 10.1 
(1) Existing Shuttle passengers annual benefit/loss £/10^6 0.0 12.4 6.4 0.0 17.2 43.5 83.5 98.4 104.5 157.2 145.4 154.1 149.7 172.4 150.3 142.9 153.6 199.5 187.4 
Shuttle Generated passengers  0.2 3.4 7.4 8.6 10.9 8.0 4.2 2.9 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(2) Generated Shuttle passengers annual benefit/loss (1/2 
benefit from rule of half) 
£/10^6 1.2 21.5 48.7 58.3 75.4 57.7 31.2 21.9 15.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
All Leisure Passengers Annual Benefit/Loss £/10^6 1.2 33.9 55.1 58.3 92.6 101.2 114.7 120.3 119.6 157.2 145.4 154.1 149.7 172.4 150.3 142.9 153.6 199.5 187.4 
Total Travel Time Savings                     
Passengers diverted from Air to Eurostar                     
Business £/10^6 0.0 -4.8 -8.4 -9.9 -10.8 -12.2 -13.8 -18.3 -19.3 -6.5 -7.3 -8.5 -9.0 16.5 18.4 19.8 21.2 20.4 20.1 
Leisure £/10^6 0.0 1.6 2.8 3.2 3.5 4.0 4.6 6.2 6.6 10.5 11.7 13.5 14.7 20.8 22.9 24.3 25.7 24.4 24.6 
Total diverted from Air £/10^6 0.0 -3.2 -5.6 -6.6 -7.3 -8.2 -9.2 -12.1 -12.7 3.9 4.4 5.0 5.8 37.3 41.3 44.1 46.9 44.8 44.7 
Passenger diverted from Sea to Eurostar                     
Leisure £/10^6 0.0 3.5 6.1 7.1 7.8 8.7 10.0 13.4 14.3 16.7 18.7 21.6 23.5 26.0 28.6 30.2 31.9 30.3 30.5 
Passenger diverted from Sea to Shuttle                     
Leisure £/10^6 0.0 12.4 6.4 0.0 17.2 43.5 83.5 98.4 104.5 157.2 145.4 154.1 149.7 172.4 150.3 142.9 153.6 199.5 187.4 
Total diverted from Sea £/10^6 0.0 15.9 12.5 7.1 25.0 52.3 93.6 111.9 118.8 173.9 164.1 175.7 173.2 198.4 178.9 173.1 185.5 229.7 217.9 
(6,7) Eurostar Generated passengers annual benefit/loss 
(1/2 benefit from rule of half) 
£/10^6 0.5 6.9 13.5 17.9 19.1 20.4 22.2 18.6 17.2 15.7 19.5 17.4 18.4 20.2 21.4 17.9 17.0 16.6 15.4 
(2) Generated Shuttle passengers annual benefit/loss (1/2 
benefit from rule of half) 
£/10^6 1.2 21.5 48.7 58.3 75.4 57.7 31.2 21.9 15.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total Passenger Generated £/10^6 1.7 28.4 62.2 76.1 94.5 78.1 53.3 40.5 32.3 15.7 19.5 17.4 18.4 20.2 21.4 17.9 17.0 16.6 15.4 
Total Passenger Travel Time Savings   £/10^6 1.7 41.1 69.1 76.6 112.2 122.2 137.7 140.3 138.4 193.5 188.0 198.1 197.4 255.9 241.6 235.2 249.4 291.2 278.0 
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APPENDIX C: Freight Travel Time Saving Calculation 
Year Unit 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Base Year 2012                    
Number of Lorries on Shuttle (CT)  0.1 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.3 0.8 1.1 1.3 1.5 
Generated Le shuttle  0.0 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.3 0.8 1.1 1.3 1.5 
Existing Le shuttle  0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Through Rail Freight (Tonnes)  0.5 1.3 2.4 2.9 3.1 2.9 2.9 2.4 1.5 1.7 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.2 
£/hr per Truck Load  £/hr 15.2 16.5 17.0 17.5 18.1 18.7 19.1 20.8 20.3 20.9 21.7 21.4 22.0 22.1 18.9 20.9 20.7 19.5 18.5 
£/hr for Working Lorry Driver  £/hr 9.2 9.4 9.8 10.1 10.3 10.7 10.9 11.2 11.6 11.9 12.1 12.2 12.5 12.6 12.4 11.9 11.8 11.1 10.7 
£/hr per Tonne of Non-bulk Freight  £/hr 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 
Values for Travel Time Saving (minutes)                     
Lorries on Shuttle min 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Through Rail Services min 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Benefit per Crossing (per lorry crossing on shuttles)                     
From Cargo £ 7.6 8.2 8.5 8.7 9.1 9.4 9.5 10.4 10.2 10.4 10.9 10.7 11.0 11.0 9.4 10.5 10.4 9.7 9.2 
From Driver £ 4.6 4.7 4.9 5.0 5.2 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.8 5.9 6.1 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.2 6.0 5.9 5.6 5.3 
Per Tonne on Through Rail Services £ 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 
Total Travel Time Savings - Freight Carried in Lorries on Shuttles                     
Cargo Benefits from Generated  0.0 0.8 1.1 1.1 3.2 3.9 5.4 5.9 6.1 6.7 7.0 7.0 7.1 7.8 5.9 4.0 5.6 6.1 6.8 
Cargo Benefits from Existing  0.5 1.6 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 
Total Cargo Benefits  million £ 0.5 2.4 3.3 1.1 3.2 3.9 5.4 5.9 6.1 6.7 7.0 7.0 7.1 7.8 5.9 4.0 5.6 6.1 8.0 
Driver Benefits from Generated  0.0 0.9 1.3 1.3 3.6 4.5 6.2 6.4 6.9 7.6 7.8 8.0 8.1 8.9 7.7 4.6 6.4 7.0 7.8 
Driver Benefits from Existing  0.3 0.9 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 
Total Driver Benefits million £ 0.3 1.8 2.5 1.3 3.6 4.5 6.2 6.4 6.9 7.6 7.8 8.0 8.1 8.9 7.7 4.6 6.4 7.0 8.5 
Subtotal Shuttle Benefits million £ 0.8 4.2 5.8 2.4 6.8 8.4 11.6 12.2 13.0 14.4 14.7 15.0 15.2 16.7 13.7 8.6 12.1 13.2 16.6 
Freight Carried on Through Rail Services                     
Benefits million £ 0.3 0.9 1.6 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.2 1.8 1.1 1.4 1.5 1.2 1.2 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7 
Total Freight Travel Time Saving  million £ 1.1 5.1 7.3 4.4 9.0 10.5 13.8 14.1 14.2 15.8 16.2 16.2 16.4 17.6 14.5 9.4 12.8 14.0 17.3 
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APPENDIX D: Passenger User Benefit from Fare Reduction Calculation 
 
Year Unit Before 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Base Year 2012                     
Accompanied traffic                      
Number of cars on 
Dover Straits 
Million  3.23 2.89 3.05 3.56 3.30 3.00 2.59 2.55 2.63 2.58 2.51 2.55 2.65 2.84 2.83 2.78 2.82 2.65 2.40 
Number of cars on 
Shuttle 
Million  0.08 1.23 2.08 2.32 3.35 3.26 2.78 2.53 2.34 2.28 2.28 2.01 2.02 2.14 1.91 1.92 2.13 2.26 2.42 
Total channel car 
passenger market 
  3.32 4.13 5.13 5.88 6.65 6.26 5.38 5.08 4.97 4.86 4.79 4.56 4.67 4.98 4.74 4.69 4.94 4.92 4.82 
Generated Cars   0.43 1.09 1.94 2.53 3.16 2.62 1.58 1.13 0.86 0.61 0.38 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Existing Cars   2.89 3.04 3.19 3.34 3.50 3.65 3.80 3.95 4.10 4.26 4.41 4.56 4.67 4.86 4.74 4.69 4.94 4.92 4.82 
Number of coaches on 
Dover Straits  
Million  0.16 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 
Number of coaches in 
Shuttle 
Million  0.00 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 
Total channel coach 
passenger market 
  0.16 0.18 0.21 0.24 0.22 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
Generated Coaches   0.01 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Existing Coaches   0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
Average Tunnel/ferry 
fare per vehicle 
2012 194.4 0.00 70.39 53.71 46.87 45.68 59.98 71.64 82.79 88.90 62.29 43.65 48.10 56.35 51.04 70.38 78.69 51.27 40.57 33.06 
Benefit to existing Car 
passengers 
  561.71 377.15 449.25 493.49 520.04 490.44 466.54 441.11 432.98 562.27 664.48 667.06 644.57 697.21 587.64 542.95 707.68 756.32 778.53 
Benefit to existing 
Coaches passengers  
  28.58 18.75 21.85 23.53 24.33 22.55 21.10 19.65 19.01 24.36 28.42 24.95 25.27 24.47 19.05 15.71 20.40 21.70 23.11 
Total Existing traffic 
benefit 
  590.29 395.90 471.10 517.01 544.37 512.99 487.65 460.76 452.00 586.63 692.90 692.02 669.84 721.68 606.69 558.66 728.09 778.02 801.64 
Benefit to generated 
Car passengers  
  41.44 67.33 136.42 186.85 234.65 175.79 96.92 63.23 45.61 39.98 28.53 0.43 0.00 8.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Benefit to generated 
Coach passengers 
  0.98 1.89 3.96 5.57 4.47 4.60 2.85 1.71 1.97 0.85 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total Generated traffic 
benefit 
  42.42 69.22 140.38 192.42 239.12 180.39 99.77 64.94 47.58 40.83 29.43 0.43 0.00 8.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total annual benefits   632.70 465.12 611.48 709.44 783.49 693.39 587.41 525.70 499.58 627.47 722.34 692.45 669.84 730.03 606.69 558.66 728.09 778.02 801.64 
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APPENDIX E: Freight User Benefit from Fare Reduction Calculation 
 
Year Unit Before 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Base Year 2012                     
Number of units 
through the port of 
Dover 
Million  1.16 1.08 1.07 1.60 1.52 1.67 1.62 1.77 1.85 1.78 1.98 2.05 2.32 2.36 2.31 2.30 2.09 2.07 1.95 
Number of units on 
the shuttle 
Million  0.07 0.39 0.52 0.26 0.70 0.84 1.13 1.13 1.20 1.28 1.28 1.31 1.30 1.41 1.25 0.77 1.09 1.26 1.46 
Total unit of freight 
on the channel 
Million  1.22 1.47 1.59 1.86 2.23 2.51 2.75 2.90 3.05 3.07 3.26 3.35 3.62 3.78 3.56 3.07 3.18 3.33 3.42 
Average ferry/tunnel 
fare per unit 
£ 360.74 286.04 273.04 222.33 240.54 222.33 235.34 215.83 192.43 204.13 208.03 209.33 209.33 209.33 209.33 209.33 209.33 209.33 209.33 209.33 
Benefit to existing 
customer 
£ Million  91.35 111.50 182.64 164.40 195.95 183.57 219.10 262.58 251.85 252.93 258.06 265.34 272.62 279.90 287.19 294.47 301.75 313.40 295.56 
Generated Freight £ Million  0.00 0.20 0.27 0.49 0.81 1.04 1.24 1.34 1.44 1.41 1.56 1.60 1.82 1.93 1.67 1.12 1.19 1.29 1.33 
Benefit to Generated 
customer 
£ Million  0.00 8.56 18.75 29.51 56.18 65.39 89.78 113.18 113.05 107.77 117.90 121.29 137.80 146.08 126.07 85.15 89.90 97.82 100.52 
Total Unitised Freight 
benefit 
£ Million  91.35 120.07 201.39 193.91 252.13 248.96 308.88 375.75 364.91 360.69 375.96 386.63 410.42 425.98 413.25 379.62 391.65 411.22 396.08 
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APPENDIX F: Passenger Producers’ Loss Calculation 
 
Year Unit Before 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 2012                     
Number of cars on 
Dover Straits 
Million  3.23 2.89 3.05 3.56 3.30 3.00 2.59 2.55 2.63 2.58 2.51 2.55 2.65 2.84 2.83 2.78 2.82 2.65 2.40 
Number of cars on 
Shuttle 
Million  0.08 1.23 2.08 2.32 3.35 3.26 2.78 2.53 2.34 2.28 2.28 2.01 2.02 2.14 1.91 1.92 2.13 2.26 2.42 
Total channel car 
passenger market 
Million  3.32 4.13 5.13 5.88 6.65 6.26 5.38 5.08 4.97 4.86 4.79 4.56 4.67 4.98 4.74 4.69 4.94 4.92 4.82 
Generated Cars Million  0.43 1.09 1.94 2.53 3.16 2.62 1.58 1.13 0.86 0.61 0.38 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Existing Cars Million  2.89 3.04 3.19 3.34 3.50 3.65 3.80 3.95 4.10 4.26 4.41 4.56 4.67 4.86 4.74 4.69 4.94 4.92 4.82 
Number of coaches on 
Dover Straits  
Million  0.16 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 
Number of coaches in 
Shuttle 
Million  0.00 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 
Total channel coach 
passenger market 
Million  0.16 0.18 0.21 0.24 0.22 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
Generated Coaches Million  0.01 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Existing Coaches Million  0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
Average Tunnel/ferry 
fare per vehicle 
£ 194.42 - 70.39 53.71 46.87 45.68 59.98 71.64 82.79 88.90 62.29 43.65 48.10 56.35 51.04 70.38 78.69 51.27 40.57 33.06 
Car Producers Benefit  
Without Tunnel 
£ Million  561.71 591.22 620.74 650.25 679.76 709.27 738.79 768.30 797.81 827.32 856.84 886.35 907.66 945.37 921.09 912.17 961.13 955.74 938.03 
Car Producers Benefit 
After Tunnel 
£ Million  0.00 203.71 164.07 166.78 150.76 180.15 185.90 211.54 234.01 160.79 109.40 122.88 149.17 144.82 199.20 218.39 144.49 107.63 79.35 
Ferry Producer's loss 
on Cars 
£ Million  561.71 387.51 456.67 483.47 529.00 529.12 552.88 556.76 563.80 666.53 747.43 763.47 758.49 800.56 721.89 693.78 816.64 848.12 858.67 
Coach Producers 
Benefit  Without 
Tunnel 
£ Million  28.58 29.39 30.19 31.00 31.81 32.61 33.42 34.23 35.03 35.84 36.65 33.16 35.59 33.18 29.86 26.39 27.71 27.42 27.84 
Coach Producers 
Benefit  After Tunnel 
£ Million  0.00 11.13 8.25 7.73 7.02 9.40 10.62 11.32 13.12 7.80 5.61 5.17 5.96 5.38 6.89 6.39 4.41 3.45 2.78 
Coach Producers Loss £ Million  28.58 18.25 21.94 23.27 24.79 23.21 22.80 22.91 21.92 28.04 31.04 27.98 29.63 27.80 22.98 20.00 23.30 23.97 25.06 
Passenger Producers 
Loss 
£ Million  0.00 405.76 478.61 506.73 553.78 552.33 575.68 579.67 585.72 694.57 778.47 791.45 788.11 828.36 744.87 713.78 839.94 872.09 883.73 
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APPENDIX G: Freight Producers’ Loss Calculation 
 
Year Unit Before 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Base Year 2012                     
                      
Number of units 
through the port of 
Dover 
Million  1.16 1.08 1.07 1.60 1.52 1.67 1.62 1.77 1.85 1.78 1.98 2.05 2.32 2.36 2.31 2.30 2.09 2.07 1.95 
Number of units on 
the shuttle 
Million  0.07 0.39 0.52 0.26 0.70 0.84 1.13 1.13 1.20 1.28 1.28 1.31 1.30 1.41 1.25 0.77 1.09 1.26 1.46 
Total unit of freight 
on the channel 
Million  1.22 1.47 1.59 1.86 2.23 2.51 2.75 2.90 3.05 3.07 3.26 3.35 3.62 3.78 3.56 3.07 3.18 3.33 3.42 
Generated Freight Million  0.00 0.20 0.27 0.49 0.81 1.04 1.24 1.34 1.44 1.41 1.56 1.60 1.82 1.93 1.67 1.12 1.19 1.29 1.33 
Existing Freight Million  1.22 1.27 1.32 1.37 1.42 1.46 1.51 1.56 1.61 1.66 1.70 1.75 1.80 1.85 1.90 1.94 1.99 2.04 2.09 
Average ferry/tunnel 
fare per unit 
£ 360.74 286.04 273.04 222.33 240.54 222.33 235.34 215.83 192.43 204.13 208.03 209.33 209.33 209.33 209.33 209.33 209.33 209.33 209.33 209.33 
Freight Producers 
Benefit  Without 
Tunnel 
£ Million  441.19 458.68 476.03 493.38 510.73 528.08 545.44 562.79 580.14 597.49 614.84 632.19 649.55 666.90 684.25 701.60 718.95 736.30 753.65 
Freight Producers 
Benefit After Tunnel 
£ Million  331.24 293.78 238.25 385.55 338.60 392.53 349.26 340.95 378.51 370.89 414.62 428.27 486.61 494.78 483.10 481.56 437.82 433.31 408.65 
Freight Producers loss £ Million  109.94 164.89 237.78 107.83 172.13 135.56 196.18 221.83 201.63 226.60 200.22 203.93 162.93 172.12 201.15 220.04 281.13 303.00 345.01 
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APPENDIX H: CO2 Emissions Saving Result 
 
Year  1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total Air CO2 
Emissions 
kg 413 414 472 527 586 620 568 647 663 728 635 587 602 621 635 623 547 559 529 516 470 458 426 371 322 292 316 306 
Total Passenger 
Ferry  CO2 Emissions 
kg 69 72 70 62 75 78 80 90 92 96 89 95 107 97 91 81 80 82 73 72 67 69 71 69 65 66 64 60 
Total Freight Ferry 
CO2 Emissions 
kg 115 124 128 124 155 158 156 168 175 183 170 169 253 241 264 256 280 293 282 313 323 367 373 365 363 330 327 308 
Total Competitors 
CO2 Emissions 
kg 597 610 671 712 816 856 804 904 930 1007 894 851 963 959 990 960 907 935 885 901 860 894 870 805 751 689 707 674 
                              
Total Eurostar CO2 
Emissions 
kg          2 39 71 88 92 96 104 101 96 92 106 109 115 121 133 135 139 141 145 
Total Passenger 
Shuttle CO2 
Emissions 
kg          1 19 35 38 53 48 44 41 38 38 34 36 34 35 31 30 33 45 44 
Total Freight Shuttle 
CO2 Emissions 
kg          1 3 5 2 6 7 10 10 11 11 11 12 11 12 11 7 10 11 13 
Total Tunnel CO2 
Emissions 
kg          3 62 110 128 152 152 158 153 145 141 152 156 160 168 175 172 182 198 202 
                              
Eurostar CO2 
Emissions Saving  
kg          -20 70 119 120 130 145 182 294 319 387 419 496 535 595 670 750 808 815 855 
Passenger Shuttle 
CO2 Emissions 
Saving  
kg          -5 -14 -32 -44 -47 -33 -15 -9 -4 8 16 22 25 25 34 41 41 34 42 
Freight Shuttle CO2 
Emissions Saving  
kg          -1 17 24 -50 -34 -51 -38 -54 -60 -42 -66 -69 -105 -105 -87 -74 -36 -27 -2 
Total Tunnel CO2 
Emissions Saving 
Kg          -26 72 110 25 49 61 129 231 255 352 369 449 454 515 617 717 814 823 895 
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APPENDIX I: Cost Benefit Analysis (Short Term, 3.5% Discount Rate, £Million) 
 
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Resource cost of the 
Channel Link 
                         
Construction -1567.5 -1567.5 -1473.4 -1341.6 -1341.6 -1341.6 -335.5                   
Inland Infrastructure -278.0 -278.0 -246.6 -203.0 -203.0 -203.0 -50.7                   
Rolling Stock 0.0 0.0 -211.8 -508.4 -508.4 -508.4 -127.0  -52.0   -78.0  -78.0            
Subtotal initial capital 
costs 
-1845.5 -1845.5 -1931.8 -2052.9 -2052.9 -2052.9 -513.2  -52.0   -78.0  -78.0            
Subtotal operating cost 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -676.8 -598.9 -562.6 -495.7 -495.8 -445.4 -362.6 -339.3 -340.5 -359.3 -340.2 -306.2 -285.0 -274.5 -304.0 -320.1 -372.1 -405.4 -456.9 
Total Tunnel cost -1845.5 -1845.5 -1931.8 -2052.9 -2052.9 -2052.9 -1190.0 -598.9 -614.6 -495.7 -495.8 -523.4 -362.6 -417.3 -340.5 -359.3 -340.2 -306.2 -285.0 -274.5 -304.0 -320.1 -372.1 -405.4 -456.9 
BR investments                          
Total other costs (BR 
investments) 
-13.6 -59.0 -342.6 -636.3 -913.1 -888.4                    
Total Costs -1859.1 -1904.5 -2274.5 -2689.2 -2966.0 -2941.3 -1190.0 -598.9 -614.6 -495.7 -495.8 -523.4 -362.6 -417.3 -340.5 -359.3 -340.2 -306.2 -285.0 -274.5 -304.0 -320.1 -372.1 -405.4 -456.9 
Tunnel Revenue                          
LE SHUTTLE       18.5 195.1 230.1 173.5 313.0 397.7 449.0 433.3 458.4 413.7 370.8 373.7 389.6 408.8 400.7 316.2 339.8 358.5 388.7 
RAILWAYS       20.5 216.9 315.1 326.8 316.8 315.5 296.5 295.6 299.4 310.6 304.1 296.8 293.7 214.0 241.0 253.9 244.5 250.3 232.2 
Non transport Activities              38.0 27.7 33.5 24.7 14.2 12.1       
Other Revenue       12.5 74.1 167.1 202.7 291.3 206.9 81.2       10.8 12.3 9.8 9.0 8.8 10.5 
Euro Porte                       90.8 141.9 170.3 
Total Revenue       51.5 486.1 712.2 703.1 921.1 920.2 826.7 766.8 785.5 757.8 699.7 684.7 695.5 633.6 654.0 579.8 684.2 759.6 801.8 
Travel time savings                          
Passenger travel time 
savings 
      1.7 41.1 69.1 76.6 112.2 122.2 137.7 140.3 138.4 193.5 188.0 198.1 197.4 255.9 241.6 235.2 249.4 291.2 278.0 
Freight travel time 
savings 
      1.1 5.1 7.3 4.4 9.0 10.5 13.8 14.1 14.2 15.8 16.2 16.2 16.4 17.6 14.5 9.4 12.8 14.0 17.3 
Subtotal travel time 
savings 
      2.8 46.2 76.5 81.0 121.2 132.7 151.5 154.4 152.6 209.2 204.2 214.3 213.7 273.5 256.1 244.6 262.2 305.1 295.3 
Consumer surplus                          
Consumer surplus-
accompanied 
passengers 
      632.7 465.1 611.5 709.4 783.5 693.4 587.4 525.7 499.6 627.5 722.3 692.4 669.8 730.0 606.7 558.7 728.1 778.0 801.6 
Consumer surplus-
unitised freight 
      91.4 120.1 201.4 193.9 252.1 249.0 308.9 375.8 364.9 360.7 376.0 386.6 410.4 426.0 413.3 379.6 391.7 411.2 396.1 
Subtotal consumer 
surplus 
      724.1 585.2 812.9 903.3 1035.6 942.3 896.3 901.5 864.5 988.2 1098.3 1079.1 1080.3 1156.0 1019.9 938.3 1119.7 1189.2 1197.7 
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Subtotal benefits       726.8 631.4 889.3 984.3 1156.8 1075.0 1047.8 1055.8 1017.1 1197.4 1302.5 1293.4 1294.0 1429.5 1276.1 1182.9 1381.9 1494.4 1493.1 
Total Benefits + 
Revenue 
      778.4 1117.5 1601.6 1687.4 2078.0 1995.2 1874.5 1822.7 1802.6 1955.2 2002.2 1978.0 1989.5 2063.1 1930.1 1762.6 2066.1 2254.0 2294.8 
Producer's Loss                          
Passenger       0.0 -405.8 -478.6 -506.7 -553.8 -552.3 -575.7 -579.7 -585.7 -694.6 -778.5 -791.4 -788.1 -828.4 -744.9 -713.8 -839.9 -872.1 -883.7 
Freight       -142.9 -214.4 -309.2 -140.2 -223.8 -176.3 -255.1 -288.4 -262.2 -294.6 -260.3 -265.1 -211.8 -223.8 -261.5 -286.1 -365.5 -394.0 -448.6 
Total Producers' Loss       -142.9 -620.2 -787.8 -646.9 -777.6 -728.6 -830.8 -868.1 -847.9 -989.2 -1038.8 -1056.6 -1000.0 -1052.2 -1006.4 -999.9 -1205.5 -1266.0 -1332.3 
Each Year Cost Benefit 
with Producers' Loss 
-1859 -1905 -2274 -2689 -2966 -2941 -555 -102 199 545 805 743 681 537 614 607 623 615 705 736 620 443 489 582 506 
                          
Year by Year NPV With 
Producers Loss 
-1796 -3574 -5626 -7969 -10466 -12859 -13295 -13372 -13226 -12840 -12289 -11797 -11361 -11029 -10663 -10313 -9966 -9634 -9268 -8898 -8597 -8389 -8168 -7913 -7699 
IRR With Producers 
Loss 
        -70% -45% -32% -25% -20% -17% -15% -12% -11% -9% -8% -6% -5% -5% -4% -4% -3% 
Year by Year NPV 
Without Producers Loss 
-1796 -3574 -5626 -7969 -10466 -12859 -13183 -12789 -12065 -11220 -10136 -9162 -8195 -7327 -6454 -5534 -4608 -3708 -2821 -1923 -1133 -456 312 1121 1899 
IRR Without Producers 
Loss 
       -69% -43% -29% -19% -14% -10% -7% -5% -3% -1% 0% 1% 2% 3% 3% 4% 4% 5% 
Year by Year NPV Just 
Revenue - Cost 
-1796 -3574 -5626 -7969 -10466 -12859 -13754 -13840 -13768 -13621 -13330 -13067 -12770 -12554 -12289 -12059 -11859 -11655 -11441 -11261 -11091 -10969 -10828 -10672 -10526 
IRR Just Revenue - Cost         -80% -58% -42% -34% -27% -24% -20% -17% -16% -14% -12% -11% -10% -9% -8% -8% -7% 
Year by Year NPV 
Financial Appraisal 
-1783 -3506 -5248 -7037 -8766 -10436 -11331 -11416 -11345 -11198 -10906 -10644 -10347 -10131 -9865 -9636 -9435 -9232 -9018 -8838 -8668 -8546 -8404 -8249 -8103 
IRR Financial Appraisal         -79% -56% -39% -31% -25% -21% -18% -15% -14% -12% -10% -9% -8% -8% -7% -6% -6% 
Year by Year NPV Full 
Subsidy 
0 0 0 0 0 0 -491 -577 -467 -320 -29 285 582 846 1112 1342 1542 1746 1959 2140 2310 2431 2573 2728 2874 
IRR Full Subsidy         -59% -26% 2% 15% 22% 26% 29% 30% 31% 32% 32% 33% 33% 33% 33% 33% 33% 
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APPENDIX J: Cost Benefit Analysis (Long Term, 3.5% Discount Rate, £Million) 
 
 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060 2065 2070 2075 2080 2085 
With Producers Loss                    
CB With Producers Loss -102 681 615 489 689 748 808 867 926 986 1045 1104 1163 1223 1282 1341 1401 1460 1519 
Cumulative CB With Producers Loss -15291 -12318 -9321 -6329 -3209 414 4333 8550 13062 17872 22977 28379 34078 40073 46365 52953 59838 67019 74497 
NPV for each year with Producer's Loss -77 436 331 221 263 240 219 197 178 159 142 126 112 99 88 77 68 60 52 
Year by Year NPV With Producers Loss -13372 -11361 -9634 -8168 -6896 -5649 -4513 -3484 -2556 -1724 -980 -317 272 793 1254 1660 2018 2332 2607 
IRR With Producers Loss  -20.2% -9.0% -4.2% -1.6% 0.2% 1.3% 2.0% 2.5% 2.9% 3.2% 3.4% 3.6% 3.7% 3.8% 3.9% 3.9% 4.0% 4.0% 
Without Producers Loss                    
CB Without Producers Loss 519 1512 1672 1694 2044 2281 2518 2754 2991 3228 3464 3701 3938 4174 4411 4648 4884 5121 5358 
Cumulative CB Without Producers Loss -14528 -7783 14 8270 17948 28880 40996 54295 68777 84442 101291 119323 138538 158937 180519 203284 227232 252364 278679 
NPV for each year without Producer's Loss 394 967 900 768 780 733 681 627 574 521 471 424 380 339 301 267 237 209 184 
Year by Year NPV Without Producers Loss -12789 -8195 -3708 312 4265 8027 11538 14784 17759 20470 22925 25137 27122 28896 30476 31880 33124 34222 35191 
IRR Without Producers Loss -69.4% -9.8% 0.0% 3.7% 5.6% 6.7% 7.3% 7.7% 7.9% 8.1% 8.2% 8.3% 8.3% 8.4% 8.4% 8.4% 8.4% 8.4% 8.4% 
Just Revenue - Cost                    
CB Just Revenue - Cost -113 464 378 312 442 494 546 598 650 702 754 806 858 910 962 1014 1066 1118 1170 
Cumulative CB Just Revenue - Cost -15886 -14295 -12364 -10672 -8679 -6313 -3688 -803 2342 5748 9413 13339 17524 21970 26675 31641 36867 42353 48098 
NPV for each year Just Revenue - Cost -86 297 204 141 169 159 148 136 125 113 103 92 83 74 66 58 52 46 40 
Year by Year NPV Just Revenue - Cost -13840 -12770 -11655 -10828 -10015 -9201 -8441 -7737 -7090 -6501 -5967 -5485 -5053 -4666 -4322 -4016 -3744 -3504 -3293 
IRR Just Revenue - Cost  -27.3% -13.8% -8.4% -4.9% -2.7% -1.2% -0.2% 0.5% 1.1% 1.5% 1.8% 2.0% 2.2% 2.4% 2.5% 2.6% 2.7% 2.8% 
Financial Appraisal                    
CB Financial Appraisal -113 464 378 312 442 494 546 598 650 702 754 806 858 910 962 1014 1066 1118 1170 
Cumulative CB Financial Appraisal -13033 -11442 -9511 -7819 -5826 -3460 -835 2050 5196 8601 12266 16192 20377 24823 29529 34494 39720 45206 50951 
NPV for each year Financial Appraisal -86 297 204 141 169 159 148 136 125 113 103 92 83 74 66 58 52 46 40 
Year by Year NPV Financial Appraisal -11416 -10347 -9232 -8404 -7592 -6778 -6017 -5313 -4667 -4078 -3544 -3062 -2630 -2243 -1899 -1592 -1321 -1081 -870 
IRR Financial Appraisal  -24.9% -12.0% -7.0% -3.7% -1.7% -0.3% 0.6% 1.3% 1.8% 2.1% 2.4% 2.6% 2.8% 2.9% 3.1% 3.2% 3.2% 3.3% 
Full Subsidy                    
CB Full Subsidy -113 464 378 312 431 474 516 558 601 643 685 728 770 812 855 897 939 982 1024 
Cumulative Full Subsidy -738 983 2992 4684 6651 8934 11429 14135 17053 20183 23525 27078 30843 34820 39008 43409 48021 52845 57880 
NPV for each year Full Subsidy -86 297 204 141 165 152 140 127 115 104 93 83 74 66 58 52 46 40 35 
Year by Year NPV Full Subsidy -577 582 1746 2573 3375 4161 4884 5544 6144 6686 7172 7608 7997 8343 8650 8921 9161 9372 9557 
IRR Full Subsidy  22.2% 31.8% 33.1% 33.4% 33.5% 33.5% 33.5% 33.5% 33.5% 33.5% 33.5% 33.5% 33.5% 33.5% 33.5% 33.5% 33.5% 33.5% 
 
